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ABSTRACT 
 
This research contributes to an understanding of Japanese Foreign Investment (JFDI) in Poland, 
by using a Variety of Capitalism approach and drawing on literature from employment 
relations. It examines firstly, the extent to which Japanese production and managerial 
institutions and practices can be transplanted to different economic and cultural environments; 
and secondly, the character of workers’ response towards these practices, in the context of JFDI 
in Poland. It draws on primary data drawn from interviews conducted with the managers and 
workers in five firms in a Japanese electronics manufacturing cluster in Toruń, Northern 
Poland, as well as the policy makers, researchers and journalists on a regional level. First, the 
transfer of Japanese management ‘style’ is considered in terms of recruitment, training 
practices, issues of monitoring and discipline and quality assurance policies. This study reveals 
that the transfer of Japanese typical practices is of minor importance to Japanese corporations 
based in Poland, and the character of these practices in the Polish workplace is peripheral. 
However, the subordination of labour is brought by the precarisation of employment, rather 
than the implementation of Japanese quality policies. Second, the focus of the research is on 
the response of workers and finds that they did not remain passive actors in this process and 
resisted the adapted form of Japanisation in Poland. Although the role of formal trade unions 
was limited, the data pointed to other forms of resistance, both conventional and novel, from 
sabotage, absenteeism, humour to insubordination and the use of blogging sites. In the context 
of the researched labour process, the empirical findings point to markers of collectivism in all 
forms of worker resistance and hence identified that the collective worker not only has not 
disappeared from both the labour process debate and the workplace itself, but, even if not 
evidently, is present through the resistance to management practices and control.    
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management transfer, workers’ resistance, collectivism  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation and context 
 
12 April 2006 is a date so significant in Toruń’s (Northeast Poland) modern history, it even has 
a mention in Wikipedia. The day itself was no different to any other April day. The town was 
basking in the early spring sun, which was still not quite powerful enough to kill the coldness 
of the morning. Students were rushing for their classes, a busy crowd of bargain hunting 
shoppers was strolling down the high street; children were at school, and parents were at work. 
Only the journalists suddenly appeared in large numbers outside the Governor’s Office, and 
while setting up their gear, kept checking their watches nervously.  At the same time Sharp’s 
chairman and CEO, Mr Katsuhiko Machida, was just leaving the Prime Minister’s office in 
Warsaw, heading up north to confirm the new location for the firm’s investment. For several 
weeks the press had speculated on Toruń as a potential location for Japanese investment. The 
promised day had come – the decision-maker himself was to visit the nearby village of 
Ostaszewo, where the Crystal Park was to be built. 
The limousine parked just outside the Province Governor’s Office in the town of Toruń. Mr 
Machida was greeted with honours by the governor, Waldemar Achramowicz, in his office. 
They took a walk through the UNESCO listed gothic Old Town. Finally, the CEO and his 
entourage travelled to Ostaszewo, a small village located on the northern outskirts of Toruń, 
five miles from the centre of the town. 
Ostaszewo, a former collective farm, shared the fate of many other communist era state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and was dissolved in the early 1990s leaving its employees out of work with 
nothing but a hopeless future to look forward to. East Asian corporations were to re-shape the 
whole Toruń region. Along with other Japanese contractors, Sharp was promising to employ 
up to 10,000 workers. Such investment would change the rural landscape – visually, 
economically and socially. Mr Machida found Ostaszewo an excellent location for a new Sharp 
factory. His acceptance gave the green light to the investment. 
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It appears that Toruń (with Ostaszewo) attracted the Japanese predominantly by its good 
transportation links (North-South axis); its proximity to Warsaw and the ports of Gdansk and 
Gdynia; as well as the labour market structure (relatively high unemployment). Shortly after 
the Japanese had successfully conducted their ‘landing operation’ (as one of the local papers 
metaphorically put it) in Toruń, Sharp attracted other giants: Orion, Sumika (part of 
Sumitomo), Tokai Okaya; as well as logistics companies such as NYK and Nissin, creating 
one of the biggest greenfield investments and the biggest electronic clusters in the country. 
‘The corporate troops’ – a few hundred Japanese managers and engineers moved to Toruń. 
It was commonly believed that the Japanese were also captivated by Toruń itself and fell in 
love with the vibrant university town; its medieval Teutonic appearance, steeples, spires and 
gothic brick arches. Not all of the Japanese managers were however infatuated with the 
‘peripheral’ city, and many decided to commute from Warsaw. In 2009 Toruń was listed as the 
12th best city in Poland to live in by Przekrój, the opinion magazine. At the same time Toruń 
had a shameful record of being the most indebted city in Poland with its municipal debt almost 
ten times higher than Warsaw’s. 
Having spent six years (between 2000 and 2006) - studying and working in Toruń – I slowly 
felt I belonged there and my concern with the town’s future became entwined with a worry 
about the job prospects myself and my fellow students would face after graduating. Like most 
of the dwellers, I have followed the hope of the Japanese ‘miracle’ the town was gossiping 
about. Everyone seemed excited about the idea of Japanese investment in Toruń. It would 
tackle unemployment, bring jobs, prosperity and happiness to the town. Toruń is a very 
attractive place to study, but a far less attractive place to work - in terms of job opportunities – 
and only very few graduates decide to stay after graduating. Sharing the fate of other cities, 
Toruń was severely hit by unemployment (15 per cent), when industry restructuring came along 
in the 1990s. A number of new investments, chiefly in the retail sector, did not compensate for 
the bankruptcy of the champion socialist factories. It was not surprising that for many of my 
friends from university, Crystal Park seemed to be almost their salvation. The town itself, 
where the university was the biggest employer, started to change. Toruń wanted to welcome 
the Japanese in the best way it could and make some money at the same time – a couple of 
Sushi houses were open – expensive, unaffordable for most of Torunians and not quite popular 
yet, relying mostly on nostalgic Japanese managers who arrived with the investment. Crystal 
Park was expected to grow and, in addition, long-term strategies were growing in the heads of 
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locals. The University started a new Japanese Language and Culture BA course, hoping to 
educate future Crystal Park desirable employees. The Japanese-bug was spreading and 
excitement was growing. The local newspapers enthusiastically posted regular updates on the 
progress of the building works. Not a single bad word was said about the investment during 
the set up period. Everyone was suddenly an expert in Japanese culture, Japanese practice and 
all things Japanese. The only mild criticism concentrated on the aesthetic character of the 
investment and its possible impact on Toruń’s image as academic and cultural centre and its 
gothic heritage. 
This euphoric media-fuelled mood was also shared by local economists and entrepreneurs. In 
May 2006 The Nowości daily newspaper organised a debate on the prospects of Japanese 
investment. Optimistic opinions dominated the debate. The director of Torun Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry - Wojciech Maksymowicz - foresaw a longstanding and stable 
relationship with Japanese investors. He argued that: 
The Japanese will bring investment of a different standard. Western firms are as 
quick in closing businesses down as in opening new ones, most recent example being 
Elektrolux closing down its factories in Sweden just to move them to Poland. 
Japanese invest in a different fashion. They value tradition and long term 
cooperation. In Japan people often start their first employment and retire in the same 
company.  
(Rzepczyński, 2006)  
The only controversy discussed by the panel was regarding the city’s tourist profile and the 
presumption that this image of medieval wonder would be distorted by the industrial 
neighbourhood. The Director of Toruń Regional Development Agency - Ewa Rybińska - refuted this 
allegation and reinforced the legitimacy of an argument for the Japanese investment in Toruń:  
 (...) modern factory built near Toruń, will not only do no harm to the profile of the 
city but the contrary, it will be a great publicity for Toruń.  
(ibid) 
The bubble of euphoria was rather short lived. The goose that laid the golden eggs suddenly 
disappeared leaving a very ugly duckling instead.  
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In February 2007 I read a report entitled ‘Japanese don’t like women speaking! How I worked 
for peanuts in a television manufacturing factory near Toruń. For 672 PLN Net.’ published in 
Gazeta Wyborcza, the main daily newspaper in Poland. The author, Aleksandra Leśniewska, 
had worked undercover in one of the biggest plants in Crystal Park for several weeks. The 
journalist exposed the rigid Japanese regime on the shop floor; some of the harsher aspects of 
lean production, and ubiquitous Japanese supervision. The tone of the article was grim, 
dominated by the atmosphere of fear, and the depiction of nearly maquiladora conditions. 
Leśniewska (2007) herself experienced the discipline and time control of a Japanese workplace 
that she found unpleasantly confining. Further, she became aware of: 
I’ve learnt there that within 15 minutes one can have lunch as well as a cigarette, 
coffee and also ones toilet break. Here we are standing with my work colleagues 
behind the yellow line; Mr Hinooka is asking what could be done to manufacture 
more tellies. One of the workers replies: we need to be paid more. But the interpreter 
doesn’t pass it on. Japanese don’t like women who speak out. 
Rank and file workers had limited or no contact with the managers. Any communication as it 
happened was unilateral rather than reciprocal. Workers were expected to listen and obey. 
Offering opinions and discussions were unwelcome. Interpreters did not always translate 
negative remarks or worker’s demands during the meetings. The content of Leśniewska’s 
report inspired me to question the positive picture of the new investment and stimulated me to 
verify the report. Leśniewska had only spent four weeks in the factory, during the chaotic start-
up period; what seems enough for a hard-hitting cover story, however is insufficient for an 
academic investigation. Additionally, the local press engaged in the symbolical ‘Japanisation 
of Toruń’: numerous articles described how the Japanese managers were settling in town and 
how the town itself accommodated the new incomers.  
I wanted to look outside this ‘cultural’ turmoil, and investigate Japanisation at the factory level. 
What is the reality of working for a Japanese company in Poland from the employee’s 
viewpoint? How is this different from a Polish or European workplace? Did the Japanese 
manage to adapt to the Polish environment? Perhaps the Japanese Foreign Direct Investment 
(JFDI) are not as kawaii (Japanese ‘lovable’; ‘adorable’), as it initially appeared to be. I recalled 
watching an American comedy film, directed by Ron Howard (1986) entitled ‘Gung Ho’. The 
movie showed the story of a Japanese fictional company; ‘Assan Motors’, which took over an 
American, local car plant. Many scenes depicted compulsory morning exercises conducted by 
the Japanese management. American workers were reluctant to practise and even manifested 
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their disobedience by making jokes about Japanese ‘rituals’. Even though the story was 
exaggerated or even distorted, it did not stop me thinking how ‘Gung Ho’ would have looked 
in a Polish environment. 
The Japanese style of management has received a lot of attention in Poland, especially from 
the mid-2000s. Our University of Toruń Library had an extensive section on Japanese 
management; the bookshop shelves were full of self-help guides for managers; ranging from 
Total Flow Management to ‘enigmatic’ kaizen (the philosophy of continuous improvement), 
advertised as ‘must-haves’ and core texts on quality management. Generally these works were 
lacking both an academic and Polish perspective. They were mainly management ‘industry’ 
guides, translated into Polish and churned out in the 1990s when western neoliberal 
evangelisation was at its peak. 
Dr Marcin Kuzel (Toruń University leading specialist on FDI), with whom I had a conversation 
about Japanese practices, suggested that the term kaizen is widely recognised among Polish 
managers. Their awareness, however, seems to be rather theoretical. The actual understanding 
and implementation of kaizen is a totally different matter. Dr Kuzel interviewed numerous 
managers asking about kaizen. The respondents all knew the definition; hence an answer to the 
initial question was regarded as obvious. Of course Polish managers know about kaizen and 
have read many books about its application. Nevertheless, when it came to explaining how they 
would implement an idea of continuous improvement in their workplaces, they were unable to 
find appropriate examples. Kuzel was surprised to find that kaizen seemed to be a ‘managerial 
caprice’ rather than a way to improve the production system. It was a fashion or a fever to 
which every manager in the post-communist economy appeared prone. Like many other ‘new’ 
western practices – kaizen or “just-in-time” – were almost buzzwords the managers might have 
learnt on their MBA courses, splendid while being explained by strategy gurus and other 
enthusiasts, but too ‘western’ to neophytes embedded in the old system. On the workplace level 
these methods were seldom applied and managers needed time to ‘retune’ to the new approach. 
Anything coming from successful western economies was highly regarded, however there is a 
doubt whether those managerial practices were fully understood initially and implemented in 
a complete form. Quite an opposite picture comes to light. If the Japanese style of management 
was adapted in a Polish owned company, it was done rather superficially; when asked, 
managers were not able to explain it or give any real life examples of transferring the Japanese 
management practices in their companies. Dr Kuzel did not at the time have a chance to 
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investigate whether the same pattern was to be observed in Polish JFDIs. In my research I 
attempt to address this gap.   
Therefore investigating a Japanese corporation seemed to be a great opportunity to verify the 
extent to which core Japanese management practices are implemented. I wanted to look beyond 
the praise of the effectiveness of these methods.  
 
1.2 The wider context of foreign direct investment and the transfer of Japanese 
employment practices. 
 
The wider context of this investment is also noteworthy. The Toruń cluster is just one of many 
foreign investments in the Pomerania region and a small element of a much bigger picture. 
Poland, the biggest economy within Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) started attracting FDI 
in the beginning of the 1990s, when the country became part of the global economy and 
investment flowed from the core developed economies to the transition economies. These 
foreign investments are regarded as significant and ‘strategic’ to the development of CEE, 
which suffered from the effects of being an inefficient, command economy. The presence of 
FDI in Poland has stimulated important and also controversial debates on privatization, 
deregulation and labour market flexibility. Some argue the benefits of FDI have been overrated, 
and low levels of FDI perpetuate the existing economic status quo with Poland based still on 
the periphery, rather than at the core of world economy (Hardy, 1998; Domański, 2004; 
Grabner and Stark (eds), 1997). Nevertheless FDI became integral to Poland’s economic 
development over the last twenty years. The private, foreign owned sector is gradually 
growing, employing a considerable share of Poles and bringing institutional change. 
One of the expanding sources of foreign capital in Poland comes from Japanese multinationals 
which substantially invested in the manufacturing sector (predominantly: Toyota, Isuzu and 
Bridgestone). Thousands of employees in Japanese factories for the very first time have been 
introduced to specific methods of production and management. This Japanese peculiarity is 
based to some extent in the culture; Confucian philosophy and a strong sense of collectivism. 
Whitehall (1992) argues that Confucianism hugely affects the thinking and behaviour of 
managers. Attributes stemming from this doctrine such as obedience, loyalty and self-
development are a common part of Japanese managerial practice. At the same time, Japanese 
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collectivism, or groupism is presented as something opposite to American individualism. The 
Japanese are famously known for their distinctive employment system, the so-called ‘three 
pillars’: lifetime employment, a seniority-based system and enterprise unionism. Japanese 
corporation have also successfully implemented just- in- time (JIT), total quality management 
(TQM) and kaizen techniques which contributed to high efficiency and quality of work. This 
specific managerial style and application of the quality polices were not purely dependent on 
‘Japanese culture’. The Influence of the USA in the post-war years has affected economic and 
political aspects of Japanese life, including its management. For instance the ideas of Taylorism 
were well known and practised even before WWII (Warner, 1994). Also, quality management 
was popularized by the American statistician William Edward Deming (Tsutsui, 1996). 
With the expanding JFDI, the question was: could these institutions be transplanted to different 
economic and cultural environments? Hence, the interesting phenomenon accompanying JFDI 
(and also non-Japanese companies) is the process of Japanisation, notion that the firms are 
reproducing Japanese forms of economic structures and practices. The cluster of Japanese 
corporations near Toruń with its characteristic management and production practices must 
undoubtedly have had an impact on workplace relations. This thesis puts the ‘Polish-Japanese’ 
workplace under the microscope and attempts to find answers to a set of questions elaborated 
in the next section. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
There is a body of work on Polish employment and industrial relations (see Ost, 2005; 2002; 
Gardawski et al., 1999; Gardawski, 2009 (ed); Hardy, 1998; 2006; 2009; Hardy and Kozek, 
2011; Meardi, 2002; 2007; Mrozowicki, 2011; Mrozowicki and Maciejewska, 2013). The 
above mentioned research will be discussed further in Chapters Three and Four. However the 
specific impact of Japanisation on the Polish workplace has not yet been sufficiently explored. 
The majority of the research covers a narrow area of studies focusing on Japanese managerial 
practices (see Krasiński, 2012a; 2012b; 2014; Janus, 2013; Ćwiklicki and Obora, 2011). This 
could be explained by Poland’s post-1989 aspiration to catch up with the West; researchers’ 
interests reflect this mood thoroughly. This created a significant research gap. Poland quite 
understandably missed the ‘Japanisation hype’ in the 1980s. A decade later the scale of JFDI 
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was still limited, and at the same time the American model of management was getting most 
of the attention from both academics and practitioners. Also, relatively little is known regarding 
the impact of JFDI in Poland’s post-communist economy. 
The intention of this project is to fill this gap, and to establish to what extent typical Japanese 
management and production practices have been adopted in Japanese-owned factories in 
Poland and what the specific impacts of Japanese FDI are on Polish workplace institutions. 
Initially, I was interested in the broader aspects of FDI in Poland and its economic impact on 
the region. The preliminary fieldwork not only refined, but also reshaped my research 
objectives. Some of the interviewees on the local government level briefly mentioned that the 
Japanese companies I was planning to visit were experiencing recurring problems concerning 
discipline, management and workers’ expectations. This was blamed on the character of 
Japanese culture. These primary interviews kindled my curiosity. I knew already that, in 
comparison with other Japanese FDI recipient countries, there was little research into this 
emerging issue in Poland.  
Firstly, the research is directed towards casting light on the following areas of interest:  
- The dynamics of the transfer of employment and human resource practices from Japan 
to Poland. This will include areas of recruitment, training, and implementation of the 
quality policies. 
- Separately the trade union activity needs to be investigated in the context of Japanese 
corporation  
This led to the main research problems that the following thesis will address. 
- Are these practices being fully embraced by managers in Poland? 
- The nature of worker and trade union responses to ‘Japanese’ managerial and production 
methods in Poland.  
The research in the developed economies has shown that Japanese management has met with 
resistance from workers. To what extent would Polish workers react in the same way, and how 
far would they be willing to unreservedly accept the ‘Japanese model’? 
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The overarching research question is to what extent ‘Japanisation’ has been transferred to the 
Polish workplaces through Japanese FDI. Specifically, how far there has been a transfer of 
Japanese employment and managerial practices to sites of foreign direct investment in Poland. 
With regards to the nature of workers’ response to these practices it is necessary to determine, 
to what extent there has been resistance to these methods and what the nature of such resistance 
is. To what extent has there been, individual or collective resistance to Japanese management 
style in the researched plants? 
 
1.4 Empirical focus 
 
The cases of Japanese (and Korean) investment in Europe reveal quite different locational 
patterns to those of Western investment, which tends to locate their plants in developed 
metropolitan areas. For instance in Great Britain, East Asian conglomerates prefer to invest in 
peripheral, less developed or even depressed regions. The main South Korean chaebols came 
to an agreement and ‘collusively divided’ upon spheres of influence; Hyundai took Scotland, 
Samsung Northern England and Daewoo Northern Ireland. LG decided to invest in Newport 
in Wales (the largest single instance of FDI in the UK in the terms of promised employment), 
which was hugely affected by unemployment (Phelps et al., 1998). Japanese corporations 
implemented a similar strategy locating their factories in quite remote areas of Northern 
England, Wales or in Telford, Shropshire, where three Japanese firms are situated. Such 
‘isolated’ regions are not attractive for European or American investors due to the poor network 
of suppliers. For the Japanese companies which are organised through the kaizen philosophy 
and just-in-time techniques (Phelps, 1997) this is not an issue. It has to be stressed that these 
peripheral regions of the UK are well integrated through transportation networks; M4 in 
Southern Wales, M1 in Northern England, and M58 leading to Telford. These features were 
taken into consideration by East Asian investors. Japanese and Korean firms apply the same 
model of investing in CEE countries, and FDIs are located in peripheral areas with relatively 
good integrated communication network (LG in Mława, Poland, KIA Motors in Žilina, 
Slovakia, or Toyota in Kolin, Czech Republic). 
The site of the largest cluster of Japanese investment in Toruń fits in the ‘peripheral’ investment 
pattern. In the late 2006 the Sharp Corporation opened one of the biggest LCD factories in 
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Europe on the outskirts of the city in Ostaszewo. The location is characterized by decent 
transport links and an advantageous labour market structure with unemployment above the 
national average, and the regional average wage below the national average (see Map 1.1).  
 
Map 1.1 Location of Crystal Park in Poland, with transportation links. 
 
Source: author 
 
This new industrial site was called ‘Crystal Park’ (a reference to LCD screens production and 
its components) and became part of the Pomerania Special Economic Zone (PSEZ). It is the 
biggest Japanese ‘cluster’ in Poland. Other major Japanese manufacturing FDIs are located 
separately: Isuzu in Tychy, Toyota in Wałbrzych, Bridgestone in Stargard Szczeciński and 
Poznań, all of them benefiting from locations in the SEZs. Investment on this scale easily seized 
the attention, not only at a regional, but also at a national level with Sharp’s plans to invest 250 
million Euros alone. It also understandably raised hopes for the improvement of the economic 
situation of the whole region. The Polish edition of the Forbes magazine acknowledged 
establishing PSEZ in Toruń as a ‘the most spectacular economic event in 2007’. 
12 
 
                   
 
It is important to note that Poland is economically divided into so-called Poland A (core) and 
Poland B (periphery). This strong dichotomy has its roots in 18th century (Chapter Four will 
explain the concept of Poland B as well as the origins of such division in more detail). Even 
though Toruń itself is relatively developed (the city is the hometown of one the biggest 
universities in Poland), the Kujawy-Pomerania Province as a whole is not, and shares 
characteristics of the periphery; it suffers from structural unemployment, lack of investment, 
and experiences  the exodus of the youth to Western Europe and to more prosperous  regions 
of Poland. 
The advantage of cheap labour in the region is emphasised by the government investment 
agencies, which are trying to encourage more investment and recommend the Kujawy-
Pomerania Province: 
Among their other assets, local authorities list low labour costs, a large workforce 
(various fields of medicine are noted) and the quality of local institutions of higher 
education. Unemployment remains relatively high, meaning employers have the 
advantage in the market, and a number of well-respected universities add to the 
labour pool each year.  
Investing in Poland (2010) 
In the years 2006-2012, 4,000 people worked at Crystal Park, although initially these firms had 
a target of hiring 10,000 workers. Since 2011 some of the Japanese firms based in Crystal Park 
have been downsizing their production and employment, although not withdrawing from the 
site. The majority of the labour force, employed by Japanese companies in Ostaszewo, came 
from districts hugely affected by unemployment: Toruń rural district, Chełmno, Grudziądz (15-
30 per cent). For many of them Crystal Park’s companies were their first employers. Map 1.2 
shows the Toruński district, where Crystal Park is located and its neighbouring districts with 
the unemployment rates. 
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Map 1.2 Kujawy-Pomerania Province. Districts adjacent to Crystal Park with unemployment 
rates (2012) Crystal Park is located in Toruński district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author, based on WUP (2012) 
 
1.5 Conceptual framework 
 
In order to address the research questions, three strands of literature are drawn on (discussed 
in Chapter Three and Four). Firstly, the research will be set in the context of Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC). Poland’s Variety of Capitalism is extensively discussed. The main division 
in this conceptualization is between Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs). According to Lipton and Sachs (1990) and Blanchard et al., (1991) 
transformation of Polish capitalism was instituted on the basis of a design of LME. 
Development of Polish capitalism was heavily influenced by international forces (Bohle, 
2006). Although this development was carried out with reduction of high-value production and 
an increase in low-value added activities as privatization and foreign investment has locked 
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firms into global value chains of international companies (Hardy, 2009; Hardy, 2007) while 
other firms have been left without the resources for modernization and restructuring. 
Secondly for the purpose of this study, VoC framework due to its static character is considered 
to be insufficient to fully uncover the nature of workplace relations in FDIs. Therefore it 
seemed necessary to employ the taxonomy of labour process, especially with regards to the 
notion of workers resistance towards the new management methods. 
Thirdly the study will draw on work of Japanisation: the influence of Japanese manufacturing 
investment and Japanese working practices across the global economy. Some early studies 
suggested that neither was it possible to transfer Japanese practices to the Western subsidiaries 
due to indissoluble embeddedness of the Japanese firm within Japanese society (Dore, 1973), 
nor was it possible to even attempt at researching the subject, without extensive studies into 
Japanese language, culture and area knowledge. 
However in the aftermath of Japanese investment ‘expansion’ in the 1980s, JFDI became a 
very popular subject for academic analysis. The research focus shifted into the subsidiary plants 
and the transfer of Japanese practices abroad and abandoned the institutional perspective (Elger 
and Smith, 1994). The Japanese firm was treated as an abstract model and was analysed outside 
the Japanese economy, the focus being put on workers’ experience and, however overused, the 
‘transplant’ of Japanese practice. Many researchers concentrated on the implications for work 
organization, employee relation, and response of the host trade union movement to Japanisation 
(Olivier and Wilkinson, 1992; Bratton, 1992). An alternative view is presented by the writers 
who adapted a system or dominance approach. These researchers point out the advantages of 
unique Japanese practices as opposite to the American model (Pascale and Athos, 1982). Works 
of Delbridge and Turnbull (1992), Stewart (1996), Elger and Smith (2005) and Stewart et al. 
(2009) concentrate on a wide-ranging critique of the established view of the Japanese model of 
work organization. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
In order to cast light on the aforementioned research questions a qualitative approach has been 
adopted as outlined in Chapter Five. The fieldwork was undertaken in Crystal Park and at 
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regional level (local government) in Poland between years 2011 and 2012. Semi-structured in-
depth interviews were conducted with managers and workers at the Crystal Park site in order 
to investigate the distinctive effects of Japanese FDI on managerial policies and practices, and 
work and employment conditions, in selected Japanese-owned factories. 
The approach to fieldwork concentrated on in-depth and triangulated exploration of social and 
work phenomena in a relatively small number of case organisations. The micro level 
investigation was contextualised through a series of semi-structured interviews with expert 
stakeholders (including local government officials, trade unionists, scientists and journalists) 
in Poland. In order to explore the wider institutional and employment effects of Japanese FDI 
in Poland as well as to establish the main areas of workers’ acceptance and resistance to the 
Japanese methods, 36 in-depth interviews were conducted in five case study firms. In addition 
to face-to-face interviews, the research is enriched by workers’ opinions found on popular 
online forums and commentary boards regarding Crystal Park site. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
  
To contextualise the Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, the next chapter (Chapter Two) will 
briefly outline the recent trends in global Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but for 
the most part it will focus on patterns of national and regional Japanese investment in Poland. 
It will analyse the local political economy of the investment in Toruń, as well as the main 
determinants of Japanese investment.  
Chapters Three and Four provide the conceptual underpinnings for the research. Chapter Three 
compares Poland and Japan’s business systems. A Variety of Capitalism framework is adopted. 
Recognising the limitations imposed by the static nature of the framework followed, it is argued 
that Polish economy is a challenging subject of such taxonomisation, showing features of both 
ideal types outlined by Hall and Soskice (2001). It is also necessary for this analysis to draw 
on historical and political contexts of transformation, as the business systems are deeply 
influenced by institutional arrangements which ‘reflect historical dynamic’ (Ferner, 2000: 3). 
Next, the features of employment relations in both economies are examined, to bring the focus 
closer to the workplace itself. The development of the ‘new workplace’ and managerial regime 
is examined from the perspective of transition.  
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Chapter Four draws on three strands of literature. Firstly, the labour process theory is 
considered and various dimensions of workers’ resistance are discussed. Secondly recognising 
the importance of FDI as one of the main ‘sculptors’ of Polish post-socialist economy; the 
focus will move onto the particular form of the foreign direct investment, that is JFDI and the 
ambiguous phenomenon of Japanisation. Thirdly, the issue of ‘transferability’ of Japanese 
practices to alien environments will be explored.  
Chapter Five justifies research methods and provides the outline of the fieldwork methodology 
adapted for the purpose of the thesis.  
Chapters Six and Seven will present the research findings from the Crystal Park fieldwork. The 
main focus of Chapter Six is on the issue of transfer of typical Japanese management and 
production practices to case study factories. The analysis will be built around the following 
themes: recruitment, training, pay system, quality assurance, monitoring and discipline. 
Chapter Seven will shed light on the nature of resistance and contestation in Crystal Park’s 
plants. Workers’ and trade unions’ responses to ‘Japanisation’ will be considered.  
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate JFDI in Poland in terms of the transfer of 
Japanese production and managerial institutions and practices and the character of workers’ 
response towards them. Chapter Eight will provide overall conclusions and will address the 
research questions. It will seek to explore the following. Firstly, the notion of Japanisation, in 
relation to lean production and the problem of transferability of the typical Japanese practices 
into the subsidiary workplace will be discussed. Subsequently, the nature of workers’ 
responses to Japanese management practices will be explored in the context of Crystal Park 
investment. The collective and individual aspects of worker resistance will be considered. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will turn to the Variety of Capitalism (VoC) approach in 
order to investigate the links between the Polish capitalism variety and the pattern of 
Japanese investment in Poland.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PATTERNS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN POLAND 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the global trends of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment 
(JFDI), including those in the United Kingdom and Central and Eastern Europe. It presents the 
historical background of JFDI in Poland and discusses its economic and political context. 
Finally, the locational determinants of the biggest cluster of Japanese electronics and logistics 
companies in Poland (research site), Crystal Park near Toruń, Northern Poland are analysed.  
Although it is not in the scope of this research to investigate the purely economic impact of the 
case study firms on regional and national level, as it mainly focuses on workplace institutions 
and management transfer, a brief characteristic of Crystal Park firms’ local embeddedness is 
provided. It is important to understand the context of JFDI in Poland and grasp its national and 
regional effect. 
 
2.2 The overview of the Japanese outward investment 
 
Japan’s post-war economy is regarded as one of the most successful and efficient. Despite the 
fact that a few slumps took place in the 1970s and 1990s, the Japanese economy is listed among 
the world’s strongest. The contribution of the Japanese economy to world’s GDP grew from 
just two per cent to over 10 per cent between 1967 and 1987. Therefore its impact can be 
acknowledged as ‘dramatic’ (Beamish et al., 1997).  Undoubtedly, the expansive activities of 
Japanese corporations back up the dominant position of Japan in the global economy. Among 
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the top 100 multinationals there are 39 Japanese corporations, including the largest auto-
makers, electronic firms and trading companies: Toyota, Mitsubishi, Sony, Nissan, Fujitsu and 
Mitsubishi (Flath, 2005). Global JFDI is determinant of this success.    
Japanese manufacturers made their way in the world after the end of the World War II. From 
1951, companies were allowed to invest abroad (from 1955 Japan accessed GATT), but due to 
a weak post-war economy and Japanese government restrictions on outward investments, JFDI 
was limited. Morris (1988) distinguishes three phases of Japanese direct investments; 1947-
1971 – a period of steady and modest increases; 1971-1980 a surge of growth, and the turning 
point of the scale of foreign investment took place in 1972. In the years 1972 and 1973 FDI 
was greater than in the preceding period: 1951-1971. The phase starting from 1980 was 
characterized by a steep upward trend (with the ‘boom’ period: 1986-89). The 1980s 
consolidates Japan’s domination in terms of outflow investments. In 1989 the value of Japan’s 
foreign investment was USD 67.5 billion, more than any country in the world at that time. 
Japanese corporations provided about 30 per cent of world FDI flows (Westley, 2008). This 
sudden growth can be explained by several factors: as a result of Plaza Accord (1985), an 
international agreement which allowed depreciation of the American dollar; in the period 1985-
1988 Japan’s currency appreciated and the value of yen against the dollar almost doubled. Yen 
appreciation evoked the ‘crisis of high yen’ (Japanese: endaka) which greatly affected Japanese 
exports, so crucial for the country’s economy. Endaka encouraged Japanese firms to overseas 
investments as a result of much lower manufacturing costs abroad. On the other hand 
appreciation of yen badly affected Japanese subsidiaries abroad, much depended on materials 
imported from Japan (Komiya, 1990). Even though endaka did not stop Japan’s export 
competitiveness, it rather boosted Japanese determination to remain one of the most efficient 
and competitive nations in the world (Olivier and Wilkinson, 1992). 
Further, another factor which contributed to JFDI’s expansion was the so-called Japanese 
‘bubble economy’; companies were able to finance overseas investment through cheap and 
available credit (Beamish et al., 1997). The ‘bubble economy’ made land prices higher, which 
turned real-estate firms and companies needing land for factories to invest abroad. The next 
motivation for expansion of Japanese FDI in 1980s was hollowing-out (de-industrialization) of 
manufacturing industry. Japan’s production significantly shifted out of manufacturing. This 
share of real GDP fell from 27.9 in 1985 to 24.3 in 1990. Decline in this sector also affected 
manufacturing’s share of employment in Japan; large firms began to recruit fewer new graduate 
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managers, older workers were retired or shifted to other companies. Corporations were forced 
to seek manufacturing employees abroad as they shifted industrial production outside Japan 
(Morgan et al., 2002). 
Japan’s stagnation in the 1990s substantially reduced the amount of the outward JFDI. The last 
two decades showed that Japanese corporations have been not investing so extensively, as they 
used to in the late 1980s. The Japanese economy was heavily affected by the economic bubble 
in the early nineties and was not immune to the Asian financial crisis (1997). Those slumps 
reduced the global volume of JFDI. During the 1990s Japan was the second largest investor, 
after USA. In the 2000s other developed economies (France, Germany, and the UK) outpaced 
Japan in the value of FDI outflow. 
Characteristically outflows of FDI from Japan were much larger than equivalent inflows to the 
country; by 1993, the stock of JFDI abroad stood at USD 422.5 billion - almost fifteen times 
the USD 29.9 billion stock of FDI received by Japan (Bayoumi and Lipworth, 1997). This gap 
was growing over the years. The Japanese government had hostile policies to inward 
investment, which remained persistent until the 1980s. In addition features of isolated Japanese 
culture and language made Japan a hard place to invest and contributed to this investment 
imbalance (Flath, 2005). Foreign economic policy is described appropriately by popular 
slogans in Japan: ‘Export or die’ and ‘Making the economy more sufficient’. This kind of 
approach accurately explains the trend of Japanese foreign investment in the years 1970-1990. 
Japanese investments during the first thirty post-war years (1951-1980) were primarily 
concentrated in Asia, Middle East and Latin America. Until 1980 developing countries 
received about half of all JFDI (Jun et al., 1993). In the 1980s Japanese corporations established 
new subsidiaries in the USA, the UK and France - Japan’s prime exports markets, shifting some 
investments away from Asia to Western developed countries. Japanese companies continued 
investing in the developing world mainly in ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, and Malaysia) and Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). The major 
target of JFDI in the 1980s was North America: the United States and Canada. In 1989 the 
value of all JFDI in the USA alone was 50 per cent; another 22 per cent was invested in Europe 
(see Figure 2.1). Japanese investment in Europe exceeded that in America in 1999; 39 per cent 
and 33 per cent of the total respectively. In Australia, Japan was the third major investor, after 
the USA and the UK. At the same time JFDI in Asia and Latin America remained at the same 
level, around 30 per cent altogether. There is insignificant presence of JFDI in the Middle East 
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(few considerable investments in Iraq and Iran before 1980, stopped by the war between these 
countries); and Africa (Zaire, Nigeria and Zambia); (ibid). 
 
Figure 2.1 Global distribution of JFDI, (1980-2005). 
 
Source: Author based on Westney (2008) 
 
Therefore, initially JFDI strongly depended on geographical location, leaning towards 
proximity to the home country; the majority of the investment went to neighbouring Asian 
economies. Apart from closer location, some cultural, political and historical reasons 
influenced investment in Asia. From the 1980s Japanese companies recognized the proximity 
to the sales market, moving capital to the North America and Europe. The big shift in outward 
JFDI from developing countries to developed countries has been caused by several factors 
including worsening of investment environments in the most developing countries (political 
instability, accumulated debt, civil wars), and rising barriers to imports from Japan to the 
United States and some European countries (Komiya, 1990). 
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The UK was the primary location for JFDI in Europe, constituting over a third of total Japanese 
investment in the European Economic Community (EEC). The number of Japanese companies 
in Great Britain rose from 20 in 1980 to around 160 in 1991, employing 50,000 workers and 
accordingly 272 in 1996 with 80, 000 employees. The United Kingdom became the most 
favoured location in Europe due to a positive political climate; the Conservative Government 
reduced trade union power1, the existence of large markets (domestic and European), the 
English language, skilled labour, good infrastructure and one of the world’s biggest businesses, 
a legal and administrative centre - London (Nguyen, 1997). The British government has played 
a positive role in encouraging capital expenditure; at the end of the 1970s Invest in Britain 
Bureau (IBB) with the regional agencies promoting inward investments was established. The 
majority of the Japanese investment went to depressed areas of the UK: South Wales, North 
East and Scotland. Japanese manufacturers were investing in the regions of relatively high 
unemployment; however the new towns such as Telford, Milton Keynes and Livingstone 
received significant investment. Despite the positive effects (creating new jobs), there is also 
some criticism towards Japanese corporations. Most of the JFDI in the UK commitments are 
largely in low-value added assembly operations, dependent on components from outside the 
country. Jobs created at the plants have been low-paid and low- skilled, when R&D and 
production within the high-value added components remained in Japan. ‘Optimists’ have 
argued that this was a temporary phase and it was declining, as the local component supplies 
began to replace imported parts. In many developed countries, the Japanese have clustered 
investments, which reinforced the influence of Japanese firms on the local economy and 
indigenous working practices (Elger and Smith, 1994). 
In the 1990s there were some cases of Japanese firms closing UK plants to restructure their 
operations either regionally across Europe or globally (closure of Fujitsu plant of semi-
conductors in the North East England in 1998). Other EU countries became more attractive 
locations for JFDI (Toyota’s second European plant is currently in Valenciennes in France) 
due to the UK staying out of euro-zone and rising costs in the British Isles (Morgan et al., 
2002). 
                                                          
1 The Conservative Government wanted to replace and modernize ailing manufacturing sectors and discipline 
labour. Two Japanese commentators note: ‘The British government expressed the hope that Japanese companies 
would introduce new industrial relations practices and transfer their manufacturing philosophy and technology to 
their British counterparts’ (Kume and Totsuka, 1991: 53). 
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The current trend shows that, in emerging markets, the Japanese are outpaced by the South 
Korean or local investors. Ichii et al. (2012: 127) attribute this to: Japanese aversion to mergers 
and acquisitions, a reluctance to commit financially and organizationally in those countries, 
also to the failure to properly allocate managerial talents, and negligence of the middle and low 
segments of the markets2. This is the case of Brazil, Russia, India and China, where rival Asian 
and European multinationals seized the advantage. The booming Chinese economy might be 
the ideal place for Japan to locate their factories in terms of geographical proximity, the size of 
the labour pool and the market. Nonetheless, the historical animosities between both countries 
can still harm economic cooperation. Recent diplomatic tensions (September 2012) over 
disputed islands Senkaku/Diaoyu have led to huge anti-Japanese protests. Many Japanese 
businesses in China, but also in Western Europe were forced to close down and JFDI to 
downsize, including the major Japanese manufacturers: Toyota, Panasonic and Honda.  
The political and economic transformation of the late 1980s in Eastern Europe had opened the 
door to multinationals and new markets emerged. This vacuum was partly filled by JFDI 
shifting this time from Western economies to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Table 2.1 
illustrates this trend in relocation of JFDI. The next section looks at the Japanese investment in 
the CEE region. 
Table 2.1 Number of JFDI in manufacturing in selected European counties (1990-2010). 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
United Kingdom 265 320 370 308 248 
Germany 120 149 146 141 146 
France 147 162 180 194 133 
Italy 64 70 75 77 62 
Spain 74 81 81 76 57 
Poland 0 6 21 54 80 
Czech Republic 0 15 32 85 94 
Hungary 4 15 39 50 39 
Slovakia 0 0 6 12 16 
Source: Author based on JETRO (2012). 
                                                          
2 The authors supported it with the interesting example from India, where the TV sets market is still dominated 
(70 per cent) by cathode-ray-tube televisions. Japanese electronics corporations exclusively manufacture flat 
screen sets, ignoring the demand of the Indian market. 
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2.3 Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
 
The post-1989 period in CEE has been characterized by rapid privatization, liberalization of 
trade and inflow of foreign investment. Proximity to the developed western economies 
(Germany, France, Italy and the UK); a pool of cheap, skilled labour, and finally growing 
domestic markets are among the main reasons that multinationals from Japan have been 
attracted to CEE. Additionally, the inflow of FDI was encouraged by the governments, which 
were desperately seeking new sources of investment and trade. 
Prior to economic transition in the late 1980s some major Japanese firms were participating in 
trade and investment with communist economies. This co-operation between Japan and Eastern 
Europe was limited, mainly based on the licensing agreements, which provided technology, 
patents and know-how for the communist governments. The most active countries in these 
processes were: Bulgaria (where Japan was the most important economic partner outside Soviet 
Bloc), the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. 
Consequently, Japanese investments have substantially increased in the post-transitional period 
(see Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2 JFDI in Europe - change in number of Japanese subsidiaries in manufacturing 
sector 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Author, based on JETRO (2012). 
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Park (2003) distinguished three different stages of JFDI strategies: natural resource investments 
in the1950s, market expansion investment in the 1970s and the 1980s and a mixture of cost-
reducing and market penetrating investment in the 1990s. JFDI in CEE perfectly fits the last 
one. With the population exceeding one hundred million and an emerging liberal market 
economy, CEE could not have been ignored by the major Japanese multinationals. 
In the early 1990s Japanese economic growth slowed down, thus affecting the volume of the 
outward investment. Japanese multinationals have also been facing an increasing competition 
in the 1990s, with South Korea (with its powerful chaebols) and other Far East countries 
becoming the biggest rivals. Japan had to rethink their objectives in the internationalization 
process. It meant wider geographical opportunities for investment and production which had 
opened up in the 1990s and 2000s following the expansion of the European Union, with the 
CEE countries and the entry of China into global economy (Morgan et al., 2002). On the other 
hand the proximity of European advanced economies made CEE an attractive location for 
Japanese investors. It meant not only the access to those markets, but also co-operation with 
the European partners in the form of joint ventures. Prominent examples of these include 
Toyota and PSA Citroen Peugeot (Czech Republic), Matsushita and Philips (Poland). 
Characteristically, JFDIs in Central and Eastern Europe are predominantly greenfield sites; 
reflecting a reluctance towards mergers and acquisitions. 
Since the mid-1990s full-scale investments have appeared in CCE (including Matsushita 
Electric in Czech Republic, Sanyo Electric in Hungary and Isuzu Motors in Poland). These 
three countries have received the majority of Japanese investment accounting for almost 90 per 
cent (Marinova and Marinov, 2003). However, the participation of Japanese investment in 
overall FDI in the CEE is relatively low. American, German, Dutch or French investments have 
exceeded JFDI by several times. According to Kawai (2006) this relatively weak presence of 
JFDI in the region is attributed to the unstable economic and political situation and the 
relatively small size of the market. However, since the EU enlargement in 2004, Japanese 
reluctance has been overcome and Japanese investment has steadily increased since. In 2002 
the Czech government had managed to attract Toyota and PSA Peugeot Citroen, providing a 
wide range of incentives for prestigious Japanese-French investors and outbid other locations 
in Poland and Hungary (Drahokoupil, 2009). This is one of the biggest automotive investments 
in CEE, which has created over 3,000 direct workplaces.  
The next part looks closely at JFDI in the biggest CEE’s economy- Poland.  
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2.4 Japan’s economic presence in Poland 
 
Although an enormous distance separates Poland and Japan, both countries have long standing 
mutual relations. Prior to 1918 the Polish independence movement activists co-operated with 
the Japanese military. Japan and Poland were fighting the same enemy: the Russian empire (in 
the years 1904-1905). Officially, diplomatic relations were established in 1919, just after 
Poland regained independence. Unsurprisingly, after the Second World War, Poland’s 
government was reluctant to restore mutual relations. Politically and economically, Japan 
belonged to a capitalist world with strong links to the USA. Poland was part of the communist 
bloc; moreover the Soviet Union did not recognize the legality of the Treaty of San Francisco 
(1951). Polish-Japanese relations were eventually restored in 1957. In the same year, Japanese 
firms exhibited at Poznań International Fair for the first time (Tarnowski, 2009). Economic co-
operation flourished during the Gierek decade (1970-1980), as Japanese firms licensed the 
technology to many of Poland’s SOEs (State-owned Enterprises). Poland in return exported 
coking coal to Japan. To facilitate these economic ties the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) bureau was opened in Warsaw in 1975, the second of its kind in the communist bloc3. 
During the first wave of Solidarity (1980-1981), the co-operation between the Polish and 
Japanese also took some non-governmental forms. Solidarność has significantly inspired the 
labour movement in Japan and the secretary generals of trade union confederations, Domei and 
Sōhyō, visited Poland in September and November 1980. Sōhyō was the first foreign trade 
union to establish formal contacts with Solidarność. Lech Wałęsa and other Solidarność 
activists flew to Japan in May 1981. It is worth noting the work of Umeda Yoshiho, a Japanese 
who had lived in Poland since the 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s. Umeda was involved 
in KOR (Workers' Defense Committee, Polish: Komitet Obrony Robotników), and later in 
Solidarność. In January 1982 he was expelled from Poland for ‘anti-state’ activity. 
The outbreak of martial law at the end of 1981 stopped economic co-operation between both 
countries. Some serious possibilities for cooperation emerged in 1983, when Daihatsu 
demonstrated interest in investing in FSO (Passenger Automobile Factory, Polish: Fabryka 
Samochodów Osobowych) (Warsaw), one of the biggest automotive plants in Poland. 
                                                          
3 The first JETRO in CEE was opened in Bucharest, Romania in 1971. 
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However, longstanding problems with finalising the investment and Poland’s government 
sluggishness, contributed to the failure of negotiations. Eventually, Daihatsu withdrew in 1990. 
In the 1990s, FSO co-operated with South Korean Daewoo and with General Motors. 
The liberalization of trade and investment regulation in Poland after 1989 did not cause an 
immediate flow of JFDI. The reason for this lack of interest in the early days of transformation 
could also be explained politically. Understandably Poland, among other CEE countries, was 
not known to Japanese investors. Additionally, Poland was considered as not a particularly safe 
country to invest in after introducing martial law in 1981. The Japanese government did not 
favour a decision of cancelling of Poland’s foreign debt either (Piech, 2003; Tarnowski, 2009). 
However, the Japanese objected to the Paris Club’s decision on cancellation and eventually the 
Japanese government, pushed by the USA, agreed to writing off 50 per cent of Poland’s 
liabilities. It was Poland’s Pyrrhic victory: on the one hand, half of the debt was cancelled, on 
the other, the country lost a strategic investor during its crucial first years of transformation. 
Moreover, Japanese investors were discouraged by the earlier investment setback of Daihatsu 
and Asahi Glass, which could not have come into terms with Polish partners as well as with 
the government. The mutual relations were frozen in years 1991-1994 and during this period 
Japanese investors’ interest was more focused on the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The stabilisation of Poland’s economy in the mid-1990s and successful JFDI in other CEE 
countries (Czech Republic and Hungary) boosted the trust of Japanese investment. Slowly JFDI 
started flowing into Poland in the mid-1990s. The importance of those investments is pointed 
out by Tarnowski (2009: 33): 
‘Therefore, in Polish-Japanese relations, the Tripatrite Diplomacy period has started, 
whereas apart two traditional actors (the governments of Poland and Japan), new 
actors in the international political arena have emerged - transnational corporations, 
in this case big Japanese firms such as Toyota and Isuzu’. 
It took almost ten years of Polish transformation before both the aforementioned Japanese 
automotive corporations chose to invest in Poland (Isuzu in 1997 and Toyota in 1999). The 
first Japanese manufacturing company which opened the greenfield site was Matsuchita (joint 
venture with Philips Electronics) in Gniezno in 1994. The first decade of Polish capitalism in 
terms of Japanese investment could be considered a time of lost chances and wasted potential. 
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One of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) experts in Total Quality Management 
(TQM), who was based in Poland for the Umbrella project4 said: 
(...) Poland is located in the center of Europe, and filled with plenty of superior 
educated researchers, engineers and diligent workers. If they work for Poland, the 
abilities of Poland will increase very much. Most of Japanese industries still make 
investment in China or Southeast Asia. However considering the market, it is 
advantageous to put a base in Europe. Until now I don’t feel eager activities to invite 
industries from Japan. Poland should show your intentions clearly. You must reserve 
your power, you must open your door and heart for Japan (...) you should issue such 
information more clearly (...)  
Kanya Tsuchihashi; JICA Allumni Association in Poland Bulletin (2002)   
The attractiveness of Poland had been rising substantially after accession to the European 
Union in 2004. As previously stressed, the attitude of Polish government towards JFDI (and 
any other form of FDI) is evidently positive. Strong political commitment to attract FDI has 
become the raison d'État. The facilitation of trade and investment has played an important role 
in Polish foreign policy after 1989. Table 2.2 shows the main institutional and market related 
determinants of Japanese decisions to invest in Poland. When it comes to investing in Poland, 
the Japanese underline the importance of government support, among the other factors, in the 
decision-making process.  
Joining the Schengen Area in 2007 was another facilitation which increased the volume of 
JFDI in Poland. Prior to 2007, the heavily controlled cross border traffic was a burden for the 
Japanese companies who were working under just-in-time methods. Despite being criticised 
for not doing enough to attract foreign investment (mainly lack of infrastructure), Poland is 
considered to be one of the most attractive locations in Europe and in terms of numbers of 
Japanese factories is fourth in Europe, after Germany, France and the Czech Republic (JETRO, 
2011). 
 
                                                          
4 In Poland Umbrella was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project, which also co-operated 
through ODA Official Development Assistance. It co-ordinated transformation processes in Poland from 1990 to 
2005 and had given foundations for a commercial consultancy agency, which is now helping businesses in 
restructuring their management practices and implementing quality standards. 
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Table 2.2 Overview of institutional and market related determinants of JFDI in Poland 
Welcomed and 
encouraging 
Government’s support for the FDI: 
- financial incentives 
- tax breaks 
- operation of Special Economic 
Zones 
Political and economic stability: 
- EU membership (since 2004) 
- resilience of the Polish 
economy during the Global 
Financial Crisis (2008-2009) 
Poland’s economy 
characteristics: 
- the size of the market 
(the most populous in 
the CEE; 38 million) 
-  location                                                 
(Central Europe; 
proximity to 
Germany’s market and 
transportation network, 
port of Hamburg as an 
alternative to Gdańsk 
and Gdynia) 
Characteristic of the 
labour market:  
- comparatively low 
labour costs  
- relatively high 
unemployment rate  
- use of short term 
contracts; 
- relatively easy 
recruitment process                        
(employment agencies) 
Labour 
characteristics:
  
- skilled (based on 
vocational 
education) 
- diligent workers 
Unwelcomed,  
suggested areas 
of improvement 
Weak commercial climate  
- bureaucracy and  long 
administrative procedures 
- inflexible labour regulation and 
Labour Code (particularly 
provisions regarding working time 
and sick leave) 
Infrastructure: 
- lack of extensive network of 
motorways 
- unreliable and underinvested 
public transportation (investors in 
Crystal Park had to provide 
transportation for workers) 
Source: Author, based on research findings (interviews with managers), and Shokokai Report (2012). 
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JFDI in Poland is relatively small compared with that of The Netherlands, Germany, France or 
even Luxemburg. Table 2.3 lists the main investors in Poland by country of origin. In 2010 
Japanese capital in Poland was worth almost 1.2 billion Euros, and that increased significantly 
in the last decade (in 1997 it was worth only 69.5 million USD). The value of the JFDI is 
comparable with those coming from Finland or Portugal. The Japanese are the biggest investor 
from Asia, much exceeding the volume of South Korean and Chinese firms. In 2012 268 
Japanese investors were operating in Poland, including 85 manufacturers.  
 
Table 2.3 FDI inflow in Poland by country of origin (in millions of Euro) (2011) 
The Netherlands 26,817 
Germany  20,394 
France  18,689 
Luxemburg  13,132 
Italy  10,528 
USA  9,271 
...  
Japan  1,158 
South Korea  556 
Total  150,441 
Source: Author based on National Bank of Poland (2011). 
 
The major Japanese investments in manufacturing (automotive, electronics, bearing industries) 
were located in some of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ). SEZs play a crucial role in 
Poland’s development strategy. There are fourteen SEZs, employing more than 225,000 
workers (KPMG, 2011), which makes Poland a leader in CEE. 
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Poland’s Special Economic Zones were established in the mid-1990s to attract investors and 
accelerate economic growth in the most undeveloped regions. The first zone was opened in 
Mielec, South-East in 1995. Initially SEZs were set to operate for twenty years. In 2007 the 
Tusk government has enthusiastically extended functioning of the zones until 2020. However, 
the effectiveness of SEZs was undermined by the independent report published by the Polish 
Supreme Audit Office (NIK, 2009). The Audit Office has indicated that the Ministry of the 
Economy did not scrutinise the benefits and cost stemming from the SEZs and is lacking 
information as to how much precisely was spent on tax breaks and direct governmental support 
paid to investors. Additionally, it was pointed out that 30 per cent of the SEZs’ land is not used. 
Nevertheless, the zones are continuously expanding, getting support from local and national 
governments. 
 
Map 2.1 Concentration of Japanese companies in Poland's SEZs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
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The major clusters of Japanese manufacturing companies are situated in the south-west 
(Wałbrzych Special Economic Zone) and in the north (Pomerania Special Economic Zone). 
The third largest concentration of Japanese firms is located in the heavy industrialized region 
of Upper Silesia (Katowice SEZ); (see Map 2.1). Both areas are relatively remote from 
agglomerations and big city centres. Conventionally, in economic terms, Poland is divided into 
developed, ‘urban’, Poland ‘A’ and undeveloped, ‘rural’ Poland ‘B’ (the origin of this division 
finds its roots in the Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the end of the XVIII 
century). Generally ‘A’ represents the West and ‘B’ the East of the country, with the 
demarcation line along the Vistula River. However there are many underdeveloped and 
depressed areas in the South and in the West (like the Wałbrzych region). Poland ‘B’ is 
characterized by structural unemployment mainly caused by collapse of the SOEs and 
collective farming, so-called PGRs (Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne; English: State 
Agricultural Farm). 
Research conducted in the western economies (Ford and Strange, 1999) confirmed that the 
Japanese are attracted to heavily industrialized regions with a low unionization rates, where the 
wages are relatively low. Aaron’s (1999) study suggests that Japanese investors (Nissan, Sharp 
and Toyota) located their factories in relatively depressed regions: Tennessee and Kentucky in 
the USA and Northern England and Wales in the UK, where the unemployment rate was high 
and cost of the labour was low. Established Japanese investors in Poland: Toyota, Isuzu, 
Bridgestone and Matsishuta have located their plants in Poland’s regions with very good 
transportations links (the capital, Lower and Upper Silesia, the Greater Poland). More recently, 
Japanese manufacturing companies prefer to invest in the special economic zones (see Table 
2.4 for detailed information on number of JFDI in particular Special Economic Zones) located 
in Poland ‘B’, mainly taking advantage of the labour market structure and accessibility to the 
major routes. This is the case with the Japanese investment in Toruń. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
                   
 
Table 2.4 Japanese investments in Poland’s Special Economic Zones (2012) 
Special Economic 
Zone 
Number of Japanese 
Investors 
Sector 
Kamienna Góra 1 Automotive 
Katowice 5 
Logistics, automotive, 
machinery 
Kostrzyń- Słubice 1 Electronics 
Kraków 1 Automotive 
Legnica 2 Automotive 
Łódź 1 Packaging 
Pomerenian (PSEZ) 115 
Automotive, electronics, 
logistics 
Tarnobrzeg 1 Electronics 
Wałbrzych 12 Automotive 
Total 34  
Source: Author based on PAIZZ (2015), information gathered directly from the zones’ administration. 
 
2.5 Japanese investment in Toruń, Kujawy-Pomerania Province 
 
Toruń is a middle-size town (200,000 inhabitants) and is one of the most attractive tourist 
destinations in Poland. It is also the biggest academic centre (Nicolaus Copernicus University, 
Polish: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, UMK) in the North of the country. The University 
                                                          
5 Additionally, in Pomerania Special Economic Zone (PSEZ) 2 other Japanese companies were registered as 
Belgian and Hong-Kong capital. 
33 
 
                   
 
remains the main employer in the city: 4,000 workers and 35,000 students. UMK largely 
contributes to Toruń’s cultural attractiveness. Despite these advantages, Toruń remains 
relatively economically underdeveloped in the Pomerania region. The lack of opportunities in 
the labour market is balanced by the cheap cost of living. 
After liberation in 1945, Toruń got a new university, established on the basis of two former 
Polish universities combined: Vilnius University and Lvov University. The new University 
was named after a famous medieval resident of Toruń - astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus.    
In the first two decades after WWII the region experienced economic depression. In the 1960s 
and the 1970s, new chemical, textile and electronic plants were built in Toruń. Among the 
biggest ones were chemical Elana and textile Merinotex which employed over 10,000 workers 
in the mid 1970s. Elana was the first company in Toruń to co-operate with Japanese firms. In 
1974 Elana’s polyester department was fully equipped by the Toyobo Co Ltd. In 1990 the 
Toruń-based company was trying again to establish economic co-operation with Toyobo, this 
time fruitlessly (Tarnowski, 2009). 
During the 1970s Toruń took an industrial character with new residential settlements (Borough 
of Rubinkowo - now inhabited by 80,000 dwellers). The population of Toruń increased to 
150,000. In the result of an administrative reform, Toruń became the capital of the new 
Province (Toruń Province) in 1975. Since 1998 the city of Toruń has belonged to Kujawy-
Pomerania Province with administrative centres located both in Bydgoszcz and Toruń.  
After 1989 most of the state-owned companies across the country were privatized, partitioned 
or went bankrupt. The situation in Toruń was not any different. Industry had shrunk 
dramatically in the 1990s, and the town was affected by unemployment. At the end of 2010 
unemployment rate in Toruń (independent city) was 9 per cent, in the Toruń land district 18 
per cent (compared with unemployment rate in Poland of 13 per cent) (WUP, 2012). New 
major investments were made mainly by multinational retail chains like Géant, Carrefour or 
Real. Among the most successful companies based in Toruń, the majority are the previous 
state-owned companies, privatized after 1990 or acquired by foreign capital. The most 
prosperous in 2009 were: ThyssenKrupp Energostal, TZMO (Toruń Dressing and Sanitary 
Materials Manufacturing), Toruń-Pacific (Nestle), Apator (electronics) and Polmos (spirits). 
Recent major investors are Castorama Polska/Kingfisher, Sourcing Eastern Europe, 
International Theaters Ltd, Makro Cash & Carry, Urbański Construction Company. Tourism 
34 
 
                   
 
has a significant impact on the economy of the town. The Medieval Old Town of Toruń is listed 
as a UNESCO Heritage Site (from 1998). Toruń was visited by 1.6 million tourists in 2007; 
tourism is expanding (several hotels and the new coach station were opened after year 2000). 
Having a German heritage (the town belonged to the East Prussia until 1918), Toruń is 
extremely popular among German tourists. The council of Toruń closely co-operates with the 
adjoining city of Bydgoszcz (a distance of 40 kilometres; which is more economically-
developed with an international airport; a population of 400,000) creating bi-polar 
agglomeration: Bydgoszcz-Toruń metropolitan area, colloquially called ‘BiT City’. This area 
is a base for a few economic zones and industrial parks, not only in Toruń and Bydgoszcz but 
also smaller towns in Kujawy-Pomerania Province like Inowrocław, Świecie or Solec 
Kujawski. At the present, intensive talks are being held between both cities to create a fast 
railway link connecting Bygdoszcz and Toruń. Furthermore, this partnership is significant, as 
for many years towns were feuding, treating themselves as a competition in the region. The 
population of Toruń was 205,129 in 2009 and is decreasing. Women make 54 per cent, and 
men 46 per cent of the population (Statistical Office in Bydgoszcz, 2015). Around 30 per cent 
of Toruń residents between the ages 25 and 29 years have a degree (Toruń City Government 
Office, 2011). 
In 2006 the Sharp Corporation opened one of the biggest LCD factories in Europe on the 
Northern outskirts of Toruń in Łysomice, which attracted other manufacturing and logistics 
Japanese companies (see Table 2.5). This new industrial site was called ‘Crystal Park’ and 
became part of the Pomerania Special Economic Zone (PSEZ). PSEZ belongs to one of the 
biggest Poland’s SEZs, has 21 subzones spreading through four regions (West-Pomerania, 
Pomerania, Kujawy-Pomerania and Greater Poland). 
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Table 2.5 Japanese companies located at Crystal Park. 
Company name Business activity 
Sharp Manufacturing 
Poland 
LCD/LED TV manufacturing 
Orion Electric Poland LCD/LED TV manufacturing, LED lighting production 
Sumika Electronic 
Materials Poland 
Polarizing filters manufacturer 
Poland Tokai Okaya 
Manufacturing 
Production and assembling of metal pressed elements. 
Tensho Poland 
Corporation 
Plastic injection moulding 
Sohbi Craft Poland Precision pressing manufacturer 
Kimoto Poland Components for LCD screens 
U-Tec Poland Packaging manufacturer  
Yussen Logistics Logistics services 
Nissin Logistics Logistics services 
Nippon Express Logistics services 
Source: Author. 
 
The government’s role in encouraging Japanese investors to Toruń was crucial. On 13th April 
2006, a preliminary agreement was reached between Prime Minister (then Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz, Law and Justice Party), PAIiIZ director - Adam Żołnowski and Sharp Poland 
CEO - Katsuhiko Machida. The very same day, Sharp CEO had visited Toruń himself to verify 
the location (see Map 2.2). He was greeted with honours by the Province Governor - Waldemar 
Achramowicz. Two other locations were considered, probably in the ‘High Tech Corridor’ 
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(North-South Axis, along A1 motorway) or in Southern Poland6. It has been said that Kujawy-
Pomerania Province was not so attractive for investors. The rankings placed the Kujawy-
Pomerania region at the 10th place out of sixteen provinces (Godlewska-Majkowska, et al., 
2011). 
 
Map 2.2 Location of Crystal Park site. 
 
Source: Author. 
 
According to a local government official, the Toruń location was chosen by Japanese 
‘accidently’ on the way to check another place (probably in the Northern Poland)7.  
                                                          
6 Interview with the legal advisor at Investor Assistance Centre in Kuyavia-Pomerania Province. Toruń, 7th June 
2011. 
7 Interview with the legal advisor at Investor Assistance Centre in Kuyavia-Pomerania Province. Toruń, 7th June 
2011. Many higher rank managers at Crystal Park have also confirmed, Japanese preferred Toruń to other 
locations because of its cultural and architectural attractiveness. 
37 
 
                   
 
However, Sharp management claimed that the choice was not unintentional, quite the opposite: 
Sharp’s location in SEZ is mainly down to adherence of academic centres in 
Bydgoszcz and Toruń and in consequence availability of highly specialised and well 
educated potential personnel. Japanese are planning cooperation with Polish scientist 
and employment of the university graduates crème de la crème. We have opened the 
first of five planned production halls. We produce LCD TV sets with the mother glass 
substrates coming from the most technologically advanced factory in Japanese 
Kamayama. Except substrates all the other electronic components are produced in 
Poland.  
Wawrzyniec Jakubowski, Sharp Marketing Manager (Rzeczpospolita, 2007) 
The willingness of the Japanese to invest at this particular site influenced the government’s 
decision to expand Pomerania Special Economic Zone to Toruń and the government decree on 
the expansion of the PSEZ was signed on 5th December 2006. The Province’s marshal Piotr 
Całbecki said: ‘Undoubtedly, Crystal Park’s location near Toruń is a success for the whole 
region. Here at Pomerania Special Economic Zone, as probably nowhere in Poland, new 
initiatives are welcomed and fully supported by many research and development institutions’ 
(Kujawsko-Pomorskie Investor Assistance Centre, 2015). 
This government involvement was also shown during the official opening of the Sharp Factory 
in August 2007. Then Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński was present during the event. 
He said that the government was interested in attracting foreign investors, especially high-tech 
companies: ‘Poland is aware of Sharp’s importance to the world’s economy (...). Owing to its 
investments in Poland our country will soon become Europe’s tycoon TV maker.’ (PAP, 2007). 
The Sharp investment agreement (Memorandum of Understanding), 2006 was signed between 
Sharp Manufacturing Poland, PAIZZ, the local government and PSEZ. This document 
specified long-term government support for Sharp, paid in tranches, by the Ministry of the 
Economy. Moreover, the government was committed to improve infrastructure (mainly, A1 
Motorway). In return Sharp was obliged to create employment. The company faced some 
problems in complying with this contract, as many workers were employed by agencies. Such 
employment is not considered as ‘permanent’. In the years 2006-2010, according to the 
agreement with the government, the firm should have created 3,000 jobs, (Sharp’s prognosis 
were even more ambitious and it claimed to plan on creating 10,000 jobs by 2010; see JETRO, 
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2007) and invested respectively 44 (first stage of investment) and in total 150 million Euros 
(by the end of 2010) (see Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2006: 21). However this did not happen 
and Sharp’s management blamed the crisis for unredeemed promises. During Sharp’s operation 
the employment at the site fluctuated. At its highest, more than two thousand workers were 
employed by the company8. However the corporation was dependent on agencies, which 
supplied up to 50 per cent of the staff. As per 2011 Sharp has only invested 460 million PLN 
(around 110.5 million Euros) and created 1,620 jobs (see Hejna, 2011). As a result of 
decreasing investment and employment, the Polish government has limited subsidies. The LCD 
manufacturer was only granted 56 million PLN, instead of 90 million. The government had 
completely withdrawn the support in 2013 due to Sharp’s not fulfilling the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
At local level, the regional council agreed to exempt Sharp from payment for land conversion 
- from agricultural to industrial site. The other Japanese companies were granted the same 
privilege after a few months, although it should be stressed that the Crystal Park companies are 
still paying property tax. 
The local government, PSEZ and PAIiIZ were working closely together in attracting Japanese 
investment. The political mood was described as ‘positive’, especially the role and attitude of 
Kujawy-Pomerania Province Governor at the time – Waldemar Achramowicz (LDA, Left 
Democratic Alliance, Polish: SLD, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) and Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency director - Włodzimierz Ziółkowski. All of the major political 
parties at the regional level have supported Japanese investment. This consensus is visible at 
Regional Parliament, and among local MPs. One of the leading local politicians who support 
the Japanese investment is MP Tomasz Lenz (Civic Platform, Polish: PO, Platforma 
Obywatelska). He had organized the conference held at local government offices (in April 
2008) titled: ‘The development of Crystal Park’. The Japanese side was complacent with such 
an initiative; Mr Lenz had visited Crystal Park, where he conducted talks with the management 
on the investment plans at the site. 
Crystal Park was also expected to bring direct benefits to local business. Relatively intensive 
co-operation between Japanese investors took place during the start-up period 2006-2008. 
Many local companies were involved in the construction of the site. However, the main 
                                                          
8 Information provided by Sharp’s manager and workers during the fieldwork interviews.   
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investor – Sharp had used a Japanese contractor – Shimizu (which builds most of the Sharp 
sites all over the world). Orion was built by the biggest local construction company – Marbud. 
Another local company installed all the plumbing at the park (Melbud). This co-operation 
diminished in the following years. Japanese firms grouped in Crystal Park are not registered at 
Toruń Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Polish law does not require a company’s 
registration at the Chamber of Commerce (unlike in Germany). Presumably, firms associated 
with the chamber are not considered as serious partners for Japanese investors. Table 2.6 lists 
Crystal Park locational characteristics which have influenced Japanese decisions to invest in 
Kujawy-Pomerania Region. 
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Fixed locational characteristics  
 provision of the industrial 
site 
 market access 
 transportation infrastructure 
 labour force characteristics 
 labour relations climate 
 
 Industrial site: the local government provided fully equipped land, with 10 km of internal roads, with gas, water and electric networks. 
This investment was worth 100 million PLN. 
 Labour characteristics: High unemployment rate in the whole province: in 2006- 22per cent, in 2010- 15per cent. Average monthly 
gross wages and salaries are 14 per cent lower than country’s average. 
 Skilled and ample labour force- around 30 per cent of Toruń residents at the age 25-29 years have a degree.  
 The trade unions are considerably weaker in the Toruń region, than in the metropolitan areas. Only Solidarność union has established 
relatively good network in a private owned companies. 
 Transportation infrastructure: Crystal Park was located next to the A1 Motorway linking South and North of Poland (there are good 
connections to the port of Gdańsk, as well as to Warsaw). Polish railways Cargo Terminal supposed to invest in Crystal Park, Polish 
Railways bought the land; no investment took place. Proximity of the major Poland’s airport in Warsaw – 250 km distance from 
Toruń; other minor international airport in Bydgoszcz (located 50km from the site).  
 Market access: From the national level: decision was undoubtedly influenced by the Poland’s accession to the EU (2004). Proximity 
to German market. 
 Toruń’s cultural and architectural attractiveness (mainly gothic old town, UNESCO heritage site). 
Adaptable locational 
characteristics  
 fiscal and financial initiative 
 
 At the national level: investment agreement (this document was called Memorandum of Understanding). 
 The long-term government support for Sharp; paid in tranches, by The Ministry of the Economy. Moreover, the local government is 
obliged to improve infrastructure (mainly A1 Motorway and other local routes). 
 At the local level: Regional Council has agreed to exempt Sharp from payment for the land conversion- from agriculture to industrial 
site. The other Japanese companies were granted the same privilege after few months. It has to be stressed that Crystal Park companies 
are still paying property tax. 
Creatable locational characteristics  
 political support 
 investment climate 
 Good co-operation between the local government, PSEZ and Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency. 
 All of the major political parties at the regional level have supported Japanese investment. This consensus is visible at Regional 
Parliament, and among local MPs. 
 Table 2.6 Locational characteristics of the Japanese investment in Toruń. 
Source: Author based Aaron’s typology (1999). 
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The production in Crystal Park peaked in 2009-2010, due to a high market demand for TVs 
stimulated by incoming football championships. As far as the 2010 world cup proved 
successful in terms of sales and demand, European championship in 2012 disappointingly did 
not bring the longed-for boom. Oversaturated markets did not react to an aggressive advertising 
campaign, the sales had grown less than expected, even though Sharp was one of the major 
sponsors of UEFA Euro 2012. Since 2011 the site has been downsizing. Shown in table 2.7 is 
the scale of the Japanese phase out.  
Table 2.7 Downsizing of the Crystal Park 
Company name 
Employment 
(as per January 2012) 
Current status (2014) 
Sharp Manufacturing 
Poland 
2000 
Operating; downsizing; in 2014 sold to Slovakian 
company UMC – Universal Media Corporation; 
partnership with Sharp 
Orion Electric Poland 700 
Withdrawn, factory building partially leased to Polish 
company Kreis Pack (food industry packaging 
manufacturer) 
Sumika Electronic 
Materials Poland 
500 
Withdrawn; sold to Polish company Katarzynki 
Akcesoria Meblowe (furniture manufacturer) 
Poland Tokai Okaya 
Manufacturing 
800 Operating, stable 
Tensho Poland 
Corporation 
250 
Sale in completion, bought by Polish firm Boryszew S.A. 
(automotive components) 
Sohbi Craft Poland 270 Operating, stable 
Kimoto Poland 40 Put out to tender 
U-Tec Poland 116 
Withdrawn, facilities sold to Tioman Ltd (signs and 
banners manufacturer) 
Yussen Logistics 70 Operating, stable 
Nissin Logistics 70 Operating, stable 
Nippon Express 70 Operating, stable 
Source: Author; based on Kujawy-Pomerania Investor Assistance Centre (2015) 
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Administration of PSEZ slowly started attracting Polish investors, when two of the Japanese 
corporations Sumika and Orion suspended production in late 2012. The latter is partially taken 
on lease by Kreis Pack – a producer of food packaging. One Polish company has built a factory 
within the site; however, the administration of Kujawy-Pomeriania SEZ is attempting to attract 
more new investors to enter the site and talks are being held with potential investors. The 
character of the investment was initially supposed to be lease-based, however Polish firms 
acquired Sumika, Tensho and U-tec. Another abandoned factory is on sale. The local press 
coined a new catch-phrase and is now foreseeing ‘Polonisation of the Japanese site’ 
(Ciechoński, 2014). 
The size of this ‘take over’ is not known yet, however the media appears to embrace this new 
trend as much as the ‘Japanese invasion’ only a few years back. In 2014 employment at Crystal 
Park Japanese firms was relatively low and only 1,050 people were working at the site. Despite 
‘broken promises’ Japanese investment is still considered positive and beneficial to the region. 
During the parliamentary question time, when asked about the downsizing and future of 
Łysomice, the Polish Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Economy said: 
We agree that both, Administration of PSEZ and the local authorities have exercised 
all legally possible means to alleviate consequences of downsizing production at 
Crystal Park Japanese companies. We consider establishing of the cluster in 2006 
under special economic zone a rational decision based on the economic prognosis of 
highly regarded economic institutes. According to investment plans production level 
was to provide employment for over 10 thousand people. As we know today, no one 
could have predicted the sudden market slump, especially in electronics industry, and 
no one could have prepared for this early enough. The problem has also grown due 
to close proximity of the interlinked firms which shared similar production profile 
and industry. Administration of the economic zone is successfully working on 
resolving the situation. We have seen some positive effects already and chances are 
that within the next two to three years Crystal Park will undergo investment 
‘revitalisation’. 
(Antoniszyn-Klik, 2013) 
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2.6 Conclusions 
With the stagnation of the Japanese economy, the significance of the global Japanese FDI has 
declined over the last twenty years. In addition, the emergence of South Korea and BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies as an important source of outward investment has 
eroded some of the Japanese investors.  However, JFDI has not diminished and it can be argued 
that the collapse of communism in CEE, and the consequent accession to the EU contributed 
to the diversion of some JFDI from Western to Eastern Europe.  
Poland is the leader among CEE countries in attracting Japanese investors. This could be 
attributed to the role and the scale of Poland’s SEZs of which Japanese manufacturers have 
fully taken advantage. The Japanese are attached to the supportive role of the state, which is 
expressed in strong administrative supervision of the corporate sector by the Ministry of 
Economy Trade and Industry (METI) in Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese investors the role 
of Polish government in attracting Japanese multinationals, is still insufficient, although the 
attractiveness of Poland substantially increased after the EU enlargement in 2004. The vast 
majority of Japanese manufacturing corporations in Poland operate within SEZs and the two 
biggest (in terms of concentration of JFDI) Japanese clusters in Poland are located in 
Wałbrzych Special Economic Zone and in the subzone of Pomerania Special Economic Zone 
near Toruń (Crystal Park). Both regions suffer from structural unemployment and 
underinvestment.  
The Japanese corporations maintained a close relationship with the host-country’s political 
networks and took advantage of strong support of local legislative and executive bodies. From 
the national level, the Toruń investment obtained the necessary assistance from the government 
(Ministry of the Economy, Prime Ministers themselves representing two opposing political 
parties as well as Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency). The harsh economic 
situation (especially the high unemployment rate and lack of the greenfield investment) in the 
province forced political consensus, even among foreign investment sceptic parties such as PiS 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, English: Law and Justice). This political support has not decreased 
even though Sharp did not fulfil their requirements in terms of creating employment.  
From the point of view of the location decision, market access, the supply of labour, 
transportation infrastructure and financial incentives have played a fundamental role. The skills 
level was of marginal importance, as the majority of jobs required low-skilled labour. The 
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locations of Japanese investments in Toruń share similar features as Japanese corporations’ 
other investments in Western Europe and United States. Japan prefers to invest in peripheral, 
less-developed or even depressed regions, but those well-integrated through transportation 
network at the same time. The site in Crystal Park is downsizing, this however reflects the 
global trend of decreasing demand for electronics, particularly LCDs.   
This chapter has outlined the context of JFDI in Poland. Theoretical underpinnings of the 
project will be presented in the next two chapters. Researching transforming economies 
requires a deep understanding of the highly complex and dynamic context (Steger, 2004) and 
the researcher is faced with the task of unravelling and understanding as much of this context 
as possible. In case of qualitative research, the existence of an ‘absolute truth’ is generally 
rejected (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Steger, 2004) and there is no single best framework or theory 
to grasp the dynamics of transformation in CEE, hence the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach.  
The following chapters will present an analysis and comparison of Japanese and Polish 
business systems and capitalism. Japanese FDI characteristics, starting at a national level 
(Chapter Three) and then moving to the workplace itself (Chapter Four) will be given.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
JAPANESE AND POLISH VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Workplaces can be viewed as peculiar laboratories of socio-economic interaction, yet, they do 
not operate in the vacuum. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the relationship between 
the foreign investors (Japanese FDI) and the FDI recipient (Polish workplace) in the context of 
employment relations. The theoretical approach for the purpose of this analysis is the Variety 
of Capitalism framework (VoC). This chapter aims to cast light on the existing literature on 
Varieties of Capitalism in a complex context of transforming CEE economies. Some scholars 
consider the application of the VoC taxonomy in analysing transforming economies ‘fruitful’ 
and ‘useful’ (Crowley, 2008); sufficient in gaining understanding and providing tools for 
analysis of the latecomers (Federowicz, 2004); however it can also prove ‘challenging’ when 
applied to CEE (Hardy and Kozek, 2011; King, 2007a; 2007b) or even narrow in 
underestimating the role of external dimensions in shaping institutions (Bohle, 2006; Shields, 
2004). 
  
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, to contextualize Poland, works presenting 
transformation in historical perspective, from planned to free-market economy will be 
reviewed (3.2). Next, the ongoing debate on the variety of capitalism framework will be 
presented (3.3). Simultaneously, based on the VoC framework, Poland and Japan’s economies 
will be examined in terms of the main defining features of VoC (3.4). The discussion will then 
move on to the further aspects of capitalism. The employment relations in the context of Polish 
and Japanese workplaces will be explored (3.5). Lastly, recognizing the limitations of the VoC 
framework in transforming economies, this chapter will briefly outline the critical literature on 
the subject (3.6). 
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3.2 Economic Transformation in Poland 
 
Throughout twenty years of Poland’s democratization, since 1989 the economy remains in 
transition. There is no reversion, as King (2002: 8) observes: ‘Shock Therapy destroyed old 
communist era institutions − making the transition irreversible’. Poland became a playground 
for many conflicting political and economic factions. Nevertheless, the majority of all 
governments since 1989 have agreed that Poland should follow a market oriented path, 
underpinned by an explicit admiration of Anglo-Saxon type of capitalism. An unwritten 
alliance among Polish elites over neoliberal policies took place after 1989. Moreover, in the 
beginning phase of the transformation the working class (with the dominant Solidarność trade 
union) supported this agreement 9 . ‘A protective umbrella’ was folded over the reforms 
introduced by the government in 1989 (Rainnie and Hardy, 1998). David Ost (2002) accurately 
observes that the trade unions, initially at least, accepted the shock therapy measures. 
Poland belongs to the post-communist economies, which are distinguished by political 
economists into two main subgroups: Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The former has integrated with Western capitalism relatively 
quickly; in the latter transformation processes took much longer. The Polish road to capitalism 
shares similar characteristics to other CEE countries, particularly to the three remaining 
Visegrád Group (V4) economies; hence in the political economy literature these economies are 
regularly compared with each other. Poland, Czech, Slovak Republics and Hungary, despite 
collaboration within the V4 had co-operated economically altogether within the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement  (CEFTA), followed by joint accession to the European Union 
(EU) in 2004. As Bohle and Greskovits (2007a: 90) point out: ‘East European societies indeed 
seem to have settled on divergent models of capitalism’. Still, Poland differs from its 
counterparts not only in the terms of the structure and size of the economy, but also 
institutionally. This chapter tries to place Poland’s economy in the variety of capitalism 
approach avoiding generalization made by the V4 perspective. In order to understand how this 
specific, ‘Polish’ type of capitalism is responsible for creating brand new, post-communist 
                                                          
9 In 1989 Lech Wałęsa said: ‘We will not catch up to Europe if we build a strong union’ (Ławiński, 1989). During 
his presidential campaign in 1990 he argued, that the plight of the working class in the beginning phase of the 
transformation can be solved only by introducing more capitalism and more privatization. 
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industrial relations and the development and complexity of Poland’s capitalism it is necessary 
to outline its economic-historical cycles. 
 
3.2.1 Economy 
 
Poland’s economy along with the other countries of CEE started transforming from 
commanded to market economy in 1989 and 1990. This transition is known as the Balcerowicz 
Plan or Program10 (Hardy, 2009). Leszek Balcerowicz as the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland 
and Minister of Finance (1989-1991) in Tadeusz Mazowiecki government had introduced a 
packet of ten acts liberalizing Poland’s economy11. At that stage there was no serious debate 
over the model of capitalism Poland should follow; neither was any alternative plan officially 
presented 12 Balcerowicz Programme undoubtedly was leaning towards liberal market 
economy. Leszek Balcerowicz and other economists backed up the market ‘on all fronts’ and 
‘advocated the Shock Therapy of stabilization, liberalization and privatization’ as a part of the 
‘neoliberal blueprint’ and ‘extraordinary politics’ (King 2002, 2007b). The implementation of 
the plan was carried out with the support of the IMF and the World Bank, organizations which, 
at that time, imposed the particular way of transformation, not only in Europe, but also in Latin 
America (‘Washington Consensus’). 
The Mazowiecki government was granted a loan of nearly two billion dollars, which reduced 
Poland’s huge foreign debt (over 40 billion USD) by half. Both Paris and London Clubs agreed 
                                                          
10 According to the Polish economist, Professor Tadeusz Kowalik, the whole Balcerowicz Programme was in fact 
the idea of foreign advisors such as Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton and Stanisław Gomułka (Dryszel, 2010). 
11 Entrepreneurship act was introduced earlier, by Mieczysław Rakowski communist government in the late 1988. 
This act is considered as a model for liberal entrepreneurship legislation. Mieczysław Wilczek, one of the few 
successful entrepreneurs in the 1960s and the 1970s, later the Minister of the Industry in the Rakowski cabinet 
was the initiator of the act. The last legal decision of Rakowski ministry was passing the price liberalization act 
in August 1989, which caused hyperinflation in next few months. 
12 As Drahokoupil (2009: 90) states: ‘Shortly before the collapse of communism, the idea of the Third Way 
between capitalism and socialism was quite popular. In the discussion about the reform strategy ‘Sweden’ was an 
important reference point as of capitalism and social system for which the CEE states should strive. Alternative, 
more gradual plans of transformation, based on German and Scandinavians models were prepared by Polish 
economists Ryszard Bugaj, Danuta Hübner and Tadeusz Kowalik, although never seriously considered by 
Mazowiecki government. Considerable, but only academic debate about Balcerowicz programme took place later. 
The main opponent was prof. Grzegorz Kolodko, supporter of the gradual, ‘Keynsian’ way of transformation. The 
Balcerowicz-Kołodko dispute is fully understood, since both of them were involved in governing (Ministry of 
Finance), implementing different economic policies. On many occasions Kołodko named Balcerowicz 
programme: ‘Shock without therapy’ (see Kołodko, 2007; Mańka, 2011). 
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to cut it back due to a difficult transition period and implementing free-market reforms 
(Balcerowicz, 2009). 
Since 1989 Poland has also become the beneficiary of the PHARE programme (Poland and 
Hungary − Assistance for Economic Restructuring) financed by the European Union. 
Drahokoupil (2009) coined the term neoliberal transformational state which is related to shock 
stabilization, shock price, trade liberalization and privatization in CEE countries. In a short 
period of time Poland’s inflation and budget deficit were significantly reduced, and its currency 
stabilized. The slow growth of GDP was noted. On the other hand, Poland faced massive public 
cuts and structural unemployment (increase from 0.5 per cent in 1989 to 14 per cent in 199413) 
followed by bankruptcies of some state-owned companies (SOEs) (predominantly affecting 
steel, mining and heavy industry).  
Balcerowicz focused predominantly on monetary policy. In order to control money supply in 
the years 1990 -1994 SOE employees’ wages were subdued by deflationary popiwek tax (super-
normative wages tax). The decrease in living standards was severe. In 1990, an average family 
spent more than 72 per cent of its income on food; it was 30 per cent more than in 1989 
(Supińska, 1995). The transition was especially hard for the rural areas where the previously 
collectivized state-owned farms (Polish: PGR - Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne), now 
bankrupt, were the only employers and therefore source of income14. With the open market and 
the liberalization of trade, Polish farmers were forced to compete with the subsidized 
agricultural products of the EU (Shields, 2004). The vast unemployment in the depressed 
regions of Poland became the transition’s longstanding symbol.  
Kołodko and Nuti (1997: 9) argue:  
(…) in the Polish case, progress in some directions was matched by excessive 
deterioration in others, showing that early Polish transition had not resolved the 
                                                          
13 Some economists claim that it was not the real increase of unemployment since ‘hidden unemployment’ took 
place in the SOEs before transformation. In 1989 only 10 thousand people were registered as unemployed. Leszek 
Balcerowicz (2009) states, that unemployment in years 1989-1991 was at the usual European rate (unemployment 
in Spain was 22 per cent at that time), and it was intrinsic to transformation. 
14 The research of Polish Association of Suicidology monitored the growth of the suicide rate in the rural depressed 
regions, which was disproportionately higher compared to urban areas. In 1992 in agricultural areas as many as 
2156 deaths were noted to have been the result of a suicide (1495 in 1990). The tendency continued to grow till 
the end of the 1990s (see Jarosz, 2005). 
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outstanding problems but simply transformed them into other problems and, what 
matters most, had underperformed. 
The outcome of the ‘shocks’ overshot initial targets in terms of budget surplus and trade 
surplus. At the same time Poland was still facing recession and high inflation (60 per cent in 
1991)15. The privatization processes in the beginning of the 1990s were carried out gradually, 
mainly in small and medium enterprises (SME). As Drahokoupil (2009) points out, 
privatization was not conducted in a pure neoliberal way. In the period 1995-1996 the social-
democratic government implemented mass privatization through direct sales, although FDI’s 
contribution in the conversion was insignificant. The early phase of Polish transformation was 
also characterized to some extent by state interventionism caused by a social and political 
backlash. The ‘nationalistic’, Olszewski government (1991-1992) tried to constrain the reforms 
started by Balcerowicz, but his cabinet was more focused on the political issues 
(‘decommunization’ and ‘lustration’16) than on economic ones. In the view of the latter, social-
democratic governments (1994-97) inflow of FDI became a panacea for high unemployment. 
It was supposed to compensate for huge social problems evoked by shock liberalization and 
stabilization. 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) provided capital, technology, access to foreign markets 
and were responsible for the country’s re-industrialization (King, 2007a). Indeed, the Polish 
economy accelerated; industrial production rose and unemployment fell. In 1996, Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) and investments grants were introduced to attract foreign investors. 
SEZs were a much preferred location for foreign companies than domestic firms. The inflow 
of foreign investment increased, especially in the automotive sectors (General Motors, Fiat, 
and Daewoo). The new institutions present in the Visegrád countries such as: protective 
regulation and tariffs, foreign trade and investment agencies, investment support funds and tax 
exemption regimes attracted foreign investors (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a). At the end of the 
decade, foreign investors took more advantage of privatization opportunities. In the years 1999-
                                                          
15  ‘Balcerowicz has to go!’ (Polish: Balcerowicz musi odejść!), slogan popularized by the leader of the 
Samoobrona (English: Self Defense) party, Andrzej Lepper in the mid-1990s was directed not to Balcerowicz 
personally, but expressed a dissatisfaction with the free-market reforms. 
16 Lustration (Polish: lustracja), name taken from the Roman lustrum purification rituals; was a process of purge 
and scrutinization of government officials once affiliated with the Communist system. In variety of forms it took 
place in the whole of CEE and in principle resembled de-Nazification in post-World War II Europe. Its purpose 
was to eliminate all those formerly involved in communist state from any public office. It was also aimed at 
unmasking former members of SB (communist secret police; Polish: Służby Bezpieczeństwa) and later in its 
extreme form, all the civil ‘informants’ who might have cooperated with the communist regime. 
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2000 an immense sell-off in the banking sector was observed. At the same time the ‘national’ 
Mass Privatization Programme (Polish: PPP - Program Powszechnej Prywatyzacji) – so-called 
‘voucher privatization’ did not bring significant economic results, as the bonds did not reach 
the initially suggested price on the stock exchange (see Baltowski and Mickiewicz, 2000). The 
effects on corporate governance were also minimal, as the PPP in Poland was conducted 
through the investment funds (Estrin et al., 2009). Finally, in terms of political impact it was 
even considered a failure, as in the eyes of the voters it was nothing more but the ‘sell-out to 
the Germans’ (Boycko et al., 1993: 10). 
Overall, the second part of the 1990s had consolidated Polish capitalism with the global 
economy. Significant economic growth was noted in the years 1994-1997 (the biggest growth 
rate in CEE) (World Bank, 2013). The end of the decade was characterized by recession and 
social unrest caused by the failure of four reforms introduced in 1999 by the Solidarity 
government. Nearly one thousand industrial actions took place in 1999 alone (ILO, 2014)17. In 
the international arena, with EU negotiations opened (1994) and accession to OECD (1996) 
and NATO (1999) - Poland was recognized politically and economically. The new millennium 
brought social democrats (Democratic Left Alliance) to the power again (2001). Being inspired 
by the economic position of Labour in the UK and SPD in Germany (‘The Third Way’), DLA 
fully accepted capitalism, continuing neoliberal policy. The social democrats significantly 
reduced spending on welfare and made the Labour Code more flexible (Hardy, 2009). Although 
economic growth rose, the unemployment rate reached 19 per cent in 2004 (GUS, 2006). This 
trend was stopped by EU accession and huge labour emigration. Joining the Union also 
intensified MNCs’ activities in Poland, improving the economic situation. In 2007 alone, more 
than half million jobs were created in the private sector (GUS, 2008). Poland developed 
manufacturing sectors (white goods and LCD monitors) (Ancyparowicz, 2009). The post-2005 
right-wing governments (Law and Justice followed by the Civic Platform) applied even more 
neoliberalism: further public cuts and privatization. Poland’s economy was at variance with the 
global crisis, with positive economic growth as the only country in the region, hence the media 
called the Polish economic situation the ‘velvet crisis’ (Hardy, 2010). However at the same 
time other macroeconomic factors like unemployment and public debt had a rising tendency 
(GUS, 2010). 
                                                          
17 Social disappointment of reforms was expressed by famous slogan: ‘Four Reforms and the Funeral’. 
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Despite the immense economic growth (in the years 2000-2007 by 250 per cent) (World Bank, 
2013), transformation did not diminish the historical division of Poland ‘A’ and Poland ‘B’ 
(‘Eastern Frontier’). The Eastern, undeveloped, underinvested part of the country is 
characterized by structural unemployment, a huge percentage living in poverty and lack of FDI, 
which contrasted with predominately western, developed regions18. Half of the FDI in the 
manufacturing sector has been invested in three western and southern (Poland ‘A’) provinces 
only: Mazowieckie, Śląskie and Wielkopolskie. The capital intensive investments are located 
in metropolitan areas, and the labour intensive in the rural regions. As a result, metropolitan 
areas are getting long-term, more technologically advanced investments (Domański, 2003). 
The most significant aspects of Poland’s division are income disparities and the rate of 
unemployment; Mazursko-Warmińskie Province has 18 per cent registered unemployed while 
Mazowieckie or Małopolskie 10 per cent less (GUS, 2010). It is hard to avoid comparisons 
with the imperfect unification of Germany in 1990s, when the country was still not fully 
integrated and immense social and economic differences between ‘Ossi’ and ‘Wessi’ could be 
found. Poland ‘B’ is also suffering from depopulation due to huge rural-urban migration started 
in the 1970s, deepened by joining the EU in 2004 with easily-accessed labour markets of 
Western Europe. Uneven regional development seems to be an inherent part of Polish 
capitalism. Existence of poverty in the rural, Southern and Eastern parts of the country is a 
structural problem. The different level of economic development in the regions is related to the 
various capacities of human capital in Poland ‘B’, hence serious disparities in income are 
present in different regions (Leszczyńska, 2006).  The ‘Eastern Frontier’ is not only lacking 
investments and infrastructure, but also public institutions. Economic diversity of the regions 
is typical for many developed countries like the UK or Belgium, but the scale of Polish 
‘partition’ is more severe and has a deteriorating tendency. At present, the dominant neoliberal 
discourse opted for labour migration, rather than for restructuring the depressed regions19. 
Developmental unevenness is a hallmark of Poland’s economy. 
                                                          
18 Purely geographical division is too general. Many regions in the West (especially the West-Pomeranian Region) 
and in the central part of Poland (Świętokrzyskie Region) belong to Poland ‘B’. The division has also its political 
aspect: ‘A’ is more liberal and pro-European (supporters of the ‘Civic Platform’ Party), while ‘B’ is conservative 
and catholic (‘Law and Justice’ Party). Interestingly enough, the economic division can be observed also on the 
railway map of Poland: dense network prevails in the West and South (Prussian and Austro-Hungarian partitions). 
This serves as one of the examples of lack of infrastructure in the East. 
19 Leszek Balcerowicz in the interview for Gazeta Wyborcza on 17th December 2009 said: ‘There is no point to 
create jobs in Poland ‘B’, it is better for people to migrate to developed regions in search of jobs’ (Klich, 2009). 
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The next sections will compare Poland’s and Japan’s economic systems using the Variety of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework. 
 
3.3 Varieties of Capitalism: Conceptual Framework 
 
The application of comparative approaches in analysing capitalist systems is not a new 
perspective (Crouch and Streeck (eds), 1997; Whitley, 1999; Coates, 2000; Jessop, 2002). The 
Variety of Capitalism (VoC) framework identified by Hall and Soskice (2001) has been broadly 
adopted and scrutinised over the last decade. It distinguishes two main types of capitalist 
economies: Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME). The 
first perspective places the firm in a dominant role among other ‘actors’ of the economy: 
individuals, governments and producer groups. LMEs are characterized by the presence of the 
market mechanism co-ordinating relations between firms, and between firms and their 
financiers, while CMEs depend more on non-market relationships and formal institutions 
which harmonized these relations. Such a dichotomy has limitations. Hence, this approach has 
attracted some criticism. The analysis considers only one feature of capitalist economies - the 
co-ordination process of firms (Lane and Myant, 2007). Alternatively, Amable (2003) develops 
five types of capitalism: The Market-Based one is equivalent to the LME. The Asian model is 
‘highly dependent on the business strategies of large corporations in collaboration with the 
state and the central financial system’ (Ibid: 15). The Social-Democratic model is characterized 
by moderate employment security and high levels of social welfare. The Continental European 
system is similar to the social-democratic model, the welfare state is less developed, and the 
wage bargaining system is co-ordinated. The Mediterranean model has more employment 
protection and less social provision than the continental European model. Amable uses more 
complex criteria (product market, labour market, finance, welfare and education) to distinguish 
these types. 
The Varieties of Capitalism paradigm is based on an institutionalist worldview. Hall and 
Soskice are attempting to understand ‘institutional similarities and differences among the 
developed economies’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 1). The major strength of this approach lies in 
the synthetic explanation of economic systems - their main features, sources of comparative 
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advantage on an institutional level, although there is a strong argument for more emphasis put 
on the exogenous factors. It is argued that a wider theoretical framework may be required to 
gain a deeper understanding. Howell (2008: 122) proposes: 
The next step is to place its distinctive institutional analysis within a wider theoretical 
framework that incorporates historical trajectories, class relationships, and the 
development of capitalism as a global system. 
According to Hall and Soskice (2001) in different market economies generally corporate 
strategy is conditioned, yet not completely determined, by institutional structure. They 
acknowledge the importance of various regional and sector level impacts on strategy (Campbell 
et al., 1991; Hollingsworth et al. (eds), 1994) however their focus is on the national level. 
The Variety of Capitalism framework places the firm in the centre of the socioeconomic arena. 
In order to be successful, the firm needs to interrelate with a wide range of actors. Hall and 
Soskice identify the following spheres of such co-ordination: industrial relations, vocational 
training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and finally the employees. 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 7) Each of these areas may present problems and it is vital to the 
firm’s development and growth to be able to tackle them. This is done with the support of 
institutions. (Ibid: 9). Therefore it is argued that 
(...) differences in the institutional framework of the political economy generate 
systematic differences in corporate strategy across LMEs and CMEs. (Ibid: 16) 
Departing from the above-mentioned viewpoint, it is crucial for this analysis to establish 
whether in fact, as Hall and Soskice suggest, within given political economy, firms meet ‘a set 
of coordinating institutions’ that they are not able to fully control (Ibid: 15). 
Following the notion of VoC framework it is presumed that on a national level different 
investment strategies are shaped by availability of ‘institutional support’ rather than market 
relations alone. Moreover, this can also be applied on a general level, as ‘each economy 
displays specific capacities for coordination that will condition what its firms and government 
do.’ (Ibid: 35). 
The era of globalisation brings new questions to the comparative capitalism perspective. 
Determined by easier and cheaper transport and communication, the liberalization of trade and 
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financial regimes and growing international competition, a large increase in foreign direct 
investment is a characteristic notion of a globalising world. It is not in the scope of this research 
to discuss the phenomenon of globalisation per se. Ohmae (1990), Berger and Dore (1996), 
Friedman (1999), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Giddens (1999), among many others have 
considered this extensively over the last couple of decades. Yet, in the globalisation debate the 
variety of capitalism approach takes an unconventional stand. 
Firstly, it presumes that firms are not homogenous across nations and, as Knetter (1989) 
suggests, their reactions to similar challenges also differ, and therefore they cannot respond to 
globalisation in the same way either (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 56). Secondly, it argues that 
firms’ mobility and preparedness to conquer global markets is determined by comparative 
institutional advantage. Firms may be reluctant to give up the supporting institutions of the 
home country; simultaneously they may want to take advantage of the particular institutions 
off-shore in the process of ‘institutional arbitrage’ (Ibid: 57). In this view globalisation is 
unlikely to lead to a monolithic model of politic and economic governance (Giddens, 1999).  
As sceptics of convergence, Hall and Soskice conclude:  
Because of comparative institutional advantage, nations often prosper, not by 
becoming more similar, but by building on their institutional differences. (Ibid: 60) 
In the light of the above, the question of the diffusion of particular practices and institutions 
across the borders appears especially important. As a capital (firm) travels to operate abroad it 
does so equipped with its nation-specific ‘baggage’. Two strands of literature, both within the 
institutionalist tradition, explain this notion of globalisation. 
Departing from a view that MNCs are not ‘stateless’ organisations and are not in fact 
independent of their homeland model of economic culture; an older approach points to 
distinctiveness of ’industrial orders’ (Lane, 1989), better known under the name of ‘national 
business systems’ (NBSs) (Whitley, 1992 (ed); 1998; Sally, 1994) as determinants of specific 
business behaviours across countries. Another explanation underlines the importance of 
‘country of origin effects’ in shaping corporate strategies overseas (Ferner, 1997; Ferner and 
Quintanilla, 1998; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003). 
National business systems are defined as: 
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(...) particular arrangements of hierarchy-market relations which become 
institutionalized and relatively successful in particular contexts. 
(Whitley, 1992: 10) 
Deeply embedded in specific institutional contexts of different nations these ‘clusters’ of 
institutions significantly influence MNCs behaviours (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998) on many 
levels. Lane (1998: 463) argues that: 
Degree of national embeddedness and implantation into national policy networks is 
held to influence the internationalization strategy of companies - the degree of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) undertaken, the kind of competitive advantage they 
seek to derive from it and the way in which they combine nationally based and 
globally focused activities. 
At the same time, the extent to which NBS influence patterns of MNCs business behaviour is 
problematic. Derived from the new-institutionalist notion of isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Westney, 1993; Zucker, 1977), some scholars 
suggest that in some areas MNCs subsidiaries are likely to adopt similar structures and 
practices as countries in which they operate (Brewster, et al., 2007), while in other areas the 
‘country-of-origin’ effect is prevalent (Ferner, 1997). MNCs are deeply anchored in their 
national business systems and the latter influence corporate strategies; yet not all elements of 
the business systems are transferable, or in Ferner’s (1997) words – ‘exportable’. While some 
features of native variety are rooted too deep in the ‘home’ culture to disseminate, host country 
institutions may guard the import of foreign NBS or shape the dynamics of the transfer, and 
therefore ‘national differences in MNCs will continue’ (Ibid: 34), yet they will do so in an 
evolutionary manner. An earlier work points to MNCs as key actors in the diffusion of ‘best 
practice’ across the borders through FDI. According to Elger and Smith (1994: 35): 
(...) the international division of labour and production through transnational capital 
means an unequal installation of personnel practices, manufacturing techniques and 
training programmes typically identified with the home practices of the dominant 
country. 
Elger and Smith (1994) are therefore convinced that the national economies compete to 
introduce their version of capitalism. Moreover, a competitive advantage of a particular 
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economy (or economies) is a deciding factor in the run towards ‘hegemony’. At the same time 
MNCs are seen as the main protagonists of this transfer process, and their capacity to move 
HR/IR practices from one country to another marks the significance of multinationals in the 
globalised world. One fact of this is the transfer of employment practices to subsidiaries. If 
successful the latter may result in higher efficiency of the given MNC; simultaneously it may 
pose a challenge, as - due to the shift from the practices widely accepted on national level - it 
can lead to tensions between different organizational groups (Edwards, 2004). Response to the 
transfer may take many forms – actors in subsidiaries adopt a variety of approaches in response 
– from willingness to learn and enthusiastic implementation, to questioning and opposing the 
practice and reluctant acceptance; or even critique and resistance, insisting on the practice 
being adapted to the host country’s specific requirements (Edwards, 2004; Broad, 1994). 
Employment practices, like any other institutions, are deeply embedded in national contexts 
and cultures; therefore it is presumed that transfer of the latter practices will also be contested 
by nature. Edwards (2004: 396) concludes that: 
 (...) national origin shapes and constrains the actions of these actors but leaves scope 
for them to draw on practices operating in other countries (...) 
It is suggested that a host-country effect (Edwards and Ferner, 2000; Lipsey, 2002; Almond et 
al., 2005; Broad, 1994) may also inform the behaviour of MNCs while transferring 
employment practices to host environments. Thus the institutional and cultural features of a 
subsidiary business system shape the dynamics of the transfer and in some cases the practice 
‘may undergo transmutation as actors in the recipient seek to adapt it to pre-existing models of 
behaviour, assumptions and power relations’ (Edwards and Ferner, 2000: 13). Almond et al., 
(2005) enumerate main influences that should be considered while researching HRM within 
MNCs. They point to: country of origin, dominance effects, pressures for international 
integration, and host country effects. It is argued that the degree of impact may vary and alter 
over time because of wider political, economic and institutional change.  
In the light of the above-mentioned literature, it is important to examine the behaviour of MNCs 
(in the case of this thesis - Japanese corporations) – which originate in a particular national 
business system (Japanese business system) – when moving to a host-country environment 
(transforming economy of CEE – Poland). The national business systems of both - home and 
host - countries can be defined as ‘the interlocking relationships between societally constructed 
institutional forms’ (Almond et al., 2005: 279) in the following areas - industrial relations, 
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vocational training and education, the nature of inter-firm relations, the firm-level employee 
relations’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The proposed Variety of Capitalism framework allows 
such theoretical exertion. 
While theVoC framework successfully identifies patterns of similarity and differences across 
national economies, it is not flawless. Placing Poland and Japan in the taxonomy of the VoC 
framework (below, Section 3.4) allows an integrated comparison of these economies. At the 
same time, for a variety of reasons, it is necessary to take into consideration a number of factors 
that transcend beyond the two ideal types presented by Hall and Soskice. Country-of-origin 
effect and national business systems concepts have been introduced for a better understanding 
of the FDI’s institutional impacts. The critique of the VoC literature will be discussed further 
in the last section of this chapter (3.6).  
 
3.4 Polish and Japanese Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The following sections provide a comparative analysis of both economies. While the Japanese 
type can be classified as CME, placing the Polish transforming economy within the VoC 
taxonomy is problematic. There is a body of literature attempting to address this dilemma 
(Mykhnenko, 2007; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009; Hardy and Kozek, 2011; Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2007a). It is argued that Poland is a mixed economy and that characteristics of 
either of both ideal types distinguished by Hall and Soskice (2001) are present. Throughout the 
twenty five years of transformation the Polish economy has shifted towards the LME type, 
however still some characteristics of socialist regime can be found. Hence reliance on FDI is 
considered an important feature of post socialist economies. The term ‘Dependent Market 
Economy’ has been coined to depict the nature of this relationship. A concise comparison of 
the two economies can be found in Table 3.1, while a detailed juxtaposition, based on the VoC 
framework, with the focus on the employment relation aspects of Poland’s and Japan’s systems, 
is provided in the next two sections, respectively 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). 
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Table 3.1 Poland and Japan compared (Varieties of Capitalism framework). 
Feature of VoC Poland Japan 
Relationship with 
suppliers 
Short-term relationship Long-term relationship 
(cooperative). 
Relationship with the 
government. 
Open policy towards 
FDI.  SEZs set up by the 
government. 
 
Strong administrative 
supervision of the 
corporate sector by the 
Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry (MITI) 
Corporate governance Shareholder model of 
corporate governance 
with little dispersion of 
shares. The boards of 
directors are often 
politicised  
Insider control. High level 
of control and ownership 
by banks and affiliated 
companies; 
Distinct keiretsu system. 
Education and vocational 
training 
Company- or industry- 
specific skills are 
acquired both through 
state funded vocational 
training and further 
education and on-the-job 
training. 
Vocational training 
strongly promoted by the 
government. Importance of 
on-the-job training. 
Culture Individualistic Collectivistic 
Source: Author, based on Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
 
 
59 
 
                   
 
3.4.1 Poland 
 
Poland’s post-communist economy can neither be recognized as the ideal LME or CME type, 
nor one of Amable’s approaches. Both Hall and Soksice’s and Amable’s models are mainly 
concentrated on the most developed countries, not allowing for post-communist economies of 
CEE, including Poland. As Bohle and Greskovits (2007a: 90) have rightly noticed: 
…15 years after the breakdown of state-socialism and after sustained attempts at 
market reform, the East European societies indeed seem to have settled on divergent 
models of capitalism, and ‘transitology’ has moved on to comparison. 
Therefore, placing Poland in the Variety of Capitalism approach brings some difficulties. 
Polish capitalistic institutions are relatively new; the ancien regime prevailed to some extent 
especially in terms of the expanded machinery of the state (regulated product market, 
administrative burden). Colloquially the Polish new system was negatively described as ‘crony 
capitalism’ referring to the corrupt practices. This however was unavoidable since the 
transformation was conducted in the rapid way. King (2007a) expanded Hall and Soksice’s 
typology distinguishing Liberal Dependant Capitalism (LDP) in CEE, with proto-CME and -
LME elements, which can be applied to V4. LDP is characterized by the dominant role of FDI. 
Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) have ‘baptized’ this new model of capitalism, alternative to 
LME and CME, a Dependent Market Economy (DME), congenial to LDP. This variety can be 
found across Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The four share ‘very similar 
socioeconomic institutions, while being distinct from, for example, the Baltic States, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Romania or Slovenia’ (Ibid: 671). Moreover, 
Nölke and Vliegenthart suggested that the economies of the Visegrád Group have comparative 
advantages in the assembly and production of relatively complex consumer goods. Among the 
main advantages are cheap skilled labour and the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
which is the most important source of capital; the share of foreign ownership in strategic sectors 
such automotive, electronics and banking is predominant. Thus, the ‘dependent’ variety of 
capitalism suggests how crucial the dependency on foreign capital and the presence of 
multinational companies in Visegrád Group economies is. The authors concluded that the most 
important financing decisions are made in Western Europe and U.S., not in the region itself. 
The labour situation in DMEs is considerably weaker than in CMEs. MNCs are reluctant to 
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institutionalize high wages, high union density and comprehensive collective agreements. 
These industrial relations can be bolstered by competitive pressures and the threat of moving 
investment further east. Additionally MNCs in V4 are attracted by states with substantial tax 
breaks. In terms of welfare arrangements DMEs are not as comprehensive as CMEs, but public 
social spending is more substantial than in LMEs. Myant and Drahokoupil (2010) distinguish 
five, flexible and overlapping types of VoC in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia: FDI-based market economies; peripheral market economies; oligarchic or 
‘clientelistic’ capitalism; order states and remittance; and aid-based economies. In this 
approach, Poland’s economy can be classified as an example of the FDI-based market 
economies, which are characterized by relatively stable and democratic system, integration to 
the EU and the dominant role of MNCs. Greskovits (2005) applied a similar, simplified 
approach based on Wallerstein’s (1974) world systems theory with ‘semi-core’ (V4) and ‘semi- 
peripheral’ (Baltic and Southeast countries) divisions in Eastern Europe. Poland’s exports, 
reliant on the ‘heavy basic’ and ‘heavy complex’ sectors, constitutes Poland as a ‘semi core’ 
country in a global economy. Bohle and Greskovits (2007a; 2007b) claim that countries 
grouped in V4 are interested in industrial-upgrading. Additionally they offer more social 
protection against neoliberal side effects.  
Another perspective is presented by Mykhnenko (2007) who was the first to compare Poland’s 
variety of capitalism with Ukraine. The Polish economy is characterized by a heavily regulated 
product market and a high level of protection against foreign trade and investment. Capitalism 
in both Poland and the Ukraine is classified as Mixed Market Economy (MME) or ‘weak’ 
CME, with moderate employment protection, weak unions and little formal centralization and 
co-ordination for wage bargaining. Since the late 1990s the role of Poland’s welfare state has 
decreased, and the wage-labour nexus has shifted towards market-based models. Polish 
industrial relations have decentralized. Relations between managers and employees are non-
confrontational, as the small scale of industrial disputes indicates. While in Ukraine strong 
unions have a high degree of wage-bargaining centralization and extensive co-ordination. 
Poland’s variety of capitalism shares some similarities with LME in terms of contracting 
welfare and privatization of the public sector; on the other hand, the structure and size of the 
Polish economy indicates its peripheral character. The Polish economy is lacking in high value-
added sectors. Low labour and means of production costs still remain the most important 
incentive for foreign investment. Definitely, Poland is not a typical ‘maquiladora’ of the 
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Western Europe. Foreign investors, despite cheap labour, are looking for large markets, in 
respect of a country’s size and human potential. Following Kołodko’s article (2009) Poland 
has reached a two-thirds rate of success. 
In the case of Poland’s economy, MME and FDI-based market economy perspectives are the 
most adequate in describing the variety of capitalism. All of them include ‘national’ 
conditionality residual welfare and the crucial role of the FDIs. However, in comparison to the 
other CEE countries, the FDI’s presence in Poland should not be overestimated. The value of 
FDI per capita in 2007 was 337 Euros, when in the Czech Republic it was 652 Euros and in 
Hungary 401 Euros20. Attention needs to be paid to the structure of foreign investment in 
Poland. A considerable bulk is short-term investment in banking and service sectors. According 
to Kołodko (2007) the lack of investment in productivity and infrastructure sectors is not 
improving competiveness and export capacity. The industrial sector in Poland is smaller than 
in other Visegrád countries. The inconsiderable size of Research & Development (R&D) sites 
and the purely ‘assembly’ character of new investments, rule Poland out of the ‘core’ 
economies. Moreover, MNCs are interested in investing in profitable companies, applying 
‘cherrypicking’ tactics (Hardy, 2009). Domański (2003) argues that the emergence of MNC in 
Poland brought an indirect positive effect on the number of jobs. Employment in the foreign-
owned factories was downsized while productivity increased. In the early phase of 
transformation in CCE, FDI was boisterously called an ‘engine of growth’ (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990) or a ‘New Marshall Plan to help Central and Eastern Europe’21. This was disputed by 
Ivanova (2007), who argued that precisely the opposite strategy was adopted in CEE countries 
after 1989; which effected in the ‘high share of foreign ownership of assets especially in the 
industrial and financial sectors of the economy, large and growing dependence on capital 
imports, and trade dependence’ (Ibid: 345). 
 
                                                          
20 Report published by Polish Ministry of the Economy: ‘Naplyw bezposrednich inwestycji zagranicznych do 
Polski. Bariery i możliwości wzrostu’ [Inflow of FDI to Poland. Barriers and Possibilities to Growth], source 
available for download at:  
http://www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/F91B004A-083D-439F-87CB-A964981E4B5F/44316/BIZ042008.pdf; 
accessed 15th January 2011. 
21 This expression is attributed to Donald Blinken, the US Ambassador in Hungary in the years 1994-1998 who, 
during a speech given on 16 March 1995 at the Collegium Budapest, said that ‘private foreign investment was a 
new Marshall Plan for Europe’ (see Gowan, 1995: 10; Drahokoupil, 2009: 2). 
62 
 
                   
 
The analysis of the Polish variety of capitalism should also delve into the research of Polish 
authors. Krzysztof Jasiecki’s Capitalism, the Polish Way (2013) provides a comprehensive 
investigation into the specificities of Polish capitalism. Jasiecki argues that Poland constitutes 
a hybrid of LME and CME; at the same time pointing out that the Polish variety is far apart 
from the Anglo-Saxon model. According to Jasiecki, Poland suffers from the lack of good 
quality public institutions, which make the country vulnerable economically and politically. As 
primal examples Jaciecki lists the chaos in the national health system, the precarious character 
of employment and financial scandals involving shadow banking which shook the Polish 
banking system. He emphasizes the paramount role of foreign capital, therefore he refers to 
Poland’s capitalism as ‘from without’. Szahaj (2015) argued that Polish capitalism shares many 
of the Anglo-Saxon model characteristics, which uncritical acceptance led to negative effects 
of Polish transformation such as a high unemployment rate, unbalanced regional development, 
economic marginality and ‘pathological forms of employment’ (ibid: 813). In Szahaj’s view 
Poland should depart from the Anglo-Saxon model and follow the Nordic one, enriched by the 
elements of the Rhineland model (based on industrial policy). The similar perspective is 
presented by Kowalik’s (2011) critical analysis of the Polish neoliberal version of capitalism. 
Kowalik argued that the alternative system, based on principles of the Swedish model could 
have been introduced in 1989. The transformation takes the centre of Kieżun’s (2013) analysis.  
Kieżun argues that, Poland’s economy was ‘colonised’ by foreign capital and dominated by 
post-communist nomenklatura. Tinnenbrun (2007) takes a broader perspective, and suggests 
that the world of business and politics in Poland is much broader than the system of former 
dignitaries of the communist party. Tinnebraun noticed that the richest Poles acquired their 
wealth directly through public auctions with the help of both post-communist and ‘Solidarity’ 
led governments. This symbiosis is perfectly described by Tinnenbraun as ‘matrimonial 
capitalism’.  
Apart from a vast non-academic encomia (see Balcerowicz 2009), the sceptical view of the 
capitalist transformation is dominant. Polish researchers put emphasis on the role of foreign 
capital, which corresponds with the Dependant Market Economy type proposed by Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009). Nevertheless they also demonstrate the weakness of public institutions. 
The Polish variant of capitalism is not only neoliberal, but also ‘crony’. 
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3.4.2. Japan 
 
Japan belongs to the well-established capitalist economies. The state has been playing a 
significant role in stimulating the economy. The post-1945 government led industrialization 
and exports of Japanese products were responsible for the rapid growth and building of the 
second largest economy. Japan’s political institutions are very stable. For most of its post-war 
history Japan has been ruled by only one party – centre-right LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). 
‘One and half party system’ perfectly describes LDP hegemony. LDP is pursuing the mixture 
of free-market policies and protectionist, Keynesian measures. Only sporadically, since the 
mid-1970s, Japan has experienced social unrest and turmoil. Japanese labour institutions are 
hugely influenced by a strong sense of corporatism. Since the peace Treaty of San Francisco 
(1951) Japan is closely allied with the USA. Economically, apart from financial support, this 
special relationship has revealed its ‘submissive’ nature, especially in the 1980s. For instance 
Japan agreed for Voluntary Export Restrains (VER) in the automotive sector, and made its 
exports less competitive, appreciating the Japanese Yen against the US Dollar (Plaza Accord 
1986). 
Japanese economic development is regarded as an example of the ‘success story’. It has been 
to some extent repeated by other East Asian countries (‘Flying geese’ paradigm). The 1950s 
and 1960s were characterized by the enormous economic growth of the Japanese economy. 
Nakijama et al., (2001) argue that technical progress and the associated expansion of capital 
rather than labour input expansion played a crucial role in this spectacular growth. Commonly, 
this advancement is also attributed to mass production, improvement of labour productivity 
and close ties between large and small business (Takeshi, 1989). In the 1960s the average GDP 
growth rate was 10 per cent. The 1973 oil crisis has severely affected the Japanese economy, 
causing shortage of energy supply and soaring inflation. Growth substantially decreased, but 
thanks to the special trade and investment connection between Japan and Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NIC), the slowdown was not so severe. As Itoh (2000: 21) explains: 
...Japan maintained a closer connection with these Asian countries and formed an 
international division of labour through international investment and trade. This 
helped Japanese economy to sustain a relatively high economic growth rate among 
advanced economies until the end of the 1980s. As a market for Japanese exports, 
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Asian countries took up 30 per cent throughout the 1980s. Their share increased in 
the 1990s, and became as high as 44 per cent in 1995-1996; much bigger than the 
share of the USA. Moreover, trade with Asian countries brings to Japan a large trade 
surplus, as does her trade with USA. 
Following a ‘bubble’ economy in the early 1990s, Japan has fallen into recession, which also 
influenced the growth of other East Asian countries. Slight sign of the sluggish recovery have 
been noted since the mid-2000s. 
As it was mentioned earlier, industrial policy determined Japan’s capitalism post-war 
development. Since 1951 the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry - METI (MITI)22 
played a crucial role in supporting the corporate sector and in implementing industrial policy 
(see Johnson, 1982). Sheridan (1993: 151) explains the protectionist nature of the policies 
implemented by the Ministry: 
An extensive and systematic policy formula was elaborated by MITI officials for the 
protection and assistance of ‘infant industries’, and the maintenance of an ‘efficient 
market structure’ in the manufacturing industry. The former was achieved by a 
variety of measures, including tax concessions, subsidies, supply of government 
finance, and the relaxation of anti-monopoly laws to allow various kinds of control 
agreements. To achieve the latter, MITI encouraged mergers and other types of 
‘collusive conduct’ by firms. MITI possessed the authority to grant import licences. 
This authority was used to control and restrict investment and new entries into the 
target industries. It also manipulated licences for the import of foreign technology 
and raw materials. 
Flath (2005) questions the effectiveness of these policies prior to 1964; he shows that sectors 
favoured by the state (shipbuilding, agriculture), contributed relatively less to economic 
growth. Since the 1970s the government successfully supported electronics and car 
manufacturing. In addition to METI, another governmental agency, the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) assists Japanese MNCs. 
Traditionally, Japan belongs to CMEs (Asian type). Frequently, Japan’s capitalism is 
juxtaposed to Germany’s, especially in terms of organizing and maintaining post-war growth 
by the state (Braverman, 1974; Dore 2000; Streeck and Yamumura, 2001 (eds); Kang, 2006). 
                                                          
22 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) was predecessor of METI until January 2001.  
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Interestingly, Harman (2009) points out that Japanese ‘state capitalism’ in contrast to Western 
economies, is hugely invested in civil industries rather than in the military. Certainly this shift 
has its consequence in the impressive development of hi-tech industries and Japan’s 
comparative advantage. Even though social spending and real wages are relatively low 
(Stevens, 1988), Japan is one of the very few countries in East Asia with some visible elements 
of the welfare state with an egalitarian distribution of income. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009: 
87) argue: 
...in Japan, the influence of the post- Second World War Allied occupation and 
demilitarization democracy and redistribution of wealth and power led to egalitarian 
economy and unrivalled improvements in population health. 
Whilst Estevez-Abe (2008: 1) explains the phenomenon of the ‘small’ welfare state: 
...the Japanese state interferes frequently and extensively with the market. Just as 
Sweden uses social policy as a form industrial policy, Japan uses industrial policy as 
a form of social policy. 
An important distinguishing mark of Japanese capitalism from other CMEs is group-based 
coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 34), the system of keiretsu23. It is commonly attributed 
to Japan’s fast economic development (Calder, 1993; Gerlach, 1997; Okumura, 2000; Kensy, 
2001). Keiretsu is the specific organization (‘family’) of companies from different sectors with 
interlocking business relations and shareholdings. Westney (1993) argues that the Japanese 
business system cannot be understood without analysing the keiretsu or business group. The 
keiretsu system did not catch on outside Japan; however a few British, American and Indian 
groups are regarded as ‘keiretsu’ (e.g. Virgin Group, Cisco Systems, Tata Group). There are 
two types of keiretsu in Japan: horizontal, which links conglomerates from several industries 
and vertical with one manufacturer controlling the complex system of suppliers (Grabowiecki, 
2006). The organization of keiretsu is also conducive to a long-term relationship (based more 
on co-operation rather than competition) which is a distinctive feature of Japanese business 
networks. It is argued that a keiretsu-led organization bestows the transfer of technology and 
                                                          
23 Zaibatsu (the pre-war prototype of keiretsu), was a large, family-controlled monopoly. After the war, in the late 
1940s, zaibatsu was dissolved by the Americans. 
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skills (Hall and Soskice, 2001). A keiretsu relationship can be also found in JFDI, with 
Japanese companies frequently investing and operating in clusters. 
Over the last twenty years, the nature of Japanese economy has substantially changed. This is 
not only the consequence of stagnation at home, but also due to global economic trends. 
Japanese capitalism obtained some of LME characteristics (Waldenberg, 2000; Mehri, 2012). 
The welfare achievements were substantially limited. Deregulation and privatization prevailed 
in many sectors (Kagami, 1999). Finally, the keiretsu system has loosened its ties. 
 
3.5 Polish and Japanese Employment Relations 
 
Employment relations are one of the key characteristics of national business systems (Whitley, 
1999) and therefore one of the dimensions that allow comparison of the business system 
varieties. While there exists a rich amount of research dedicated to various Western Economies 
(Blyton and Turnbull, 1994; Hyman, 1994; 1995; Ferner and Hyman (eds), 1992), employment 
relations in transforming CEE economies have only recently entered the debate (Gardawski et 
al., 2012; Maerdi, 2007; Hardy, 2009, 2010; Hollinshead and Maclean, 2007; Martin, 2006). 
Employment relations vary depending on the business system. Martin (ibid) sees employment 
relations in CEE as segmented and still transforming along the systems, with both converging 
and diverging trends; evolving from managerial capitalism, through an entrepreneurial type 
towards international capitalism. However, while in transition, they are floating somewhere in 
between the three ideal types. Thus identifying the variety of capitalism (business system) 
allows identification of the employment relations developing within these systems. For the 
purpose of this research and a better understanding of mutual impacts, it is important to 
juxtapose the main features of Japanese and Polish employment relations. The focus will be on 
labour market characteristics – the structure and training of labour, recruitment, pay, quality 
management and path dependent trade unions. 
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3.5.1 Poland 
 
Firstly, with the emergence of the new economy, the change in the Polish labour market was 
inevitable. Before the transition, the labour market in Poland was characterized by 
disequilibrium. The surplus of vacancies compared with the number of jobseekers resulted in 
over employment. With underdeveloped services there was a huge concentration of 
employment in industrial and agricultural sectors. This has changed rapidly in the aftermath of 
the Balcerowicz Programme. Both liberal and social-democratic governments have continued 
the liberal policy initiated by Balcerowicz. 
In the mid-1990s the GDP growth rate was one of the highest in CEE. Industry production 
along with labour productivity demonstrated an upward tendency. Despite these positive 
macroeconomic indicators, one of the main characteristic of Poland’s capitalism since 1990 is 
relatively high unemployment, which became a new phenomenon. Despite twenty-five years 
of new capitalism, it is still a two-digit figure and one of the most distinctive features of the 
Polish economy. As King (2002) has noticed, the working class became the biggest immediate 
victim of ‘Shock Therapy’. The unemployment rate did not decrease below 10 per cent, and in 
the period 2002-2003 reached 20 per cent. It has started decreasing since 2004 (12 per cent in 
2008, remaining one of the highest in CEE) (GUS, 2011). However, the unemployment figures 
are being underestimated since over two million Poles work abroad. Economic growth which 
is mainly based on labour efficiency and industry restructuring, is not accompanied by growth 
in employment (Golińska, 2006). Unemployment is especially intense among young people, 
including graduates (7 per cent of unemployed with a degree); almost double the average rate 
of unemployment in Poland as a whole. In the beginning of the 1990s governments have 
assumed that the unemployment generated by the public sector would be absorbed by the 
private one. That never happened. Poland has faced long-term unemployment. In 2007 more 
than 45 per cent of all unemployed were jobless for more than 12 months. Many of them were 
unable to find employment, as they were often considered second class employees by potential 
employers (Szczapa, 2008). The rate of unemployment is responsible for social exclusion, 
previously unknown in Poland on such a big scale, and is generating enclaves of poverty 
(Hardy, 2009). Full employment was a political rather than economic doctrine of PRL (Polish 
People’s Republic; Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa). It was mainly serving the 
communist ‘propaganda of success’ and purposes of society control: the state provides work 
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for everyone, everyone is allocated somewhere. Moreover, according to Ost (2005) various 
Plans for the National Economies implemented by the socialist state were enforcing social 
mobility and job migration into industrialized areas (mainly Silesia). The SOEs managers were 
obliged to meet the overshot plans’ targets and therefore produce more and employ more 
people. 
The degree of inequality in the distribution of income significantly intensified from the mid-
1990s. The number of people living in poverty is increasing. According to the Polish Central 
Statistical Office (GUS, 2011) 2.2 million live below the poverty line. Poland appears to be the 
most unequal country in terms of the distribution of consumption among post-communist 
economies. As Mykhnenko (2007: 361) explicates,  
the fundamental dichotomy between the growth record of the Polish economy, 
considered to be the best in post-communist Eurasia, and the country’s crisis of 
joblessness is emphasized by what can be described as Poland’s ‘poverty puzzle’. 
Further, Mykhnenko contends that the high level of unemployment is partly caused by Poland’s 
poverty paradox; deregulated labour markets are not able to function properly with regulated 
product markets; especially in the small and medium enterprises sector (SME), which could 
absorb the low-wage labour force. SMEs in Poland are still constrained by economic and 
administrative barriers. Some authors (Szczapa, 2008) attribute unemployment problems to the 
high cost of labour and inflexible employment law. Various legal requirements such as: period 
of notice, statutory maternity leave or insurance premium may have encouraged entrepreneurs 
to employ workers illegally. Employers’ pressure made the Left Democratic Alliance (LDA) 
government liberalize the Labour Code in 2004. There is a strong argument in support of post-
accession emigration having contributed to the decrease of unemployment more than the newly 
introduced work policy changes (Bukowski (ed), 2008; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008). 
Liberalization of the Labour Code can lead to positive changes in the labour market and, in 
consequence, the decrease of unemployment, however implementing these changes can be a 
long-lasting process and its impact on employment relations in Poland is an area of research 
still to be explored. Few empirical and theoretical studies have yet been carried out. The 
changes are often small and only applicable to a particular segment of the overall labour market, 
while emigration affected all social groups and representatives of almost every profession from 
builders and plumbers, to nurses, doctors and graduates from both Poland A and B. 
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The second important characteristic of the labour market in Poland is the strong polarization 
of wages. Economic restructuring undermined the inherited wage structure, with wage 
movements across industries, skill groups and occupations (Rutkowski, 1996), and in effect 
also influenced individuals’ educational choices and career planning. Currently, even though 
the average gross monthly salary seems to be high (over 3,500 PLN in 2010), it does not tell 
us how the income is distributed. Considering the Gini coefficient, which measures the level 
of inequality, income disparity in Poland is relatively high (36) compared to other Visegrád 
members: Czech Republic - 26, Hungary - 28 and Slovakia - 26. Data published by Eurostat 
(2013a) shows that the average Polish annual net earnings (estimate based on a single person 
without children) are one third of EU (27) average; just above Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and below Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
The immense income disparity is not fully understandable since GDP is rising along with 
labour productivity which increased much quicker than wages in the years 1995-2005 
(Growiec, 2009). Wages of the vast majority of society remain at low levels; which leads to a 
conclusion that people are not in fact benefiting from the successful economy. The emergence 
of the nouveau riche is accompanied by growth of a working poor class: people living in the 
communist-era-built blocks of flats in the medium and large town suburbs with unsecure, low-
paid jobs (Smith et al., 2008). Polish employees along with other Eastern Europeans 
(Romanian, Czech and Latvian) work the longest hours in Europe (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1. Average number of actual weekly hours of work (full-time employees) in 
Visegrád Group and selected European Union countries (third quarter, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2008), adopted by the author. 
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The threat of being unemployed stimulates irregularities and employment law-breaking. Many 
workers are still not paid on time. Studies conducted by Gardawski (2005) uncover the scale 
of these practices: only 76 per cent of employees are paid on time, over 12 per cent of workers 
are getting salaries without their taxes paid. Every fourth employee faces problems with 
punctuality or taxation of salaries. Workers employed in the private SME sector are exposed 
to the biggest exploitation, while work in the public sector and big foreign companies is more 
secure (presence of the trade unions and workers’ councils). These severe labour conditions 
(structural unemployment as well as high numbers of people working long hours at the lowest 
rates) generate poverty. Research shows that 17 per cent of Polish society is in danger of 
poverty, including 8 per cent of the working population (GUS, 2010). This figure is slightly 
lower than a few years ago; still neither the EU accession, nor the accelerating economic growth 
reduced the scale of chronic poverty. The Economist (2013) reports that the significant scale of 
economic migration can be contributed to these inequalities: 
(...) low-skilled workers from rural areas and small towns leave for low-skilled, but 
better paid, work abroad. From bigger cities, graduates and skilled technical workers 
are also emigrating, usually with a plan to save up for a few years and then return. 
(...) 
The precarious character of work (Smith et al., 2008; Hardy, 2009); increase in self-
employment, for many Poles being the only alternative to unemployment and often an effect 
of coercion rather than choice (Sula, 2006; Hardy, 2009); and growth of temporary employment 
have resulted in lower work protection. Kozek et al (2013: 84) argue that in response to poverty 
(brought by mass post-transformation unemployment) the government is operating ‘poverty 
mitigation policy’ rather than prevention. Unemployment, polarisation of wages, inequalities 
in income distribution and poverty shape attitudes towards work and employment. The work 
discourse in Poland is still influenced by the neoliberal notion of the ‘self-made man’ and a 
false belief that ‘under democracy and capitalism people could achieve everything if they 
worked hard enough’ (Ibid: 84). The ‘mass migration’ and the new debate that slowly emerges 
on the Internet (via social media, blogs and online journals) may serve as evidence of this 
discourse changing. 
Thirdly, the character of work in Polish enterprises has transformed. The shift in the global 
economy, especially the expansion of the service sector did not leave Poland excluded. 
‘Flexibility’ became a catch phrase. Workers should be ‘flexible’ in order to satisfy the 
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requirements of the labour market. ‘Flexible’ must be the Labour Code, and finally employers 
have to be granted ‘flexibility’. In 2005 over 10 per cent of all employed were part-timers and 
over 2.5 million workers were hired on limited duration contracts (Coe et al., 2008). By 2012 
the ratio had risen to 26 per cent (Eurostat, 2013b). Temporary contracts or rather ‘business 
orders’ were informally called ‘junk’ as they constitute a ‘civil law contract’ omitting the 
employment law. Since the 1990s Polish governments have been gradually ‘relaxing’ the 
Labour Code. Męcina (2009) argued that in Polish reality, flexibility is beneficial for both 
employers and employees. In times of austerity, ‘flexibility’ became an orthodoxy celebrated 
by politicians and the media. Government officials and employers’ organizations insist, there 
is even more scope for flexibility in employment law. As already stressed, the extremely 
precarious character of employment and job insecurity (‘junk’ contracts) have contributed to a 
decreasing standard of living, massive migration and possible failure of the pension schemes. 
The trade unions are the only institution which perceived the seriousness of the ‘phenomenon’ 
of ‘junk’ contracts. 
The emergence of temporary labour agencies and temporary staffing were the manifestation of 
this new tendency. The scale of the new phenomenon was so significant, that in January 2004 
Polish Sejm passed The Interim Work Act. All major, transnational working agencies started 
their business activities in Poland at the beginning of the 2000s, mainly as greenfield 
investments; however they are not as dominant as in the UK or the Netherlands. Temporary 
staff is not only present in the expanded service sector, but also in manufacturing. Many 
workers with temporary contracts are highly-skilled employees (especially in IT). It is also 
important to acknowledge that ‘flexibility’ policies are excluding people over 40. An average 
temporary worker is between 25-30 years old. The violation of the Labour Code is common, 
since many temporary workers are forced to work overtime. However, despite these 
irregularities, work agencies are an easy way to provide jobs for the people with the lowest 
qualifications in the age of structural unemployment (Hardy, 2009). 
In terms of education and training of the workforce, the transformation context is again very 
important. In the 1990s along with many other changes, Poland had to restructure its education 
system, as it was not training a workforce that could move the country toward a new economy 
(World Bank, 2014). Tertiary education and vocational schools had mostly been connected 
with large industrial plants, with staff from industry combining periods of study with periods 
of work (Dąbrowa-Szefler and Jabłecka-Prysłopska, 2006; Janowski, 2007). 
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The transformation of the education system has seen a shift from specialist vocational 
education towards general preparatory qualifications. Currently Poland is seen as a country 
with a dynamic workforce whose competencies in reading, mathematics and science exceed 
OECD and EU averages (World Bank, 2014). 
Even after the EU accession labour productivity in Poland was relatively low (67 per cent of 
the EU average) (OECD, 2011), but is growing steadily. Growth in productivity indicates the 
departure from a communist unproductive and inefficient economy to the new capitalist 
regime. The international competition and pressures of the market imposed the necessity of not 
only higher efficiency, but also quality. Polish companies were forced to duplicate the path of 
quality management systems’ development as it emerged in the Western economies (Haffer, 
2010). The new workplace institutions introduced by foreign investors included standards for 
quality management systems (IS 9001). Currently IS 9001 system is the most popular in Poland 
with the total number of certifications 10,527 (as per 2013), which places Poland in the mid-
range among the European countries (ISO Survey, 2013). 
There is a wide range of literature regarding quality management in Poland, yet it mainly 
focuses on the managerial perspective and implementation of TQM (Ulrych, 2011; Haffer, 
2010; Ćwiklicki and Obora, 2009; Łańcucki, 2006; Karaszewski, 2000). Relatively little is 
known about the impacts of increased productivity and quality demands on Polish workers. 
Karaszewski’s (2000) research revealed however some patterns (again from a managerial point 
of view) in employee reception of these policies. The lack of properly qualified and motivated 
personnel was seen as one of the obstacles in implementation of quality assurance systems. On 
the other hand the research proved that companies owned by foreign capital were the most 
advanced in implementing quality principles. 
According to Bugdol (2005) ISO certificates may still be treated as an element of promotion 
and ‘marketing’ advantage by Polish managers, therefore it is unclear whether the aim to 
restructure organizations and adjustment to the quickly changing environment was in fact the 
main reason for implementation of quality assurance systems. 
Lastly, a key aspect of employment relations is trade unionism. Despite the fact that trade 
unions still remain the main institutional form of employee interest representation in Poland, 
collective bargaining on both national and sector level is considered to be relatively weak 
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(Gardawski et al., 2012). In a Polish context, trade unions show a strong notion of path-
dependency. 
The victory of 1989 found trade unions in an ambiguous position. The political faction of 
Solidarność - OKP (Citizens’ Parliamentary Club; Polish: Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny) 
was separated from the union. OKP members were present in both chambers of the Polish 
Parliament supporting government’s reforms. According to Ost (2005); the cleavage between 
‘labour and intellectuals’ arose in the mid-1980s, when the communist system demonstrated 
weakness, and Solidarność victory was inevitable. Labour did not share the intellectuals’ 
enthusiasm for economic liberalism. The interests of both groups became divergent. A peculiar 
alliance took place: technocrats (members of the communist party) and intellectuals wanted to 
transform the socialist economy into capitalism (Szelenyi, 1998; King 2002). The continuation 
of this alliance was the first post-communist government where unionists were barely 
represented. The working class and intellectuals’ unity, so intense in 1980, started to diminish. 
The introduction of the harsh Balcerowicz plan is marked with the meek behaviour of 
Solidarność as well as OPZZ unionists (All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions; Polish: 
Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych), even though, as Klein (2007: 177) 
stresses it, ‘it was a direct clash with Solidarity’s economic programme of worker ownership’. 
Strike action in defence of working conditions and wages occurred rarely. In the years 1990-
91 – the most nagging period of the transformation – only a few hundred industrial actions 
were taken. In many cases the unions accepted lay-offs as an integral part of transition (see Ost 
and Weinstein, 1999). In 1989 one of the ‘Solidarity’ leaders Wojciech Arkuszewski 24 
instructed workers, that their jobs and wages were from now on dependent on the profitability 
of the firms. The majority of workers were convinced that significant improvement in the 
economy could only be achieved through privatization (Kozek et al., 1995). Submission and 
‘politicization’ of trade unions in the first years of the transformation significantly decreased 
their influence (Gardawski et al., 2012). Early studies (Kozek et al., 1995; Gardawski et al., 
1999) show that at the enterprise level labour relations were shaped by the official unions’ 
compliance; broad acceptance of lay-offs, lower wages, and restraint from striking. Ost and 
Weinstein (1999) presented empirical evidence supporting the thesis that in the beginning 
phase of transformation Polish trade union leaders had strong pro-market inclinations and were 
deeply sceptical of institutionalized employee influence in the new market economy. It was 
                                                          
24 Arkuszewski, W (1989), ‘Od góry do dołu’ (English: ‘From top to bottom’) in Tygodnik Solidarność, 22 
September 1989, pp 1-2. 
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suggested that Polish industrial relations have become ‘less participatory and increasingly 
hierarchical’ (Ibid: 1). Later research indicates an increase in workers confidence (Hardy and 
Kozek, 2009; 2011) and union revitalisation (Meardi, 2007; Mrozowicki et al., 2009; 
Krzywdziński, 2010). Therefore labour relations could be described as conflictual. 
Solidarność averted from the labour problems and became more of a political organization than 
the union (rivalry with OPZZ, involvement in Solidarity Electoral Action25). The union’s 
leaders did not want to be committed to trivial union work (Ost, 2005). Solidarność evolved to 
be a complete denial of the social movement from the1980s. In consequence, the membership 
became unpopular and the union density dropped in the next years (from 2.5 million in 1990 
to 1 million in 2000). Solidarność members even accepted redundancies and disinvestment as 
part of ‘restructurization’ (Hardy 2006). In the second part of the decade trade unions tried to 
rebuild their membership and reputation, rather unsuccessfully. Solidarność established a 
department of union development, aiming to encourage new members and co-operation with 
foreign trade unions (American AFL-CIO; American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations). However this strong affiliation met with some criticism of the 
union’s ‘Americanization’ (characterized by weak confederations, low collective bargaining 
coverage and decentralization). This position could have been a threat (‘The Trojan Horse’) to 
the latter’s co-operation within the ‘European style’ after the EU enlargement (Meardi, 2002). 
The union’s main concerns were: Christian worldview and anti-communism (debate over the 
abortion bill, a reference to God in the Constitution’s preamble), rather than the ‘traditional’ 
unionism. This attitude shifted Solidarność to the far right, which is hardly surprising given 
that the workers were rejected by ‘leftist’ intellectuals (Ost, 2005). Still, the right-wing and 
conservative Solidarność is considered as a peculiar phenomenon in Europe. The union’s 
political engagement and the fierce relation between Solidarność and ‘communist’ 
confederations paralysed the effectiveness of the implementation of the union’s charter 
objectives in the 1990s. Solidarność’s ardent ‘anticommunism’ was observed on the 
international scene. Polish unionists opposed co-operation with Russian unions (Meardi, 2002). 
Ost (2002: 42) described 10 years of the Polish reformed economy as the way of becoming a 
‘non-unionized economy’. This deadlock situation changed in the 2000s. 
                                                          
25 SEA (Solidarity Employment Action) - AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność): name of the coalition of Solidarity 
and small right wing parties, which won parliamentary elections in 1997. 
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Currently the unionization rate in Poland is still one of the lowest in EU – 13.4 per cent (OECD, 
2013) – while during the first wave of Solidarność movement, 1980-1981, it reached 80 per 
cent. Trade unions are hugely fragmented and politically divided. The main division between 
two of the three major confederations NSZZ Solidarność (Niezależny Samorządny Związek 
Zawodowy: Solidarność; English: Independent Self-governing Trade Union: Solidarity) and 
OPZZ is political, the third one – FZZ (Forum Związków Zawodowych; English: Trade Union 
Forum) wants to be politically indifferent and is not affiliated to any political party. The 
unionization of the private sector, which constitutes over 70 per cent of all employees, is 
residual. The privatization has marginalized and eroded trade unions. The wage-labour nexus 
can be described as ‘restrained tripartism’ – the broad civic arrangements of the interests of 
labour, business and government. Still, only one third of the workforce, mainly in larger 
enterprises, is covered by collective bargaining agreements and this number has a diminishing 
tendency (Hollinshead 2010; Gardawski et al., 2012). Collective bargaining is mainly 
company-centred and of lessening significance with most existing collective agreements 
originating in the 1990s (Gardawski et al., 2012; 1999). David Ost (2000) called tripartite 
bodies in CEE an ‘illusory corporatism’. The Polish Tripatrite Commission, established in 
199426, dragged by political disputes did not accomplish much in terms of improvement of 
government–trade unions–employer relations. Moreover, industrial relations were 
complicated, by the fact that the main trade union centrals: Solidarność and OPZZ were 
involved in governance. The Polish system of industrial relations is more similar to those in 
LMEs than in CMEs, ‘only with Mediterranean levels of labour participation’ (King, 2007a: 
309). Bohle and Greskovits (2006) state that the non-confrontational industrial relations and 
the weak welfare system in the CEE are shaped by transnational capital, which can act more 
powerfully in East Europe than at home. This state influenced the condition of Polish trade 
unions. 
Most contracts are negotiated at the level of the plant, or even with individual employees. King 
(2007a) considers the Polish working class to be ‘demobilized’ and explains the reasons for its 
weakness. Ideologically with the transition from communism, the class enemy became very 
unclear, and furthermore there was no concept of an alternative to capitalism; structurally, the 
Polish working class faced the loss of full employment. Unionization has shrunk since the 
arrival of new greenfield investments, which typically have a completely non-unionized 
                                                          
26 Similar bodies in other Visegrád countries were established much earlier, just after 1989. 
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workforce. Ost’s (2000) studies show workers’ reluctance towards trade unions and their 
absence in the private sector due to the belief that private firms operate better, and the lack of 
unions acts in workers’ favour. Employees are afraid that strong unions will not benefit from 
the new economic system. Further, Ost explains labour’s own self-marginalization and low 
self-confidence; moreover ‘being a union member is often perceived by unionists themselves 
as a sign of weakness, a sign that they and their enterprise lack the qualities that bring success’ 
(Ibid: 520). 
Research conducted by Bohle and Greskovits (2006) and later by Hardy and Kozek (2009) 
suggested that in labour-intensive industries, such as electronics or automobile, trade unions 
are well-established and have bargaining power. The intense activities of the Konfederacja 
Pracy (English: Confederation of Labour) and Sierpień ’80 (English: August ‘80) unions in 
private enterprises, are responsible for the renaissance of workers’ confidence in the 2000s. 
Hardy (2009) is positive about the future of trade unions. Since the mid-2000s some of them 
have recovered, regaining efficiency. The passivity and rigidity of Solidarność and the OPZZ 
were broken. ZNP (Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego; English: Polish Teachers’ Union), or 
August ’80 were strongly opposed to the neo-liberal policy on wages or the presence of Polish 
troops in Iraq. Brand new trade unions were established too: FZZ (Froum Związków 
Zawodowych; English: Trade Unions’ Forum) with 400,000 members or very active OZZPiP 
(Ogólnopolski Związek Zawodowy Pielęgniarek i Położnych, English: Polish Union of Nurses 
and Midwives) - 100,000; famous for an eight-day occupation of the Prime Minister’s office 
in 2007. 
Undoubtedly unemployment and living standards have influenced the working conditions in 
Polish workplaces. Employment has an enormous value. As Hardy (2009: 123) states ‘Work 
has become increasingly precarious and casual, with a plethora of different forms of flexibility’. 
The growing presence of private firms (especially in service sectors with little tradition of 
workplace organization) has changed industrial relations. Polish employees have been exposed 
to new ‘phenomenons’ as ‘mobbing’ (bullying) or other forms of discrimination in the 
workplace environment. Many cases of appalling working conditions in the foreign chains of 
supermarkets (Tesco, Biedronka, Carrefour) were revealed. However the decrease of 
unemployment in the mid-2000s caused the rise of the employees’ confidence (expressed by 
soaring number of strikes) and employers slowly began to approve the presence of the trade 
unions, especially in the private sector. For instance, previously non-unionized Tesco Poland 
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currently has three confederations. A good example of rebuilding trade unions can be found in 
Silesia, at the Opel car plant in Gliwice - one of the biggest GM factories in Europe. When the 
company started in 1998, unions were passive and absent at the workplace. This trend was 
overturned in 2005, when the union recruited 40 per cent of the workforce. Active, young 
unionists established negotiating structures with management (Hardy, 2009; Hardy and Kozek, 
2011). Mrozowicki et al. (2009: 94) explain the reasons behind the soaring membership in the 
last decade: 
…it was neither political activism, nor the rhetoric of broad social change, but a more 
efficient representation of economic interests in the workplace which attracted new 
membership. However, this economic agenda was built on an ethos which transcends 
‘bread and butter’ unionism, involving the issues of civilising workplace relations 
and defending human dignity, deeply embedded in local union traditions, Catholic 
national culture and socialist past. 
It seems, that Polish employees regained their ‘class consciousness’, which was so blurred 
during the communist regime and early years of transformation (Ost, 2005). They started to 
consider themselves workers as well as citizens or Poles. The emergence of the new 
confederations caused the depoliticization of unions in 2000s. The growing membership, 
especially among young workers and women, supports this tendency (Mrozowicki and 
Trawińska, 2013; Ostrowski, 2014; Kubisa 2011, 2009). 
In private-capital controlled enterprises management is considered to have a major (or even 
dominant) influence on the organisation of the labour process (Child, 2000). Not only the 
unions, but also the management changed during the economic transformation. The next 
sections provide an overview of the new management development in Poland. It is not in the 
scope of this research to analyse management as such, but the transfer of management practices 
to an alien environment. In the case of Poland, the process was not as painless and 
straightforward as its architects imagined (Hardy, 2009). This journey from command economy 
to new neoliberal market economy brought enormously exhausting social change. In these 
difficult times the new regime needed to be perceived as necessary and the only alternative. 
Incoming foreign investors were the harbingers of the new economy at both macro (locality as 
a whole) and micro (individual workplace) levels through the process of institutional bending. 
While grand scale influences were researched sufficiently, Hardy (2006: 131) argues little 
attention was paid to ‘changing values and norms in the workplace’. Cultural embeddedness 
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of FDIs was possible through a deep restructuring and ‘a new set of enabling myths and 
understandings about economic behaviour (...) instituted in the workplace’ (Ibid: 136).  
Research has shown that FDIs are ‘cathedrals in the desert that is enclaves of foreign capital 
with few linkages backwards and forwards’ (Hardy, 1998: 650; Grabher, 1997). Pavlinek 
(2004) indicates that spillover effects to the domestic economy in Central Europe are 
statistically insignificant. Even, if FDI brought some positive changes to the invested 
companies, these effects did not always spill over to the domestic industry. In Romania and 
Bulgaria the domestic industry was exposed even to negative spillover effects (Konings, 2000). 
The FDI effects on the local labour market are questionable. Domański (2003, 2004) argues 
that restructuring plant strategies and the outsourcing of industrial processes lead to a shrinking 
number of jobs in the successful foreign-owned companies. MNCs could bring positive 
economic prospects for the workplace, but not necessarily for individual employment. It has 
been argued that foreign investment could lead to downsizing of production, labour shedding 
and may destroy local firms, which are unable to compete with multinationals (Hardy, 1998; 
Hardy et al., 2005; Domański, 2003). Some suggest that the new investment in Eastern Europe 
emulates maquiladora - Latin American assemble factories. This type of FDI is responsible for 
creating only low-skilled jobs at assembly plants (Ellingstad, 1997). In many cases economic 
growth attracts foreign investments; hence there is no clear relation between inflows of FDI 
and economic growth (Pavlinek, 2004). Nevertheless FDI impacts on the economy through 
spillover and crowding out effects, supplier linkages and the phenomenon of the dual economy 
or social dumping have to be examined separately in the localities. Different social, political, 
and economical conditionings could interface with the role of FDI in the regions. These could 
be overlooked by national-level statistics. Lastly, but not less importantly, FDI is likely to 
transfer specific to the home country methods of management and production.  
Decades of central planning in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) changed not only the 
structures of the economies, but also created the unique ‘communist’ style of management. The 
command economy is responsible for the formation of a new set of values, behaviours and 
mentalities, which are in general described as Homo Sovieticus, a term coined by Russian 
sociologist, Aleksander Zinovyev (1986). This reference is not only related to the political, 
communist enslavement, but also to the management practices conducted in the Eastern Block. 
Over the years the soviet type of economic management spread with different intensification 
over CEE countries. In Poland some of the practices (like collectivization) encountered 
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resistance. Nevertheless, the main goal of state socialism, the rapid economic growth through 
massive industrialization coordinated by central plans, was achieved in the whole Block (Clark 
and Soulsby, 1999).  
This type of demeanour was not welcome by the neoliberal economy. Formal institutions and 
understandings were evolving, shaped by Western influence and orchestrated by international 
organizations and governments. Incoming foreign capital, although not helpless, had to face a 
plethora of informal institutions and workplace behaviours that were still being developed and 
pushed in the right direction. Inherited behaviours if nurtured could become detrimental to 
productivity and efficiency. Hardy (2006: 130) argues that ‘powerful players in the global 
economy have not been content to see formal institutions and understandings about economic 
behaviour emerge gradually or spontaneously, but sought to bend them in a particular 
direction’. 
As already mentioned, institution bending is an important factor in shaping workplace relations 
to required standards. The extent to which a firm manages to adapt to its new environment may 
vary and depend on the behaviour of economic actors (managers, workers, institutions at the 
local, national and multinational levels). This behaviour may be cooperative and adaptive but 
may also have a notion of conflict, resistance, contestation or even defiance.  
There is no single simple conceptual framework to analyze it either, as Hardy observes: 
Tensions in the workplace amount to more than simply a clash of cultures. 
Workplaces are inherently contradictory as the pressure of competition continually 
forces managers to find new ways of extracting surplus value from their workers. 
(Hardy, 2009: 96). 
For a greater understanding of the subject it is necessary to draw on the transfer of management 
in Poland’s historical context. It is of crucial importance to understand the changes that the 
managerial class underwent. Polish managers were not only implementing ‘intellectual capital’ 
to be embedded, but were also disciples to the foreign investors and were to carry on their work 
after the ‘agents of change’ had moved on elsewhere (Hardy, 2006). 
The introduction of capitalism, followed by the inflow of FDI and Poland’s connection to the 
global economy brought relevant changes in the field of management and employee relations. 
The revision of the structure of ownership and exposition to the global competition of Polish 
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companies outlined the major changes. A completely new institution had to be established at 
the workplace. In the early phase of transformation, managers were forced to adapt to the new 
managerial functions that prevailed in the competitive markets and introduce human resources 
management (HMR), which did not exist during the communist era (Hardy et al., 2005). Habits 
acquired before 1989 became ‘unsuitable legacies’ for the emerging market economy (Hardy, 
2006). Liberalization and privatization processes left Poland with a heterogeneous structure of 
companies. Some of the SOEs were privatized and the new private sector came into existence 
(SME, FDI). Management and employee relations were arranged differently in each of these 
types. In general, small private companies were left without any social dialogue between 
employees and employers. The new relations were established at brownfield and greenfield 
investments. Hardy and Kozek (2009) list incorporation and decentralisation as strategies 
implemented by foreign investors in Polish companies. Incorporation takes place when 
managers are closely linked to the structure and networks of the company, being influenced by 
the corporate culture. Decentralisation is based on greater autonomy of the managers. 
According to the authors in these models, there is no difference in affecting labour relations. 
Competitive pressure, benchmarking with the firm, constant cost and profit comparison can be 
found in firms who implemented either incorporation or decentralisation strategy. However, 
corporate culture positively influences management relations with trade unions in the firms 
where workers are viewed as a ‘source of embedded knowledge’. An example can be found in 
the greenfield automotive investments. In general, at workplaces based on low-skilled labour, 
workers have less bargaining power. Moreover, employees were rewarded individually and 
were expected to be more flexible. Implementing the new HRM practices met some backlash 
in the brownfield investments with the embedded, old workplace institutions (Hardy and 
Kozek, 2011). At the greenfield sites, managers were given much more control over the 
business itself as well as over employees (Hardy, 2006). 
The management under communist rule was characterized by an authoritarian relationship with 
employees, low economic effectiveness and indifference, where fear of punishment became an 
integral part of managerial life (Clark and Soulsby, 1999). Political rationality (maximization 
of influence) dominated economic rationality (maximization of material utility) (see Kostera 
and Wicha, 1996). Professional management education was not required, especially in the early 
years of the communist rule (Kostera, 1995b). Managers were constrained by the ‘soft budget’, 
not by the economically rational ‘hard budget’; the government could always cover the losses 
of the state enterprises (Kornai, 1992). Additionally, managers had to compete for workers in 
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a tight labour market (Weinstein and Obłój, 2002). Contrary to the free-market management, 
communist managers were limited by the supply not demand possibilities. The way of 
acquiring resources was based on the network of socio-economic connections. Managers with 
broad connections were able to benefit not only to the enterprise but also the community. (Clark 
and Soulsby, 1999). 
In Poland like in other CEE countries the majority of the management’s decisions were subject 
to the economic plans (three, five, or six year intervals), implemented by the governmental 
body – Central Planning Office (CUP; Polish: Centralny Urząd Planowania). The government 
directly instructed managers of the SOEs. Simply, Polish managers expected to be told what to 
do. The manager’s role was limited even within their ‘own’ company (Kostera, 1995b: 682). 
The most important strategic decisions were made by the Centre, the management only 
executed them. The word ‘effectiveness’ was related to the central plan achievement, not to 
economic efficiency. The managers did not take any economic risk; any ‘initiative’ was treated 
as an act of ‘showing off’ (Jankowicz, 1994). Central planning simply did not leave any space 
for ‘activity’. Plan fulfillment, rather than cost was the first law of socialist enterprise 
management (Clark and Soulsby, 1999: 80). It has to be stressed that management was 
politically involved in the communist party, and those two roles were overlapping (Ibid). In 
many cases SOEs managers held office as party secretaries (apparatchiks). The skills and 
values of the communist managers were twofold: technical and political. The first were related 
to the planning system and controlling the technology of the enterprise production, whereas the 
latter covered relations with the communist party, maintenance of links with planning officials 
and finally, political management of the labour force (Martin, 1999) Therefore politics 
prevailed over economic rationality. However, the mid 1980s, with the period of perestroika, 
brought some economic liberalization, which affected the management class as well. During 
the PRL era management education did already exist. Several management departments were 
established in Polish universities, with strong links to Western institutions (Koźminski, 2008)27  
A few years before the transformation, many Polish economists and members of the communist 
party were granted international scholarships (mainly through Fullbright and Ford Programs). 
The ideas of the free market were transferred and became popular among the class of 
technocrats (vide: Leszek Balcerowicz, Henryka Bochniarz - later Minister of Industry). The 
                                                          
27  Management institutions were also present in other CEE counties. For instance in Bulgaria during the 
communist era, the Institute of Social Management (ISM) was established. The program undertaken by ISM 
involved western consultants (Hollinshead and Michailova, 2001) 
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last communist government of Mieczyslaw Rakowski (1988-89) introduced a set of liberal 
economic bills which created favourable conditions for the reforms commenced in 1989. The 
1988 Law on Economic Activity enabled state companies to create joint ventures, or sell assets 
to private companies (Drahokoupil, 2009). As a result of such legislation, some of the SOEs 
implemented more rational economic policies28. The expanding small private sector has also 
changed its attitude towards communist-style management, regarding it as inefficient. 
Reforms started in 1989 brought enormous changes to society in Poland’s economy and 
politics. Polish workers were introduced to an unknown range of proceedings (flexibility, 
entrepreneurship, restructurization). Many did not cope with them, staying excluded, and were 
called ‘demanding’ by the resourceful ones. The working class faced new relations at the 
workplace. Closures of the hundreds of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the threat of being 
unemployed put the employers in privileged position. In order to keep the jobs, workers made 
serious concessions. Unfettered capitalism constrained unfettered labour relations, especially 
in the early stage of transformation. That could not have happened without the submissive role 
of the trade unions, which is a paradox considering the strengths of ‘Solidarity’ in the 1980s. 
The transition process and emergence of capitalism affected almost all aspects of social life. 
The appearance of marketization, privatization and entrepreneurship modified the perception 
of the economy. The institution of management was one of the first to undergo the 
transformation. This coincided with the globalization process, even though some authors partly 
refute the myth of powerful MNCs which are overwhelming the national state (see Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996; Harman, 2009). Hyman (2004: 425) points out that: 
For many employers and government in recent years, the idea of globalization has 
provided a useful excuse: it implies that the fate of national economies is not 
susceptible to influence by domestic policies, or at best that government can do no 
more than impose effective forms of adoption external forces 
The ubiquitous, post-1989 ‘westernisation’ without doubt has helped to impose this sole type 
of management. As Kostera (1995a) suggested, being ‘international’, ‘British’ or ‘American’ 
                                                          
28 In November 1988, the Gdansk shipyard, so-called ‘cradle of Solidarity’ went into liquidation due to economic 
inefficiency. This government’s decision was criticized by the trade union, as a ‘political vengeance’, not as 
‘economic rational’. Kostera and Koźmiński (2001: 334) quote one of the workers’ popular statements: ‘The 
communists [and post-communist] are after the Gdańsk Shipyard. They want its bankruptcy and closure as an act 
of historical revenge’. 
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became an uncommon virtue in post-socialist societies, additionally the predominant 
admiration of Anglo-Saxon capitalism indicated the only source of knowledge. The free 
market environment brought changes to the management.  
Management as a profession was a pure embodiment of the free market economy. Thus, the 
English word ‘manager’ was easily adopted by the Polish language (menadżer). The Polish 
equivalents of ‘manager’- ‘kierownik’ or ‘zarządca’ have pejorative connotations of mastery 
and governance (related to Communism), while menadżer can be defined as a ‘person regarded 
as skilful in household, financial or other management’ (Jankowicz, 1994: 490). Management 
as a topic became enormously fashionable and popular (diversity and the scale of the 
publications), although managers themselves were not always enjoying esteem; mainly due to 
beliefs about the fairness of entrepreneurship (Kostera, 1995a). Nevertheless, the managerial 
role in Poland is important. Proportionally higher managers’ wages constitute the popularity of 
this profession. During the transformation many of the managers in CEE were recruited with 
nomenklatura credentials. Although out of this ancien régime management evolved, obtaining 
necessary ‘free-market’ knowledge, while the most resistant figures were gradually eliminated 
(Clark and Soulsby, 1999). The age of transformation enforced the management to undertake 
different strategies in order to keep SOEs going in the post-socialist market environment 
(Martin, 1999: 82-85). The first one: ‘pragmatic opportunism’ was based on reduction of costs 
(delaying of payments, cuts in welfare expenditure). The second strategy was seeking assets 
through ‘spontaneous privatization’ and getting direct subsidies or privileges from 
bureaucracies. Finally the ‘market orientated’ strategy was focused on profit seeking through 
the provision of goods and services to customers. Unsurprisingly the third one could provide 
the long-run prosperity of the enterprise. 
Managers had to redefine their role within the enterprise. The developments had to be carried 
out in areas, which were neglected during communist rule, especially in marketing, quality, 
finance and human resources. The new approach was necessary in the employment relations; 
changing work organization, the mode of managing labour and attitude towards trade unions.  
Hence, the process of management learning took place. This could not have happened without 
support and guidance of western organizations, which treated the CEE as a ‘virgin land’. The 
transfer of knowledge was predominantly funded by the European Union’s PHARE programme 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Countless western 
management training programs and seminars flooded into universities and schools in Eastern 
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Europe contributing to the knowledge transfer (see Michailova and Hollinshead, 2009; Kostera, 
1995a). This ‘imperialistic’ approach has given rise to some criticism. Kostera (1995a) uses 
religious metaphors to illustrate the transfer of knowledge from West to East. The whole 
process of finding a model for the organization of social life after the fall of communism is 
called a ‘mission’, where the Western trainers are ‘missionaries’, who came to ‘preach’ to the 
East. These ‘evangelizing’ terms unambiguously suggest that management learning was 
conducted without respect of the local differences in culture. In terms of management Poland 
was recognized a land of ‘non culture’ or a land without its own ‘religion’, thus the 
communication between West and East is unidirectional. Following the religious trope, this 
process was not a ‘conversation’, but a ‘sermon’. According to the author the mission should 
not continue as a crusade. The work of the Western trainers imposed another extreme type of 
management based on the ‘universal’ neoliberal model leaving no room for cultural differences. 
During the first years of system ‘conversion’, the indiscriminate approach towards anything of 
Western origin dominated the discourse. This attitude has weakened since Western ideology 
faded and CEE countries built up their economic position. 
 
3.5.2 Japan 
 
Japanese employment relations are considered to be relatively stable and have a number of 
uncommon features. Companies seek to recruit individuals, who will fit into the corporate 
culture, endorse the company’s philosophy and values, and be committed to the company and 
the job. Traditionally, the Japanese employment system consists of: ‘lifetime employment’ 
(Japanese: shushin-joyo), ‘seniority-based wage system’ (Japanese: nenkō joretsu) and 
‘enterprise unionism’ (Japanese: kingyo-kumiai). In the literature these are also referred to as 
‘the three treasures’ or ‘three pillars’. Japanese employment relations are also famous for their 
distinctive flexibility and quality policies, and famously the model example of effectiveness – 
lean production. 
However, as a consequence of the economic downturn, it is not astonishing that the two first 
features of the system have eroded substantially over the last thirty years. The three main 
elements (weakening) of the Japanese employment system increase workers’ identification 
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with their company, and restrict mobility of labour between firms. However, these treasures 
are not equally accessible to Japanese workers. ‘Lifetime employment’ does not apply to 
women, who generally perform low-level jobs until they leave the workforce (through 
marriage). Hollinshead (2010: 185) puts emphasis on the dual structure of the Japanese 
employment system: 
Core employees, concentrated in keiretsu were assumed to have lifetime employment 
and were surrounded by more malleable and dispensable, peripheral employment in 
satellite firms or subcontractors. In general, female workers found themselves in 
periphery.  
‘Lifetime employment’ is not a legal obligation, but rather accepted practice. It is argued that 
a lifetime commitment to employees reduces labour mobility between firms and increases the 
potential for mobility within the firms. Beardwell (1994) argues that, by the Western standards 
it is a ‘lifetime commitment’ rather than ‘employment’. 
Unlike lifetime employment, quality management did not diminish. Quality and efficiency 
policies are regarded as vital and one of the most recognizable features of the Japanese 
employment system. Focus on quality is determined by Japan’s natural characteristics (scarcity 
of raw resources) but also by the post-war influence of American statisticians: Joseph M. Juran 
and W. Edwards Deming29, who reputedly visited Japan in the 1950s introducing the principles 
of quality management and Just-in-Time (JIT) techniques in manufacturing. Inspired by 
Juran’s and Deming’s work the Japanese launched a nationwide programme of Statistical 
Quality Control (Hutchins, 1988). Quality and minimum waste (Japanese: muda) are achieved 
by just-in-time (JIT) techniques (Bratton, 1992). These methods have enormously affected the 
work organization. It was assumed that Japanese firms had found mechanisms for being 
continually successful in manufacturing sectors. Both mechanisms are identified most clearly 
with specific working practices such as kaizen, the philosophy of continuous improvement, 
where staff constantly considers methods of improving quality and efficiency. Small groups of 
workers organized in so-called ‘quality control circles’ are very common in Japanese 
workplaces. Duties connected with the operation of the circles are carried out voluntarily. 
Generating a consensual style of decision making, quality circles can be seen as a peculiar 
manifestation of ‘industrial democracy’, where practices encouraging employee participation 
                                                          
29 In the post war years William Edward Deming was one the most famous Americans in Japan. The Deming 
Prize was established to reward Japanese companies for advances in quality management. 
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and team working are regarded as a product of the Japanese collectivist culture. Japanese 
quality management emphasizes the flexible and multi-skilled workforce. Job rotation and 
assignment of flexible tasks are supposed to enable workers to learn different skills which are 
essential to manufacture high-quality products (Beechler and Yang, 1994). 
Another salient characteristic of the post-war Japanese company is the seniority-based reward 
system which ‘ties’ the worker to the firm, attracts quality people to the organization and 
encourages longer tenure. It simply means that years of experience in the company are 
additionally rewarded. Dore (1973: 107) suggests that the origin of this scheme could be 
expressed by an equation: ‘older = more experienced = better worker’. Sato (1997) observes 
that seniority (nen) is also about merit (ko). Notwithstanding Sethi et al (1984:51) list the 
drawbacks of the seniority-based wage system: difficulty in rewarding individual creativity and 
excellence, thereby possibly reducing motivation among able employees, the possibility of 
paying compensation to those who are not capable or competent; additionally, the system has 
created a large number of middle managers in Japanese companies. The ‘bubble economy’ of 
the 1990s has altered the seniority-based system, which has been shifting toward more of a 
‘performance-pay system’. Implementation of this reform varies between particular companies 
(Conrad, 2009). 
As a result of global competition, especially that coming from the Asian Tigers, the process of 
labour flexibility in Japan has intensified (Passet, 2003). Workers are divided to ‘core’ (full 
time) and ‘peripheral’ (temporary and part-time), who are employed in periods of increased 
demand. Further flexibility took place in the 2000s, when employment agencies started to 
flourish. The number of agency workers soared from 360,000 in 2000 to 1.4 million in 2008 
(Whittaker, 2013). 
Uniquely, the majority of trade union organizations in Japan are organized, not by occupation 
or by job (like in Europe, in the USA or Canada), but by company. An enterprise union consists 
only of regular employees of a single firm, regardless of their occupation. Predominately, 
within the enterprise there is only one union (grouping both white and blue collar workers) 
even though there is no restriction on the number of unions. Company trade unions are 
developing more ‘corporation consciousness’ rather than ‘union consciousness’, which makes 
them weaker in terms of defending employees’ rights (Bratton, 1992). This stance is really well 
expressed in Nissans’ company union’s motto: ‘those who truly love their union love their 
company’ (Beale, 1994: 27). Shirai (1983: 117) claims, that in a broader perspective, this 
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special organization of trade unions is partly responsible for the Japanese economic boom of 
1950 and 1960, and also mitigated the aftermath of the early 1970s economic crisis: 
Enterprise unionism has attracted increasing attention from foreigners who see it as 
an important contributor to the remarkable economic growth of Japan following 
Wold War II, particularly between 1955 and 1974. After the 1973 oil crisis Japan, 
like other industrialized economies, faced difficulties that seemed almost 
insurmountable because of her heavy dependence on imported energy and other 
resources. However Japan managed to weather the difficult situation and to find a 
way out of it, and enterprise unionism was credited with facilitating the adjustment 
of the Japanese economy to changing circumstances. 
As was mentioned earlier, Japanese employment relations are characterized by a strong sense 
of corporatism. Workers associate themselves with the firm and its objectives (they are 
‘members’ of the organization, rather than ‘employees’). Historically, this compliant and co-
operative relationship was not always so prevalent. The emergence of the managerial hegemony 
was preceded by a long and bitter workers’ struggle (Gordon, 1998). Prior to 1975, strikes and 
disputes were an integral part of the Japan’s industrial relations (Korpi and Shalev, 1980), 
particularly, in the first years after Japan’s surrender, when the country had not risen from its 
war destruction. Takezawa, (1982) attributes this to politics being dominated by ‘subversive’ 
or even ‘Marxist’ discourse. The unionization rate was extremely high, in 1949 reaching 56 per 
cent (Fujimura, 1997). This atmosphere was also reflected in the labour movement. In the late 
1940s and early 1950s, trade unions were radicalized and run by far left activists (grouped in 
Sanbetsu - Congress of Industrial Unions), who wanted to introduce ‘soviet’ organizations at 
factories. These outbursts were stopped by the government backed by the USA (bearing in mind 
historical context: Mao Tse-Tung’s victory in China in 1949, Korean War 1950-1953).The 
majority of the communist trade unionists were crushed in a ‘Red Purge’ (Morishima, 1982). 
This evoked waves of protests and confrontations in many factories (including Hitachi and 
Toyota). In 1952 Nissan experienced the longest strike action in Japan’s history. After one 
hundred days workers lost the battle. This dispute is regarded as a watershed moment in 
Japanese industrial relations and an effective end to independent unionism, which almost 
entirely lost their radical elements. Milsome (1993: 17) argues that, Nissan’s union remained 
independent after 1953, however its involvement in the decision-making process (investment 
plans, operating schedules, staffing levels) contributed to operating losses in 1986, the first time 
since 1951. After all, full managerial control was imposed on the union.  
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Enterprise unionism met serious criticism. Dispersed unions, with weak bargaining power are 
not able to effectively protect overall labour and tend to be pressured by employers (Shirai, 
1983; Fujimura, 1997). As Sako (1997) rightly observes, it is through policy-making channels 
on the national level, rather than at the enterprise level, that workers would be able to execute 
their demands more efficiently. The tendency towards organizing national, craft-based unions 
can be observed from the late 1970s. Therefore, uniquely in Japan outside of ‘independent’, 
company-based unions, workers are also grouped within national confederations. In 1989, the 
Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) was formed, which constitutes the largest 
forum for trade unions in Japan. 
Sako explains (1997: 17): 
…policy demands made by the labour movement include neoliberal elements, such 
as privatisation and deregulation. Also the government bureaucracy, rather than 
political parties in government, plays a role in intermediating the interest of labour 
and management. In these respects, Japanese-style neo-corporatism is different from 
Social Democratic corporatist model of Sweden and Germany. 
Despite the co-operative nature Japanese trade unions; they are very active in pay negotiations. 
The majority of unions negotiate their pay annually, in April and May (called Spring Labour 
Offensive - Japanese: Shunto). In the decade 1965-1975 negotiated pay rises were twice the 
size of those won by unions in the Western countries (Shirai, 1983). Chalmers (1989) showed 
that Shunto has its effect also on small, unorganized sectors.  
The examination of Japanese trade unionism should not be limited to the stereotypical view 
(enterprise system). The research conducted by Stewart (2006a) demonstrated the existence of 
the truly independent and alternative social and labour movements: sa’ha shōsū -ha kumiai 
(minority-faction union) and shingata kumiai (the community unions). As Stewart argues, these 
organizations with progressive agendas reaching beyond the workplace, embraced the needs of 
the marginalized, including foreign workers.  
The worsening economic situation in the early 1990s changed labour institutions, employment 
systems have evolved and the protective role of the state has decreased. In a time of low 
economic growth, lifetime employment was not sustainable. The dual character of the Japanese 
economy, division of periphery and core workers, excluded those who are not employed by the 
large, established corporations and on permanent contracts. Japanese workers have also 
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experienced large scale lay-offs in the 1990s and 2000s, the first time since 1945. In 2001 the 
unemployment rate reached 5 per cent, the highest in the post-war history (Kuwahara, 2004). 
Over the last thirty years, following the global trend, Japanese unionization has reduced 
drastically, from 35 per cent in 1975 to 18.5 per cent in 2010. The 2008-2009 financial crisis 
undermined the traditional models of employment in Japan even further, with an increased 
number of non-regular workers and diminishing employment of core workers (Suzuki, 2010). 
Table 3.3 compares the main features of employment relations in Poland and Japan. 
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Table 3.2 Employment relations in Poland and Japan 
 Poland Japan 
Management Authoritative, influenced by US 
style. 
Participative.  
Companyism and groupism. 
Quality Growing importance of quality 
production due to competition. 
Total Quality Management 
Various management quality 
policies. 
Trade unions Low unionization rate.  
Weak presence in the private 
sector. 
Negotiations mainly at 
enterprise level. 
 
Dual structure: enterprise 
unions coexist with national 
confederations. 
Hierarchy Formal and hierarchical 
organization. Paternalistic 
leadership.  
Prevalence of the ‘feudal’ 
nomenclature.   
Education and seniority highly 
regarded. 
Rooted in distinct form of 
Confucianism. Present in 
Japanese workplace and 
customary. 
Main manifestation: seniority 
and formality at the same time 
Japanese workplace is 
characterized by consensual 
decision-making process.   
Performance of employment Performance-based system. 
Managers have ability to award 
themselves high salaries and 
remuneration inked to profits. 
Seniority-based system being 
rationalized. 
Discipline Punitive discipline.  
 
Non-punitive discipline. 
Importance of peer pressure. 
Stability of employment Flexibility. 
‘Junk’ contracts.  
Increase in number of non-
regular workers and the role of 
employment agencies, 
diminishing life-time 
employment.  
Source: Author 
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3.6 The critique of Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism framework outlined in the first part of this chapter has met some 
criticism.  
Firstly, as it was designed for developed economies (chiefly for OECD members), the division 
into two ideal types appears too simplistic, or as some scholars suggest even a ‘false 
juxtaposition’ (Stewart, 2014: 138). For instance, putting Germany and Japan into one category 
of co-ordinated market economies (CME) is not very accurate; as the two economies have very 
different levels of state provision and dissimilar participation in the international economy; on 
the other hand Great Britain and Canada (LMEs) have different welfare systems (Lane, 
2007:18). Moreover, the dichotomist taxonomy of LME and CME does not sufficiently 
categorize transforming economies (Lane and Myant, 2007; Knell and Srholec, 2007; Nölke 
and Vliegenthart, 2009).  
The arrival of capitalist institutions in post-socialist economies has been very dynamic, as 
opposed to the established economies (Hardy and Kozek, 2009). The VoC framework deals 
with the institutions that are present and deeply embedded in the national economies, while in 
CEE countries the institutions have emerged (Hardy, 2006). Deeg and Jackson (2007) see the 
relatively static nature of the analysis as a main deficiency of the VoC literature, especially in 
relation to the issue of institutional change.  
Secondly, VoC was criticised for placing the firm in the centre of the analysis. The Framework 
proposed by Hall and Soskice lacks the labour perspective, and more importantly does not 
explore crisis and conflict, which are central parts of the comparative political economy. This 
‘omission’ is not startling, as the VoC framework operates ‘within smoothly functioning, self-
adjusting political economy’ (Howell, 2003:112).  
Lastly, there is a doubt about the VoC framework’s capacity to account for system change 
(Ibid). Indeed, the static nature of Variety of Capitalism poses a problem for understanding 
how workplace relations change as capital moves across boundaries and how far it is able to 
bring and impose the VoC characteristics and institutions of the home country to the subsidiary 
location in which there is investment. In this context employee and labour relations have to be 
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understood as contested and workplaces have to be viewed as sites of passive and active 
conflict.  
Moreover, in terms of industrial relations the VoC framework limits the understanding of the 
travelling institution’s true nature. FDIs are inevitably affected by the recipient’s country VoC 
and alterations to corporate culture, employee and labour relations and workplace institutions 
will occur. While the best efforts are made to ‘transplant’ (as often used to describe Japanese 
production systems abroad) the home country institutions in the host workplace, it is a lengthy 
and difficult process. The next chapter will look into the foreign direct investment literature 
with respect to the transfer of foreign managerial practices and the workplace institutions that 
prevail when the firms enter a new environment. The workplace is seen as contested terrain 
and an arena of potential conflict. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
For a more thorough understanding of Polish capitalism, historical cognizance seems 
necessary. Therefore a compact chronicle of Poland’s transformation serves as a prelude to this 
chapter. Using the VoC framework, the main characteristics of Poland’s and Japan’s economies 
were analysed. Applying Hall and Soskice’s (2001) classification, Poland is clearly moving 
towards LMEs. However, it is impossible to classify Poland to ‘pure’ CME or LME type. 
Therefore, MME and DME are of valuable ‘assistance’ in describing the post-socialist country.  
Correspondingly, Japan‘s CMEs features, especially in terms of company welfarism, are in 
decline. Notwithstanding,  these enormous differences can be observed in Polish and Japanese 
types of capitalism, not only in the sizes and potential of the economies, but also in contrasting 
concepts of employment relations. Poland is an ardent pupil of neoliberal doctrine. High 
unemployment, deep rooted in Polish transformation, is responsible for extremely flexible and 
precarious forms of employment, such as short-term civil law contracts (Trappmann, 2011).  
The Japanese employment system in this respect seems more secure. Simultaneously, few 
similarities are emerging. In both countries organization of work is based on hierarchical 
values. The bargaining power of trade unions is low in Japan and Poland. It can be argued that 
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Japan’s VoC is leaning towards LME due to the competing global business environment. This 
trend decreased the importance of the famous three pillars of the Japanese employment system. 
The application of the VoC framework does not allow these subtle aberrations as its nature is 
static. Furthermore, transfer of managerial practices remains the main purpose of this research. 
Multinational companies do not travel across the borders without baggage. They bring a wide 
array of practices and customs, individual organizational culture and styles of management, 
different values, norms and workplace institutions along with technological know-how. The 
host country does not always share the same institutions and culture. Occasionally it may 
belong to the same VoC, while at other times it may represent some exactly opposite values. 
In this light the workplace can be viewed as a site of probable clashes between the ‘known old’ 
and ‘unknown new’ and, in consequence, a ground of potential contestation. A labour process 
approach needs to be considered alongside the VoC framework for a better understanding of 
this phenomenon.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND WORKPLACE 
INSTITUTIONS AS CONTRAIDACTORY AND CONTESTED 
TERRAINS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter argued that in the global economy foreign direct investment is a 
‘transmission belt’ for the dissemination of employment practices, which are embedded in 
national business systems and varieties of capitalism. Workplaces and employees, as the last 
links in this ‘influence’ chain, are likely to be affected. The aim of this chapter is to 
contextualise the debate about foreign direct investment in terms of the labour process. Ever 
since it emerged, capitalism (in all its varieties) has been reproduced and contested in the labour 
process, therefore the labour-capital conflict is intrinsic to capitalist societies.  
There is no argument that developed countries played an important role in the transformation 
of former communist economies. The neoliberal model was instilled successfully and in this 
context FDIs could be seen as an avant-garde of transformation, although its role should not be 
overestimated and some researchers argue it was modest in material terms (Hardy 1998, 2002; 
Hardy and Kozek, 2009). 
Firstly, in order to cast some light on the labour process debate, the underpinnings to the Labour 
Process Theory (LPT) will be outlined, with the main modern approaches, which can be 
described briefly as neo-Marxist (Braverman, 1974); post-structuralist (e.g. Edwards, 1979; 
Friedman, 1977a; Burawoy, 1979; Littler, 1978) and the most recent ‘core’ LPT (e.g. 
Thompson and O’Doherty, 2009; Smith, 2006; Edwards, 2007; Littler, 1990). Its critique (e.g. 
Jaros, 2005; O’Doherty and Willmott, 2001) and future directions will also be discussed 
(4.2.1).  
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Originating in LPT, the notion of the workplace as a potential contested terrain (Edwards, 
1979), poses questions regarding the nature of workplace resistance. Section 4.2.2 will examine 
workplace resistance literature.   
Lastly, taking a step closer to the beginning of a debate over the workplace, the notion of 
Japanisation (4.3) will be discussed; while section 4.4 will draw on the body of literature 
dealing with the experience of transferring Japanese work practices to alien environments. The 
Polish workplace will receive special attention in this respect. 
 
4.2 Conceptual underpinnings 
 
4.2.1 Labour Process Theory 
The Labour Process Theory (LPT) in general terms deals with a broadly understood aspect of 
‘labour’ – a form of behaviour pre-supposed to be exclusively human, and as Marx  
distinguished in the first volume of Capital (1867), one that is not synonymous with ‘those 
primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal’(Marx, 1996: 187). 
Furthermore Engels argued that labour was not only a ‘prime basic condition for all human 
existence’, but also that ‘labour created man himself’ (Engels, 1975: 1). 
Originating in the Marxist tradition, the studies of work and the labour process have seen a 
renaissance with post-war capitalist development. Since the 1960s the growing significance 
and scale of industrial conflict, has once again turned scholars’ attention to the workplace.  
The earliest most significant work shaping the modern labour process debate is that of Harry 
Braverman, who in his Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) revisited the Marxian concept of 
social conflict and control manifested through the labour process. Braverman’s extensive 
critique of the capitalist labour process, as seen in a Taylorist workplace, was based on three 
main arguments (‘principles’). It was argued that firstly, the labour process is dissociated from 
the skills of the workers; secondly, the conception is separated from execution (or in other 
terms – mental and manual labour are separated); and thirdly that the managers use their 
‘monopoly of knowledge’ (Ibid: 82) – taken away from workers and exclusively attributed to 
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managers – in order to ‘control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution’ (Ibid: 
82). According to Braverman (Ibid: 83) modern management emerged on the basis of the above 
principles, and was to  
(...) ensure that as craft declined, the worker would sink into the level of general and 
undifferentiated labour power, adaptable to a large range of simple tasks, while as 
science grew, it would be concentrated in the hands of management.  
This has led to a ‘degradation of work in the twentieth century’. Brought into existence by the 
capitalist society, management becomes the necessary means of control, as the mass of 
alienated workers who ‘have lost all stake in or concern for the process’ (Ibid: 317) carry out 
the production.  
Zimbalist et al. (1979) expanded on Braverman’s theory of fragmentation, degradation and 
deskilling - dehumanising conditions of the modern workplace. The collection of Case studies 
on the labor process supports the thesis of deskilling being a central and long-run tendency. 
Most of the critique pointed out that Braverman neglected the issues of workers’ consciousness 
and resistance. There were doubts with regards to his account of deskilling (see Thompson, 
1983; Meiksins, 1994; Spencer, 2000), and allegations of the ‘romantic’ perceptions of 
traditional craft (Littler, 1978; Littler and Salaman, 1982).  Friedman (1977b) argued that it 
was an error on Braverman’s part to suggest that with the spread of modern industry the 
material basis for workers’ resistance would disappear. Moreover, a failure to address ethnicity 
and gender issues is, among the above mentioned, a key limitation of the Marxist literature 
(Hyman, 2006). Burawoy’s (1979) influential work is consistent with Marxist understandings 
of the capitalist labour process in terms of obscuring and securing of surplus value. It does 
however question how the surplus value is secured. Thus Braverman’s deskilling and alienation 
does not provide a good enough explanation, as the labour process ‘must be understood in 
terms of the specific combinations of force and consent that elicit cooperation in the pursuit of 
profit’ (Ibid: 30). Burawoy sees the worker as an individual rather than as a member of a 
broader class; autonomous (worker controls the machine rather than is controlled by it) and 
therefore the reward system is said to be based on an individual rather than a collective effort. 
Initially workers’ effort is extracted through coercion and fear, then through ‘consent’. The 
labour process itself also becomes a metaphorical ‘game of making out’ in which workers are 
engaged by management to ‘face one another in conflict or competition’ (Ibid: 80-86). The 
conflict is thus reshaped and redirected from the hierarchical towards the lateral. Moreover, the 
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‘consent’ is being ‘manufactured’ as a consequence of the process, in both narrower 
(workplace) and more general (economic system) dimensions:  
‘(...) just as playing a game generates consent to its rules, so participating in the 
choices capitalism forces us to make also generates consent to its rules, its norms. It 
is by constituting our lives as a series of games, a set of limited choices, that capitalist 
relations not only become objects of consent but are taken as given and immutable. 
(Ibid: 93). 
According to Burawoy (1990) coercion and consent are integral to the production process, yet 
their proportions and the way they are being articulated changes. The more workers become 
engaged in the ‘game’, the less coercion is needed to extract effort. Furthermore, the coercion 
itself ‘becomes the object of consent’ (Ibid: 4).  
Workers resistance, however rare, is directly involved in the production process. Burawoy 
distinguishes between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ (Buroway, 1979: 177) struggles, of which 
only the latter may threaten the capitalist process, while the former are mainly focused on the 
effort bargain. The concept of conflict was further developed in The Politics of Production 
(Burawoy, 1985).  
Famously described by Giddens (1981: 192) as ‘one of the most significant contributions to 
the sociology of industry’, Burawoy’s work was criticised for being ‘fundamentally a-historical 
and non-dialectical’ and attributing all social processes as beneficial to the capitalist class 
(Clawson and Fantasia, 1983: 671), as well as its eschewal from interconnectedness of class 
struggle, workplace organisations and capitalist social relations (see: Spencer, 2000). Kelly 
(1985) argued that Manufacturing consent overestimated the degree of capitalist control of the 
enterprise.   
Nevertheless, the second-wave contributions, based on critiques of Braverman’s, and further 
Burawoy’s analysis, is said to have infused or even ‘initiated’ what has come to be known as 
‘the labour process debate’ (Meiksins, 1994; Smith, 2009). 
Finally, as Thompson (1983: 118) argued, regardless of the critique outlined above, ‘deskilling 
remains the major tendential presence within the development of the capitalist labour process’.  
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At the beginning of the 1990s the newest wave of the labour process debate associated mainly 
with the International Labour Process Conference emerged. Concepts of concern were control, 
resistance and consent (see Thompson, 2010; Warhurst et al., 2008) and the need for a ‘core 
theory’ (Thompson, 1990) which could provide the ‘structural characteristics of the capitalist 
labour process that shaped and constrained workplace relations’ (Thompson and O’Doherty, 
2009).  
An extensive evaluation of the core LPT critique along with methodological suggestions is 
provided by Jaros (2005; 2004). Departing from the Marxian argument that the core LPT is 
‘managerialist’ (2005: 8), and ‘methodologically deficient’, ‘theoretically trivial and politically 
irrelevant to contemporary conditions’ (2005: 9), Jaros suggests that LPT would benefit from 
the application of methods that utilize qualitative research studies.  
Another important focus of modern LPT is the nature and transformation of labour power under 
capitalism (Thompson and Smith, 2009). It is suggested that capital looks for different values 
in the modern worker. Thompson (2010: 11) points to the transfer of risk from capital to labour 
as the new form of insecurity. Under global capitalism  
Workers are told that they no longer have a job for life or even a career with a 
company, and that they have to make themselves employable even without 
employment, while pensions are being cut back or removed.  
‘High performance’ practices cause overwork, more and more time devoted to employment 
and in consequence ‘negative job-to-home spillover’ (Ibid).  
In the 21st century the labour process faces a new range of theoretical challenges and problems 
to address. There is a call for a new multi-levelled analytical approach (Thompson, 2010; 
Edwards, 2007) that would allow tracing ‘patterns of change in the labour process within and 
across increasingly globalised industries’ (Thompson, 2010: 13); but also for the rejuvenation 
of radicalism in labour process analysis (Spencer, 2000). As precarious employment and 
intensified labour mark contemporary capitalist production with increasing significance, the 
‘critique’ approach needs to rejoin the debate.  
An overview of the literature provided in the previous section also pointed to the significant 
role of management in controlling workers. Burawoy’s Politics of Production (1985) suggested 
the emergence of ‘hegemonic despotism’ as the new regime of labour control, the product of 
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economic crisis that ‘rendered workers helpless against managerial assault’ (Burawoy, 1990: 
5). Indeed, in the labour process perspective management is mainly considered in terms of 
control and resistance as well as delegation and monitoring of work (see: Storey, 1985; 1989; 
Friedman, 1987; Hyman, 1987).  
The next section will explore the body of literature on workplace resistance. 
  
4.2.2 Resistance 
 
The notion of ‘workplace as contested terrain’ is attributed to Edwards (1979), who argued that 
employers (managers) and workers have conflicting interests. It is not a new concept within 
the Marxist and LPT tradition and has been considered in the works of many theorists and a 
variety of perspectives (Marx and Engels, Gramsci, Braverman and Buroway and many others), 
as the relationship between management (capital) and workers (labour) is inherently considered 
to be an unstable and conflictual one (Hyman, 1975). 
The literature provides a plethora of definitions for resistance and a wide range of tools that 
workers can utilise to contend with their bosses. A classic account by Edwards (1979: 13) 
suggests that  
‘The workplace becomes a battleground, as employers attempt to extract the 
maximum effort from workers and workers necessarily resist their bosses’ 
impositions.’  
Collinson (1994: 49) sees the role of workplace resistance in attempting to 
(...) challenge, disrupt or invert prevailing assumptions, discourses and power 
relations. It can take multiple material and symbolic forms, and its strength, influence 
and intensity are likely to be variable and to shift over time… 
Therefore resistance is mainly associated with control, as managerial practices are always 
contestable and different functions of capital impossible to ‘harmonise’; moreover capital has 
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no ‘one best way’ in managing these contradictions, but also is en route to partial failure 
(Hyman, 1987: 30).  
The literature dealing with workplace resistance draws on two main strands (see Mumby, 
2005), and either emphasises managerial control and its ability to subordinate and surveil 
workers (e.g. Burawoy, 1979), referring to a Foucauldian (1977) factory metaphor (e.g. Sewell 
and Wilkinson, 1992), or the opposite – highlights the workers’ abilities to regain spheres of 
autonomy within these mechanisms of control (e.g. Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Fleming and 
Sewell, 2002; May, 1999; Scott, 1994). However broadly-described power relations and 
managerial strategy concepts can be an insightful prelude to understanding the nature of 
workplace resistance (see Thompson and van den Broek, 2010; Edwards et al., 1995; Roscingo 
and Hodson, 2004; Friedman, 1977a). It is also important to attempt, at the same time, a more 
critical and flexible approach, as suggested by Mumby (2005) and Prasad and Prasad (1998). 
The latter claims that perhaps the most important thing when talking about workplace 
resistance is to treat it as ‘an established set of behaviours’ (Prasad and Prasad, 1998: 251).  
When Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) suggested that ‘recalcitrant’ workers should be listed 
among the endangered species, with the research focus moving from labour towards 
management studies, they also observed that the decline in trade unions is often mistaken with 
the decline in workplace resistance, while the picture is not yet as gloomy as it may seem. In 
the later work (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 47) they state: 
Control can never be absolute and in the space provided by the indeterminacy of 
labour, employees will constantly find ways of evading and subverting managerial 
organization and direction at work. 
Hence, in contrast to the unitarist approach, conflict has not been eliminated and still exists. 
This structural antagonism results in workers responding to this oppression. Traditionally 
industrial conflict was embodied by strikes - very formal, organized and furthermost 
collectivist form of resistance. However the number of strikes and trade union density in 
developed countries decreased substantially over the last 30 years. It does not mean there are 
no other alternative forms in which conflict manifests itself in the workplace. Contestation can 
take a variety of forms. This might include absence, pilferage, and sabotage. To address the 
nomenclatural dilemma Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) replaced ‘conflict’ and ‘resistance’ 
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with a new term - ‘organizational misbehaviour’ to grasp these non-institutional forms of 
resistance. 
In a broad understanding, resistance itself may take a variety of forms, hence the attempt to 
taxonomise the concept poses some difficulties (see Richards, 2008). In the least complicated 
distinction, the main axis of division is running from individual to collective resistance, the 
organised and unorganised one and the passive and active resistance. 
Organised, and active collective workers’ resistance can be manifested in a non-violent way 
through corporate campaigns, industrial action, sit-ins, workplace occupations, blockades and 
‘hacktivism’ and trade unionism in general, while it can also take violent forms and in radical 
cases include sabotage, property destruction  or even assaults. Yet, as argued by Mishel (1985: 
76)  
A strike is [...] powerful weapon [...] When effective, a strike prevents the production 
of goods or services, and nothing hurts a company more financially than not being 
able to produce products for sale. Strikes directly use labor's greatest resource—the 
power to produce—and do not require much assistance beyond that of the workforce.  
Strikes have captured the attention of economists for many years (see Card, 1990). Žižek (2011: 
242) observes an interesting new dimension of industrial action in the changing global world, 
and sees striking more as 
(...) a protest act addressed primarily to the general public rather than owners or 
managers, its goal being simply to maintain jobs by making the public aware of the 
terrifying predicament that awaits the workers if they lose their jobs (and a typical 
strike now occurs in a factory which plans to radically curtail or close down 
production).   
Union activity itself has also taken an important place in the contemporary debate with the 
emphasis on collectivist vs. individualist identities of workers. Valkenburg (1996) emphasises 
the change in workers’ attitudes and decline in significance of collectivist frameworks. Jose 
(1999) characterises the transformation of trade unions in industrialised and less developed 
countries and despite the declining trends, he is confident that unionism will survive, yet he 
sees union activity in terms of broader social cohesion, transcending the boundaries of the 
workplace and becoming partners to other actors in civil society. The research into the new 
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politics of production (especially ‘lean production’, high-performance workplace techniques) 
suggests that trade unions are not in all instances marginalised and cooperative with the 
management agendas (Danford et al., 2002; Martinez Lucio et al., 2000; Martinez Lucio and 
Stewart, 1997). A comparative study of workers resistance in CEE confirms the above stand:  
While there has been some shift in union and employee resistance mobilisation from 
collective to individual, particularly in the countries where employment regulations 
began by being less embedded, this should not be exaggerated. (Jefferys, 2011: 686) 
The disorganised and more individualist forms of resistance are slightly more difficult to grasp. 
Firstly, it is challenging to define what exactly constitutes such resistance, as it takes more and 
more subtle and indirect shapes.  
 A broad concept of misbehaviour is, despite the limitations, an easy definition to adapt. 
‘Misbehaviour’ is regarded as anything other than organised and collective action by labour as 
a wider class agent (Thompson and Newsome, 2004), or as Acroyd and Thompson (1999) 
suggest – it can be understood as synonymous with terms such as conflict and resistance – and 
best described as ‘non-compliance’(Ibid: 21). They distinguish four directions such 
misbehaviour can take – disagreement over appropriation of work itself, the materials used in 
work; time spent on work; employee identity; and the following responses the workers may 
adapt towards the conflict in the above mentioned spheres. These range from commitment, 
engagement, cooperation and compliance to withdrawal or even denial and hostility (see: Ibid: 
25-28).  
Richards (2008) provides an extensive overview of multiple approaches to ‘misbehaviour’ 
across industrial sociology, organisational behaviour studies, industrial relations and gender 
studies. Dialectical analysis of these is beyond the scope of this research therefore the focus 
will be on a brief characteristic of the plethora of forms the disorganised workers’ resistance 
may take.   
Among the most common forms of resistance in the workplace, sabotage and micro-resistance 
take one of the top places (see Brown, 1977; Thompson and Bannon, 1985; Townsend, 2005; 
Barnes, 2007). Other popular strategies are ‘fiddles’ (e.g. Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995; Webb 
and Palmer, 1998), theft and pilferage (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and 
Ackroyd, 1995; Ditton, 1977).  
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Noon and Blyton (1997: 1435) argue that  
in order to ‘survive’ work people are obliged to become resourceful and creative in 
developing strategies that allow them to assert some control over, and construct 
meanings for the work activities they are instructed by managers to undertake.   
They explore five such strategies: fiddling, joking, ‘making out’, sabotage and escaping. Yet, 
Noon and Black are aware, that some of these strategies may be far removed from the core of 
resistance and in fact even show signs of compliance, depending on individual attitudes and 
understanding. The very same act of fiddling or sabotage may be ‘lost in translation’, as the 
worker engaging in misbehaviour and the manager may have different interpretations and 
different beliefs towards the meaning of the particular ‘misbehaviour’.  
Workplace fiddles have also been studied in terms of performing domestic chores and private 
tasks when at work (Anteby, 2003).  
Among the more subtle forms cynicism, sarcasm, joking, workplace humour, use of nicknames, 
gossiping, mocking can be listed as most distinguishable (see Scott, 1994; Richards, 2008; 
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995; Collinson, 1988, Taylor and Bain, 2003; Marra, 2007, 
Mulholand, 2004). Inspired by Bailey’s The Kingdom of Individuals (1993), Fleming and 
Sewell (2002) add ‘švejkism’, which in broad scope incorporates all the above; to the list. They 
refer to the novel by Jaroslav Hasek (1973), The Good Soldier, Svejk. The main protagonist is 
the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Army soldier, who famously, in order to survive, adapts a subtle 
strategy of subversion and resistance to the discipline through foot dragging, false compliance, 
feigned ignorance, dissimulation and so forth. They also emphasise the need of a new 
methodological approach in identifying the subtle and less evident modalities of resistance in 
the workplace.  
Finally, with the emergence of the internet, the symbolical battlefield of the workplace is 
slowly taking trenches in the ‘www.’ world; however still underestimated and insufficiently 
researched, it should not be treated as separate to traditional forms of employee resistance. 
Workers express discontent on blog sites, social media; ridicule their bosses or workplace 
relations through so-called ‘memes’.  
Therefore, in recent years employees’ use of the internet has become a subject of growing 
interest amongst scholars. With the rise of social media and the era of unlimited communication 
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workers gained a powerful tool in their struggle. A modest body of study has yet been 
conducted on workplace resistance with regards to the various aspects of the internet (Richards, 
2008; Schoneboom, 2007; Beard, 2002; Block, 2001). The internet has played an important 
role for campaigning against the employers (Collinson and Aycroyd, 2005). Some researchers 
place various ways of internet campaigning next to informal or unofficial trade union activity 
(Carter et al. 2003; Saundry et al. 2007). The most recent account by Richards (2007, 2008, 
2012) points to a growth of internet misbehaviour among non-organised workers. In his view 
‘the evolution of the internet and the technologies associated with internet access appears to 
have further increased the possibilities for employee internet-based misbehaviour’ (Richards 
2012: 30). In the context of resistance a plethora of web based tools can serve a purpose of 
resistance. Workers have been noted to use weblogs and social networking sites, to include 
most popular platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. According to Richards, blogging 
about work is a ‘metaphorical punch bag’ (Richards 2008: 102), it allows workers to, 
colloquially-speaking, ‘let the steam off’. For almost 26 per cent of cases studied by Richards 
it was considered a ‘strategy to release work-related frustrations and to release tension’ (Ibid: 
103). Effectively blogging is seen as a new form of employee resistance (Ibid), however still 
underestimated and insufficiently researched, it should not be treated as separate to traditional 
forms of employee resistance. 
The research on internet-based resistance is still in its infancy and there are many questions to 
answer regarding its methodology, approach, conceptual underpinnings (a very important issue 
should be workers’ identity in terms of individual vs. collective and its manifestations in the 
cyber world, where traditional understandings about the nature of social conflicts may not be 
easily applicable). 
Still, as Schoneboom (2007: 419-20) suggests:  
The link between blogging and organized social change is tenuous but, considered 
broadly, the cumulative power of employees writing critically about the labour 
process may contribute to an emerging public dialogue that undermines corporate 
capitalist hegemony. 
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4.3 The phenomenon of Japanisation  
 
Poland, the biggest economy within CEE, started attracting FDI at the beginning of 1990s, 
when the country became part of the global economy and investment flowed from core 
developed to the transition economies. These foreign investments are regarded significant and 
‘strategic’ to development of CEE, which suffered from effects of being an inefficient, 
command economy. The presence of FDI in Poland has stimulated important and also 
controversial debates on privatization, deregulation and labour market flexibility. Some argue 
the benefits of FDI have been overrated, and low levels of FDI perpetuate the existing economic 
status quo with Poland still based on the periphery, rather than in the core of world economy. 
Nevertheless FDI became inseparable to Poland’s economy over the last twenty years. The 
private, foreign owned sector is gradually growing, employing a considerable share of Poles 
and bringing institutional change.  
One of the growing sources of foreign capital in Poland comes from Japanese multinationals 
which substantially invested in the manufacturing sector (predominantly: Toyota, Isuzu and 
Bridgestone). Thousands of employees in Japanese factories for the very first time have been 
introduced to specific methods of production and management. This Japanese characteristic is 
based to some extent on the culture; Confucian philosophy and strong sense of collectivism. 
Whitehall (1992) argues that Confucianism hugely affects thinking and behaviour of managers. 
Attributes stemming from this doctrine of obedience, loyalty and self-development are part of 
common Japanese managerial practice. At the same time, Japanese collectivism, or groupism 
is presented as something opposite to American individualism. The Japanese are famously 
known for their distinctive employment system, so-called ‘three pillars’: lifetime employment, 
seniority-based system and enterprise unionism. The Japanese corporation have also 
successfully implemented just-in-time (JIT), total quality management (TQM) and kaizen (the 
philosophy of continuous improvement) techniques which contributed to high efficiency and 
quality of work. This specific managerial style and application of the quality policies were not 
purely dependent on ‘Japanese culture’. The influence of the USA in the post-war years has 
affected economic and political aspects of Japanese life, including management. 
Japanese production methods have been viewed from a variety of perspectives: technological, 
social-political and philosophical-ideological (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). The term 
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‘Japanisation’ has several meanings: it is the process of outward direct investment by Japanese 
corporations; it is a notion that economies are reproducing Japanese forms of economic 
structures and practices; and it also describes the attempts of mainly British and North 
American managers to emulate Japanese industrial and labour management (Ackroyd et al., 
1988). Japanisation is based primarily on specific Japanese manufacturing methods: flexibility, 
quality and minimum waste which are achieved by the just-in-time (JIT) technique30 (Bratton, 
1992). These methods have also affected the work organization. It was the assumption that 
Japanese multinationals had found mechanisms for being continually successful in particular 
industrial sectors. These mechanisms were identified most clearly with specific working 
practices (Japanese: Kaizen 31) and with the coordination of the supply chain (Kanban32 and 
JIT techniques): 
In broader political discourse, Japanese style and JFDI were assessed mainly in positive terms. 
Lech Wałęsa was not the only statesman who expressed admiration for Japanese ‘values’. 
Margaret Thatcher in her lecture on Japan’s role in the global community said: 
Japan's distinctness is manifest in the nature of her achievements. And truly 
remarkable is her ability to combine in harmony what seem contrasting qualities. Her 
culture is expressed not just in that wonderful art, portraying a lost world of rural 
idyll, but equally in her highly efficient automated mass production. Her industrial 
enterprises manage to succeed in combining the energetic pursuit of personal 
fulfilment with total loyalty to the interests of the company. Her very history 
expresses a still deeper contrast: an unsurpassed capacity to draw upon skills, first 
practised by others, in order to modernise—and yet, while changing, to remain 
herself.  
(Tokyo, 2 September 1991)33 
                                                          
30 The JIT concept has been described by Schonberger (1982: 16) as follows: ‘produce and deliver finished goods 
just in time to be sold, sub-assemblies just in time to be assembled into finished goods, fabricated parts just in 
time to go into the sub-assemblies and purchased materials just in time to be transformed into fabricated parts. 
31 Kaizen: Japanese for ‘improvement’, ‘change for better’. Kaizen is the philosophy of continuous improvement, 
in which all staff constantly considers methods of improving quality and efficiency (Hollinshead, 2010). The five 
main elements of kaizen are: team work, personal discipline, improved morale, quality circles, and suggestions 
for the improvement. The improvements sought through kaizen include maximum utilization through the 
elimination of unnecessary movement and the idle time (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). 
32 Kanban: Japanese for ‘signboard ‘or ‘billboard’. System which helps JIT techniques: ordering parts during 
production process. It improves processing vs. non-processing time ratio (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). 
33 Thatcher, M. (1991) Lecture on Japan’s role in the global community, Margaret Thatcher Foundation; available 
online at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108278 (accessed on 15.02.2011). 
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A few years before, in 1986 Thatcher herself opened the Nissan plant in Sunderland. The 
largest Japanese investment in England became her ‘favourite factory’. For Thatcher, Japanese 
investment was a way to ‘fill’ the gap after dismantling steel and mining industries (especially 
in the North of England) and to help to transplant Japanese methods across British business: 
the Japanese, now firmly established on British soil, would finally prove to British management 
and workers alike how to run a successful company (Turnbull, 1988: 18). Whereas for Poland’s 
governments Japanese ‘effectiveness’ and ‘productivity’ were more embodied in mythical East 
Asian values and cutting edge technology, rather than in a specific managerial style. Poles have 
also perceived Japan as an integral part of the affluent Western economy. This popular notion 
was expressed by Lech Wałęsa (2002):  
I saw Japanese reliability, robustness, diligence. I saw discipline, efficiency 
stemming from a free will, desire of work to build the country and own wealth, based 
on democracy. I saw roads in good conditions, I admired the economy, I observed a 
well-functioning political system, embedded in tradition and respect for monarchy, 
and at the same time very modern. This kind of reality I wanted in Poland. I wish I 
had lived in this country, only I wanted it to be situated between Bug and Oder rivers.  
It was exactly these attributes, which were awaited to revive Poland’s economy which had 
suffered from underinvestment. Quite rightly, Japan was considered to be one of the most 
successful at the time of transformation in Eastern Europe. It was believed that the inflow of 
Japanese investment would have brought back a respect for the slogan ‘Made in Poland’.  As 
it will be explained in the next chapter, Poland had to wait for JFDI at least for a few years 
after 1989. 
It is not surprising the ultra-efficient ‘Japanese style’ got so much attention in the time when 
neoliberal discourse became dominant in the political economy. Corporations were desperately 
seeking new cost-cutting methods. Japanese production practices ideally met those 
requirements. As Stewart (1996: 2) put it: ’Japan and Japanese practices are the benchmark by 
which efficacy of and new practices are to be judged’. This Japanese phenomenon was 
perfectly expressed by the productivity at the car plants in Europe and Japan; at the end of the 
1980s it took 16.8 hours to assemble a car in Japan. The average for car plants in Europe was 
more than double at 35.6 hours. High productivity in Japan was accompanied by the high 
quality of the product (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992).  Moreover, some studies suggested that 
Japanese organization is an alternative to the alienation and degradation associated with 
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conventional Taylorism (Womack et al., 1990). Applying Japanese methods became a new 
orthodoxy. They were ‘naturally’ incorporated in the West, without acknowledging them as 
‘Japanese’. 
The Japanisation debate lost its impetus in the late 1990s and 2000s. The Japanese economy 
itself slowed down, as did the volume of outward investment. At the same time South Korean 
chaebols were expanding massively, investing in USA, Europe and China. Notwithstanding 
JFDI has not disappeared, nor has the Japanese management system, although the latter has 
been criticized and substantially adjusted to the changing economic circumstances (Keizer et 
al., 2012). Since the mid-1990s the Japanese started investing in CEE. In Poland JFDI has been 
gradually rising since 1994, and especially from 2004 when Poland joined the European Union. 
Japanese corporations prefer to locate their investments in the Special Economic Zones, of 
which 14 can be found in Poland. It has to be also stressed that Poland has the largest SEZs 
concentration in CEE economies. It seems Japanese corporations exploited Poland’s 
governmental support to their full extent. This approach is completely understood since for 
decades the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Japanese External 
Trade Organization (JETRO) provided support to Japanese firms, especially those operating 
overseas. In 2010 some 254 Japanese firms were operating in Poland. Out of them, 73 were 
based in the manufacturing sector, mainly in automotive and bearings industries. 
With the expanding JFDI the question was whether these institutions could be transplanted to 
different economic and cultural environments. Hence, the interesting phenomenon 
accompanying JFDI (and also non-Japanese companies) is the process of Japanisation, the 
notion that firms are reproducing Japanese forms of economic structures and practices. 
However, the paradigm of the Japanisation frame poses certain difficulties. Firstly, it is alleged 
that this ‘miracle’ that is trying to dominate production practices, may in fact be an imitator 
itself (Warner, 1994). Secondly, as Stewart (2014: 143) argues the ‘obsession’ with the 
Japanese origins of lean production techniques, lead to an inability to regard them as 
transferable from one culture to another. The early debate was dominated by the managerialist 
perspective and advocated the notion of ‘one best way’ in production (Womack et al., 1990; 
Jones, 1992), which by many was considered a limited view (e.g. Charron and Stewart (eds.), 
2003; Durand, 2007). 
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4.4 Global transfer of Japanese managerial practices 
 
Since Meiji Restoration (1869), Japan and her economy have been found very interesting by 
Western researchers. In the field of employment relations, James Abegglen (1958) was the first 
who analyzed the phenomenon of the Japanese workplace. This interest easily intensified after 
the Japanese started investing globally and ‘Japanese’ factories became even more accessible. 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been investigated since the early 1980s. The 
bulk of research has been conducted in western, developed economies (the UK, USA and 
Australia). British management researchers were leading in the studies on the transferability of 
Japanese practices34. The height of interest on Japanisation occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Wilkinson and Olivier investigated the impact of Japanese investment on Britain in their 
The Japanization of British Industry (1988, 1992). The subsequent work Global Japanization? 
(Elger and Smith, 1994 ) has expanded the study bringing research from North America, Japan, 
Europe and Latin America. Kaplinsky (1994) looked at the implementation of Japanese 
management techniques in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). In November 1995 the 
whole issue of Journal of Management Studies was devoted to The Transfer of Japanese 
Management to Alien Institutional Environments. Three years later the subject was revisited 
with a special issue of Employee Relations Journal (1998). 
The original model of Japanese capitalism was considered to be an exemplary one that other 
countries should emulate or learn from. For instance Kaplinsky (1988) argued Japanese 
superiority stemmed not from their use of advanced technology, but from the adoption of a new 
(‘Japanese alternative’ based on the just-in-time production system) labour process which is 
more enriching than Fordism. The Japanese model of production increases ‘shop floor 
creativity’ through quality circles, multi-task work, and is generally supposed to improve 
workforce conditions. 
There is a wide spread notion that ‘radical’ management in terms of cost saving and quality 
policies, (especially in the automotive sector, the backbone of Japanese manufacturing) is 
responsible for the country’s economic success. The early proponents of Japanese management 
in the USA (Johnson and Ouchi, 1974) claimed that Americans should learn from the Japanese, 
                                                          
34 One of the leading centres was Cardiff Business School’s Japanese Management Research Unit. 
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and adopt the collectivistic approach in employment relations. Also, from the beginning many 
authors questioned or even disapproved of the transferability of Japanese methods, rejecting 
the theory that Western business must adopt Japanese management to be successful (Sethi et 
al., 1984). It was also proven that the Japanese ‘three treasures’, especially the life-time 
employment and seniority wage-based system are fully reserved for the homeland, and are very 
rarely transferable (Wilkinson et al., 1995). Dore (1973) has conducted one of the first 
comparative studies of Japanese and British industrial organization and employment relations. 
His study suggested that British factories are able to adopt Japanese solutions in management, 
production techniques, and even in industrial relations. The sudden growth of JFDI in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and the increasing role of Japanese multinationals in the world have 
provoked discussion on ‘Japanisation’. It also led to the emergence of a new ‘philosophy’ of 
HRM (Hollinshead and Leat, 1995). Some opponents argue that there is no such a thing as 
‘Japanese’ management, as in Japan itself there is a variety of management practices, for 
instance Nissan and Toyota, one of the largest car manufacturers, are operated in different ways 
(Cusumano, 1986; cited in: Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992). Whilst Stewart (1996: 11), defining 
‘Japanisation’ puts emphasis on pure technical attributes (lean production), rather than on 
Japan’s social relations and culture: 
This is not to say that social, cultural and organizational matters do not figure in the 
account, merely that they are seen to be secondary, to the overriding technical 
imperatives of lean production. 
Whilst much of the JFDI went into the non-manufacturing (financial) sector it was FDI in 
manufacturing which became a key focus of attention. For the first time the term ‘Japanisation’ 
was used by Turnbull (1986), who described changes in work organization currently underway 
in the British company, Lucas Electrical, where management had adopted  a ‘just-in-time’ 
production system. The ‘Japanese model’ at that time was primarily related to productivity and 
the efficiency of Japanese plants. 
The influential work The Machine that Changed the World: The Triumph of Lean Production 
based on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology five-year study: International Motor 
Vehicle Programme (IMVP). Womack et al. (1990) extolled Japanese production and 
management (JIT, team working, waste management).  Moreover, lean production transforms 
Taylorised labour relations, gives more responsibilities and tasks to workers. Authors have 
suggested that these methods should be emulated in Western economies. Later the IMPV’s 
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study was criticised by Coffey (2006), who dismantled the myth of superiority of Japanese car 
manufacturing in terms of productivity. 
The studies conducted in Western economies show a different level of adopting Japanese-
specific employment practices in foreign subsidiaries. The classical work of Oliver and 
Wilkinson (1988, 1992) has comprehensively looked into Japanese direct investors in Great 
Britain in 1987 and revisited their work in 1992. Their findings suggested that the Japanese 
brought many of the manufacturing and personnel practices that they use in Japan, although 
some problems have been encountered; for example in the early days  of Japanese company’s 
presence in the UK quality circles and JIT production have not always been successful. Many 
of the Japanese personnel practices (direct communication, highly selective recruitment, long-
term employment) were introduced in the British subsidiaries. Authors have stated that the 
personnel practices were being put in place more rapidly than the manufacturing practices. 
Moreover, British companies, which tried to emulate the ‘Japanese model’, were not as 
successful as the Japanese subsidiaries, mainly because they did not synchronize their 
personnel practices with their manufacturing ones. Altogether, the positive features of Japanese 
management practices outweigh the downsides (these are present and inevitable); and the 
authors support the view which could be broadly paraphrased along the following lines: 
‘Japanese may be the worst form of management practices, except for all the others’. 
Progressive management can improve company performance and in consequence provide 
employment security.  
A similar study, in terms of both the scope and findings, was conducted in the Japanese-owned 
‘transplant’ factories in America (mainly in steel, automotive and electronics industries). 
Following field research and interviews with hundreds of company officials and factory 
workers, Kenney and Florida (1993) came to the conclusion that not only ‘Japanese transplants 
are successfully transferring the basic elements of the Japanese production systems to the 
United States’, but also that the ‘Japanese system of production organisation is a set of 
interactive organisational practices that are transferable to foreign environments’ (Ibid: 8) in 
general.  
The following study which aimed to revisit Oliver and Wilkinson work, carried out by Taylor, 
et al., (1994) examined two electronic Japanese companies in the UK in the years 1992-1993 
(Orki Terebi in South Wales and Electricals Plc in the West Midlands). They revealed little 
evidence of many key components of the Japanese model of production. For instance there was 
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no JIT at Terebi. The authors were more sceptical about ‘Japanisation’; they have found no 
relevant proof of changes in the organization of production.  
The results of case studies conducted in the USA at Subaru-Isuzu (Graham, 1994), Canada, at 
CAMI - General Motors-Suzuki (Rinehart et al., 1994) and Australia at Canobolas, Hoya, 
Lachlan, Matsushita, NEC, Nippondenso, Sanyo and Toyota (Dedoussis and Littler, 1994) 
brought different conclusions. The management has been successful in transferring the 
elements of the Japanese model to the host country. In the case of the USA and Canada some 
resemblance of Japanese working practices were found, especially in terms of kaizen 
philosophy and socialization at workplace, some of them were resisted by the workers (USA); 
e. g. workers arrived late for work in order to avoid morning exercise or they remained sitting 
while others participated. Some more serious acts of collective resistance (or even sabotage) 
were noted, for example when a worker managed to stop an assembly line. The USA research 
has shown that Japanese management practices can result in a range of individual and collective 
resistance amongst workers. Workers participated in both spontaneous and planned resistance. 
Deoussis and Littler (1994) argued that there are some relevant differences in recruitment, 
promotion and communication between Australian subsidiaries and Japanese companies 
established in other countries, like recruitment of experienced, mature-aged blue-collars, less 
important seniority system; nor was there any evidence of the existence of ‘open door’ policies 
allowing employees direct contact with senior management. In contrast to Toyota’s plants in 
North America and Great Britain, which have been established in areas without a tradition of 
vehicle assembly, Toyota Australia operates in Melbourne where several auto makers are also 
established. Australian findings suggest the existence of Japanese practices, however they are 
more common amongst blue collar employees; few, if any exist among white-collar personnel 
show the peripheral model of Japanese management; relative factor endowments of economies 
will affect the processes of JFDI (e. g. differences in recruitment practices are resulting from 
the nature of local labour markets), especially in Australia where there is no core manufacturing 
sectors or centre for R&D. 
Emergence of greenfield Japanese investment in the UK also influenced home industrial 
relations. Studies conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s (White and Trevor, 1983; Trevor, 
1988; Crowther and Garrahan, 1988; Millward, 1994) showed the ‘Japanese model’ was 
adopted in many factories. This has been mainly embodied in management taking control over 
trade unions (single trade union, including ‘no strike’ agreements), and with management’s 
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greater flexibility to organising work. This tendency was also proven in the study of Wilkinson 
et al. (1995), suggestively titled The Iron Fist in The Velvet Glove: Management and 
Organization in Japanese Manufacturing Transplants in Wales. Authors (ibid: 829) conclude 
that Japanese-style industrial relations, arrangements, especially single union deals, ‘reduce the 
likelihood of collective worker dissent over tight disciplinary systems’. 
Since the early 1990s more critical discourse became prelevant in the debate on ‘Japanisation’. 
It has been perceived that various risks might stem from Japanese management, particularly in 
work intensification. Delbridge and Turnbull (1992) list the features of Japanese Human 
Resources maximization: the workers are organized into teams. Work itself is arranged around 
groups, rather than individuals. The team is responsible for ‘management of compliance’, with 
the key role of the team leader. It is important for the JIT system that these groups work 
efficiently and without disruption. ‘Management through blame’ achieves the quality control 
of the teams. Workers participate in the process of surveillance. This system allows for the 
tracing of all ‘faults’ of individuals and exposing them in front of the group. Another feature 
of HRM is standardization, where there is no individual variation. Every worker must perform 
the job in the exactly the same way. The employees are exposed to high levels of stress due to 
rigorous norms (multi-task worker) and the shattering rhythm of work (daily production targets 
displayed on light boards which ‘countdown’ during the shift). Individual workers become 
isolated and experience a feeling of distrust and fear, even towards other workers. This kind of 
behaviour is a result of ‘management by stress’ (Delbridge and Trurnbull, 1992).  
The empirical study of Garrahan and Stewart (1992) of the Nissan factory in North East 
England showed the effects of the lean production regime which does not empower workers. 
Japanese methods did not transcend Fordism either. The new regime of subordination through 
quality management effects to an even greater degree workers’ oppression, while management-
worker conflict is replaced by peer competition. So popular in the 1980s, the myth of Japanese 
‘production superiority’ (Womack et al., 1990) was debunked, and the title ‘enigma’ 
deciphered. While Nissan claims that ‘it has broken the chains of old and discredited 
employment traditions and working methods and practices’ (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992: 59); 
it is argued that the so-called ‘Nissan way’ is in fact based on ‘control through quality, 
exploitation via flexibility, and surveillance via team working’ (Ibid: 139). In post-Fordist 
capitalism the employees are not ‘one big happy family’; with constant threat of unemployment 
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they may be silenced at times, yet the new management strategies do not eliminate social 
conflict or class antagonism and finally resistance.  
The later studies suggested resistance towards Japanisation in the UK, especially in terms of 
worker response to systems of surveillance and discipline. These demonstrate that not only did 
the control of labour still pose a challenge to management (Palmer, 1996) but also workers 
were able to manipulate standard operating procedures. Despite the high levels of managerial 
control they have developed and were able to put in practice the range of both collective and 
individual ‘fiddles’ for evading surveillance and making time (Webb and Palmer, 1998). 
Delbridge (1995) suggests that workers’ resistance and ‘misbehaviour’ towards Japanese 
practices are modest and increasingly pushed to the margins, while strict disciplinary measures 
and control are forcing the frontiers of workers’ opposition further back.  
Another account by Lewtchuk and Robertson (1999: 69) gives evidence against the 
‘passiveness’ argument. Lean production was officially rejected by Canadian Auto Workers 
(CAW) in a joint Suzuki and GM plant. CAW understood that lean production causes work 
intensification and workers are even more alienated than those in traditional Fordist 
workplaces.  
Presented above is only a narrow selection of a much wider plethora of literature dealing with 
Japanisation. The focus on predominantly highly industrialized economies (Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism countries) undoubtedly exposed some limitations of the inquiry.  
Studies conducted in Japanese manufacturing plants in Malaysia are showing a whole range of 
responses towards the transferability of management practices. Removed from the labour 
process tradition, an anthropological study by Ong (1987) documents the experience of female 
workers in three Japanese factories and their ‘spirit of resistance’ to ‘the enforced discipline of 
the working class in the making’ (Ibid: 245). Her focus is more on the gender issues, as she 
argues that in case study firms, female workers’ gender and sexuality ‘have been mapped out 
as an arena for contestation’ (Ibid: 245). There is an account of a wide range of resistance to 
‘Japanese rule’, both individual and collective, with some forms of resistance deeply enrooted 
in the Malay culture (there were accounts of workers refusing work based on ethnic beliefs of 
spiritual possessions and factories being cursed, that management had to address with ‘unusual’ 
adaptation policies); as well as walkouts, strikes and even violent incidents. Significantly, in 
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the case of the discussed study, Japanese electronics firms were indeed the ‘contested terrains’ 
and were regarded as micro laboratories of transition from peasant society to the new industrial 
capitalism.  
Later studies of Malaysian subsidiaries (Abdullah and Keenoy, 1995) argue that the transfer 
occurs, however, more in terms of capital and production technology than a particular style of 
management. They suggest that the issue of transfer needs to be considered in a wider historical 
and cultural context and that the ‘global competitive environment in electronic products seems 
to play a far more significant role in employee relations policy choices than the ‘home 
practices’ of the Japanese corporations’ (Ibid: 762).   
In CEE Japanese companies have been present for more than twenty years, however not many 
studies were devoted to the implementation of specific methods and workers’ responses 
towards Japanisation. Yamazaki (2012) provides case studies of Japanese factories from all 
around the world, among them three are from Eastern Europe: U-Shin Ltd, Furugawa Electric, 
Co Ltd. in Hungary and Toyota Bashoku Factory in Russia. However, his record is an idyllic 
picture of a harmonious labour-management relationship. 
The workers’ Council in USEU has made a good deal labour-employment 
relationship possible through keeping an open dialogue between both parties. This 
harmonious relationship was facilitated by President Koji Miyashita and the 
production division chief Akinori Okubo taking appropriate measures, listening 
carefully to the labour side at the regular monthly joint labour and management 
conference. Complaint arbitration is supposed to be handled through the management 
system and the general section as well as aforementioned conference. However there 
do not seem to have been any complaints so far. 
(Ibid: 57) 
In Poland, the research conducted gives a relatively positive view of Japanese management. 
One of the accounts is that of indirect Japanisation. The work of Sobocińska et al. (2008) used 
the single case study of the Polish Security Printing Works in Warsaw (PWPW SA), where 
management has successfully implemented one Japanese management method ‘5S’ (shop floor 
housekeeping and thrift). There was evidence of initial resistance among the workers. Leaders 
had to spend a great deal of time and effort convincing workers to accept ‘5S’. Eventually, 
management achieved its goals; increase in employee creativity and involvement in fulfilling 
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tasks and stronger identification with the mission of the company (ibid: 339). However the sole 
case study of the champion, state-owned company, where there was an attempt to introduce 
only one method, does not fully reflect the process of Japanese management transfer in the 
Polish workplace.  
JFDI in Poland is mainly being researched in the context of cross cultural management, the 
Japanese philosophy of management, leadership and cultural domination. In these particular 
fields, the works of Marek Krasiński (Wrocław University of Economics) deserve mentioning. 
He argues that JFDI in Poland belongs to well-established corporations with old traditions, 
which are using management concepts that are strongly embedded in the Japanese national 
culture. Krasinski (2012a) compared Poland’s and Japan’s cultures using Hofstede’s (1980) 
cultural dimension theory. The analysis proved that Polish and Japanese cultures are 
substantially divergent in their long term orientation (LTO), the value of remaining indices: 
power distance (PDI), individualism (IDV), masculinity (MAS) and uncertainty avoidance 
(UAI) were relatively similar. However, Krasinski pointed out another salient difference 
between Poland’s and Japan’s organization culture; while in Poland (like in Europe) 
specialization at work constitutes enormous value, in Japan emphasis is put on work 
standardization and multiskilling. In his other study (2012b) of Toyota and Bridgestone 
(companies based in Lower Silesia), Krasiński argued that the Japanese failed to impose full 
cultural domination on the Poles. He suggested that Japanese corporations in Poland have 
chosen the model of cultural cooperation. Edyta Janus (2013) conducted extensive studies on 
Japanese management practices in companies with Japanese capital operating in Poland. Her 
research focuses on collectivism as a HRM approach, and its specific form - groupism (shudan-
shugi) is understood as the domination of the group over the individual (ibid: 98). Janus 
suggests that the employees’ adaptation to Japanese practices varies depending on the size of 
the company. She concludes that groupism may facilitate the transfer of Japanese management. 
The study of Ćwiklicki and Obora (2011) researched the Polish model of Hoshin Kanri method 
(strategic planning). Their finding established that Polish Hoshin Kanri model differs from the 
classical one and it needed to be adjusted to Poland’s business environment. The Polish variety 
is characterized by a lesser degree of staff participation in strategic planning. 
More critical coverage related to Japanese work practices was present in the Polish national 
newspapers. Aforementioned Leśniewska (2007) investigated the Orion Electric factory at 
Crystal Park, Toruń, where the majority of the shop-floor workers are women. The journalist 
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working undercover at the shop floor experienced a full implementation of kaizen methods and 
JIT techniques. Each working day begins with an assembly meeting, when workers are 
instructed on the daily rate of output. They are obliged to finish each operation at the assembly 
line during the limited time period counted in seconds. The slogans, which are meant to 
motivate employees to more effective work, are placed all over the plant (e. g. ‘Quality, Price, 
Quantity + Speed’). These methods along with low wages (national minimum) meet with 
workers’ discontent; however the resistance is not visible. Leśniewska’s reportage brings a 
grim perspective on women’s working conditions at the plant. It also gives an account of the 
political background of Japanese investment in the region. Still, the exploration of Japanese 
practices in Poland cannot be based on this non-academic study. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
The previous chapter argued that the VoC framework, due to its static character, may not be a 
sufficient tool of analysis for the purpose of this research. The workplace should be seen as 
‘contested terrain’ and a site of cultural change, with some of the transferred practices being 
accommodated while others have undergone institutional bending. Workers’ resistance 
towards managerial practices is underpinned by the labour process theory notion of subversion 
and conflict. As demonstrated in the review of labour process and worker resistance literature, 
workers’ resistance may take many forms and manifest itself in a variety of ways. Chapter 
Seven will provide a detailed account of the workers’ resistance in the researched companies.  
Referring to Marxian terms, in capitalist labour process the conflict is inevitable, as:  
‘the control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function arising from the 
nature of the social labour process, and peculiar to that process, but it is at the same 
time a function of the exploitation of a social labour process, and is consequently 
conditioned by the unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the raw 
material of his exploitation’ (Marx, 1976: 449).   
Understanding interests between profit-seeking capital and exploited workers as conflicting is 
not a new concept and has been a subject of numerous research within the Marxian and LPT 
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tradition. Burawoy (1979) suggested that workplace conflict was reshaped by management 
from hierarchical towards the lateral in the process of ‘consent manufacturing’, while Edwards 
(1979) coined the term ‘contested terrain’ to underline the existence of intrinsic conflict 
between management (capital) and workers (labour). Notably, as Martinez Lucio and Stewart 
(1997) point out, in a significant part of LPT research ‘labour’ was lost at an expense of an 
‘individual’ worker. They argue, that a collective worker, as a ‘structural feature of the 
capitalist labour process always confronts management and is addressed today through a range 
of strategic alternatives exemplified by the individualizing practices of, inter alia, HRM.’ (Ibid: 
49).  
In order to look at the workers’ responses towards the Japanese management practices in the 
researched factories, concepts of conflict and resistance provided by the LPT can prove a useful 
tool of analysis. However Labour Process Theory alone may not be sufficient. As argued in the 
previous chapter, employment relations transfer is shaped by the national business system of 
the transferring economy, hence the VoC partly determines the nature of this process. While 
some studies indicate that foreign investors are more likely to follow host country HRM 
practices (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994), there is a body of literature providing evidence that 
in CEE subsidiaries, FDI ‘westernized’ management practices (Aguilera and Dabu, 2005) and 
played an important role in enterprise restructuring (Hardy, 2006; Shields, 2004; Domański, 
2003; Pavlinek et al., 2009). To attract demanded FDI inflows, CEE countries required 
‘appropriate institutional and policy frameworks to position themselves within flows of global 
capital’ (Dunning, 1993; Rutland, 1995).  
In the aftermath of Japanese investment expansion in the 1980s JFDI became a very popular 
subject for academic analysis. Some early studies suggested that neither was it possible to 
transfer Japanese practices to the western subsidiaries due to the indissoluble embeddedness of 
the Japanese firm within Japanese society (Dore, 1973), nor to even attempt researching the 
subject lacking the area knowledge, without extensive studies into the Japanese language and 
culture. The writers who adopted a system or dominance approach present an alternative view. 
These works point out the advantages of unique Japanese practices as opposed to the American 
model (Pascale and Athos, 1982). More recent studies (Elger and Smith, 1994) shifted the 
research focus onto the subsidiary plants and the transfer of Japanese practices abroad and 
abandoned the institutional perspective. The Japanese firm was treated as an abstract model 
119 
 
                   
 
and was analysed outside the Japanese economy. More focus was put on workers’ experience 
and, however overused, the transplant of Japanese practice. 
The capitalist transition in CEE encouraged Japanese firms to invest in Poland; economic links 
were established between both economies in the mid-1990s. At the global level the debate on 
convergence versus diversity of management practices is continuous (Kitschelt et al., 1999; 
Inversen et al., 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Hyman (2004: 428) argues: 
…even if managements are increasingly in the driving seat, their strategic choices 
are likely to reflect distinctive traditions and nationally specific institutional 
landscape. This is not immutable: financial liberalisation linked to the spread of 
Anglo-American conception of ‘shareholder value’ (reinforced by the growing 
hegemony of US accounting protocols) may shift perspectives significantly; and 
perhaps the spread of US-style MBAs may also be encouraging more standardised 
management behaviour. Yet different strategies can be expected to persist if one 
rejects the idea that there is ‘one best way’ of organising work and workers, whether 
in the individual firm or at the level of the macroeconomy. 
Specifically, this ambiguity applies to the adaptation of specific Japanese managerial practices 
in the West. The question of the successful transferability of Japanese methods to the post-
socialist environment also remains open. As it was shown in the previous chapter, Polish 
managers were ‘converted’ to the Anglo-American style. They know Japanese methods; 
however this is more theoretical rather than practical knowledge. In Poland, the interest in 
Japanese management is predominantly uncritical; there is little evidence of research taking a 
non-managerial perspective. It is influenced by a popular, optimistic view of FDI in general. 
This stance could be compared to the euphoria over Japanese investment, present in the West 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Hence, research conducted in Poland on JFDI is evidently 
lacking a shop-floor perspective. The ‘Japanisation of Polish industry’ has not been given full 
attention yet. 
The ‘transfer’ of Japanese practices and workers’ responses towards this mode of management 
will be examined in Chapters Six and Seven.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
‘Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?  
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?’ 
 
T.S. Eliot (1934), The Rock 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide the rationale for empirical research methods deployed in the study of 
Crystal Park companies. The analysis  builds on the twofold theoretical foundations - VoC 
framework (Hall and Soskice, 2001) for a better understanding of transfer of Japanese 
management practices to the Polish workplace; as well as Labour Process Theory in order to 
conceptualise workers’ resistance towards these practices. 
The chapter is structured as follows. At a broader foundational perspective, the procedures 
chosen by researchers are related to philosophical choices (Creswell, 2003; 2009). For the 
purpose of this study a qualitative approach was adopted. The researcher’s motivation for the 
utilisation of qualitative research is explained and the choice of research methods outlined 
(5.2). In order to investigate typical Japanese practices’ presence in Polish subsidiaries – a case 
study method was adopted to gather data. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted 
with both the managers and the workers. Simultaneously, the researcher refers to the data 
gathered through the online research (5.2.1). With regards to the fieldwork undertaken, access 
issues (5.2.2) and the process of data gathering (5.2.3) are discussed. Section 5.3 gives a brief 
characteristic of the challenges the researcher was faced with while conducting field research 
in a Polish transforming economy. Finally, in section 5.4 the researcher returns to the 
methodological and ethical implications of the internet as a source of data. Issues of data 
reliability, validity, as well as the potential limitations of this form of research are addressed. 
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5.2 Choice of the research method 
 
In terms of the researcher’s role in the CEE-based field, this is positioned between two ideal 
types proposed by Steger (2004: 26-33) – that of ‘The Roman’ and ‘The Ethnographer’. As a 
native researcher I was advantaged in many respects; having native knowledge of Polish culture 
and language positively influenced my access to data. Simultaneously I was deeply aware of 
the limitations of this advantage.  
Industrial relations (or employment relations) is a problematic discipline for the researchers in 
terms of both methods and its status among the sciences and a subject of ongoing debate (see 
Whitfield and Strauss, 1998; Kelly, 2004; Almond, 2004; Kelly, 1998). Employment relations 
(or industrial relations) is a ‘borrower’ discipline (Kelly, 1999: 1) and draws on several strands 
of social science for both paradigms and research methods. This inter-disciplinarity can be 
considered the field’s great advantage, but it is also a source of problems. As a social science, 
the industrial relations field occupies itself with aspects of human activity that are related to 
‘working’ and ‘work’. Kelly points out that, the discipline is thus;  
subject to all social science debates and questions about the extent to which analysts 
can be scientific and realistic about social matters.  
(Ibid: 1) 
The role of a scientist is to explain the nature of the researched phenomena and colloquially 
speaking, get to the ‘bottom of reality’, if at all possible. However, in the case of 
interdisciplinary research this is particularly challenging.  
The researcher in workplace relations may be spoilt for choice in terms of available methods. 
However, Edwards (2007) suggested that researching the dynamics of the workplace relations 
requires a relatively ‘micro-level’ focus. According to Jaros (2005) a great practical advantage 
of the study of work lies in utilisation of qualitative methods over ‘armchair theorising’. Field 
studies are experiencing a renaissance, not only in terms of literature on the research produced, 
but also a growing utilisation of qualitative methods in social studies (Andersen et al., 1995). 
In terms of the best method to conduct research in the field ‘IR scholars have still not settled 
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on a way of undertaking research that is both distinctive and widely-accepted. The search of 
the Holy Grail goes on.’ (Whitfield and Strauss, 2008: 15). 
Most of the research into Japanisation has utilised qualitative methods, surveys and case studies 
in particular. When I first considered the project I anticipated that it would take the form of 
proving a hypothesis I already had in mind. While studying the available research, working on 
my literature review and also following the developments of the Crystal Park reported in the 
local press, I was under the impression that western methods were easily transferable and 
implementable in Polish companies. With all the Polish books and research on management 
and the praise of the western methods (Łańcucki 2006; Ćwiklicki and Obora, 2009), I was 
naively convinced that the fieldwork would confirm these assumptions. However, after the first 
of the interviews I was proved wrong so I was compelled to rethink the whole project. There 
was more to it than just simple ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers. While I could see that western 
management practices – in case of my project Japanese practices – were being implemented in 
Polish companies through – among others – FDI; the scale of workers’ adaptation, the extent 
of implementation, and finally the question of possible resistance – emerged and remained 
unanswered. This challenged me to develop a much more nuanced story. Therefore qualitative 
methods were chosen and adapted as were deemed to be appropriate for the purpose of this 
study. My aim was therefore to develop theoretical propositions rather than to test them (Steger, 
2004).  
 
5.2.1 Qualitative research: case studies and Internet-based sources 
 
As Steger (2004) argues, qualitative fieldwork provides a better understanding and description 
of the social and economic reality of the CEE, whereas surveys tend to deliver rather limited 
data. At the same time researching industrial relations poses a number of difficulties in general 
(Whitfield and Strauss, 1998), while transforming economies fieldwork adds to this challenge 
in particular (Clark and Michailova, 2004). Firstly, as Whitfield and Strauss (1998) argue the 
IR field is characterised by a huge heterogeneity, which they consider to be both its strongest 
and weakest feature. Moreover, they point to substantial differences in the way the research is 
undertaken across the world. Whitfield and Strauss (2008) portray IR as a normative and value-
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orientated discipline. Other scholars concur with this view  suggesting that Industrial Relations 
research, despite the best efforts of researchers, may be lacking a neutral perspective - IR 
scholars are supportive of unions, while those being management consultants may adopt a 
managerial perspective (Brown, 1998). Therefore the presence of two paradigms in IR – the 
original broader ‘employment’ paradigm and the modern narrower ‘labour–management’ 
paradigm – has led to a serious decline in the field (Kaufman, 2008). 
Qualitative research can rely on a variety of sources and be conducted in multiple ways - 
through direct or participant observation, as well as interviews. Potential types of qualitative 
data can include collected documents, field notes, audio-visual sources, case studies and many 
others (see Gibbs, 2007). For the purpose of this study a qualitative, multiple case study method 
was used. The fieldwork was undertaken in Crystal Park and at a regional level. Qualitative 
data were gathered through a series of semi structured interviews. It was assumed that a 
qualitative case study investigation would be the best method to address the research questions. 
According to Yin (2009: 4): 
(...) the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles, small group 
behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, (...) and the maturation of 
industries.  
In recent years there has been a growing popularity among researchers in making use of more 
than one method in a research project. This has numerous advantages, it helps validate findings, 
provide a deeper insight and consequently leads to richer results (Whitfield and Strauss, 2008). 
Acknowledging that the ‘social world is going digital’ (Kozinets, 2010: 1), for the purpose of 
this study also, Internet-based workers’ experience accounts were treated as useful qualitative 
material in gaining the insight into their reality. ‘Open message boards’ and online forums were 
examined and complement the data gathered through traditional interweaving.  
During the fieldwork it was discovered that different research settings (the place where the 
interview is conducted, as well as the interviewees’ work position, and finally their individual 
personalities) informed the answers that were given to the questions posed.  
Firstly, interviews conducted in the workplace tended to give more cautious responses in terms 
of expressing normative evaluations as opposed to those that took place outside the workplace. 
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Secondly, workers were more critical of the reality than the managers and at the same time, 
their answers were more detailed, while some of the managers attempted to paint the picture in 
bright colours only. (See researcher’s reflection 1). Thirdly, it is assumed that the anonymity 
of Internet sources used may allow a more accurate view of those aspects of workers’ 
experience that they are not confident, nor afraid to, talk about during the face-to-face 
interaction. The issue of trust is of paramount importance here (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Yin, 
2009, 1984; Rubin and Rubin 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Access issues 
 
Prior to the fieldwork the researcher studied a body of methodological works on conducting 
research in Eastern Europe, both academic (Michailova, 2004; Clark and Michailova (eds.), 
2004; Drzewiecka, 2007) and more reflective, guide-like non-academic sources (Soroczyńska, 
K., 2007; CEELBAS, 2010). Most of these sources pointed to the access issues as the first 
 
Reflection 1 – Fieldwork Interviews 
 
A sense of humour helped me greatly in breaking the distance especially among lower 
rank employees. I was avoiding talking about the project itself while the interviewees were 
quite happy – some of them treating the opportunity of being interviewed as an 
achievement - the manager picked me (so must be proud of me) - they were interested 
in telling their own story. The case was slightly different with the managers who not only 
wanted to know about the project in detail, they also wanted to ‘guess’ the findings prior 
to analysis, and to understand the methodology I was going to adopt; they had their own 
ambitions and agendas. I realized that they changed the language they spoke to me, as I 
had a chance to hear them talking to their colleagues, which may lead to a conclusion that 
they may have tried to influence the picture of themselves and the organisations they were 
managing. 
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obstacle in the data-gathering process. In the case of this research, the researcher was an 
‘insider’ in terms of culture and language, and at the same time - an ‘outsider’ when the 
accessed organisations (Crystal Park factories) are concerned. Therefore the access to 
fieldwork companies was a challenging task. On one hand, the easiest way of getting access to 
an organisation is through ‘insiders’ (respondents and other third party actors). However the 
awareness of the perils of such help is necessary. As Michailova and Clark (2004: 12) observe:  
respondents can play a crucial role in helping researchers gain insider status, or at 
least in allowing access to their networks as a means of facilitating access. Similarly, 
most authors point out the role of respondents as internal informants, who are able to 
keep the outsider in the know, make introductions and arrange interviews. These 
respondents can play an important informal mediating role, even becoming part of 
the access strategy (…), though (…) as organisational members, they can have 
hidden political interests in taking care of researchers. 
Prepared for difficulties, the researcher headed to Poland and, as expected, the initial plan on 
how to gain access to the Crystal Park site had to be modified several times and, just as Soulsby 
(2004) predicted, sometimes ‘negotiated’.   
The first point of call was Pomerania Special Economic Zone (PSEZ) administration. The 
researcher phoned the PSEZ admin office (phone number available on the Agency’s internet 
website) and the appointment was scheduled immediately at the Toruń office. PSEZ 
administration occupied only a small office on the outskirts of Toruń. After a brief discussion 
on the research subject, the researcher was encouraged to contact Crystal Park Companies. The 
PSEZ administration officer said that PSEZ was very happy with the academic interest the 
Zone had already received (several undergraduate projects concerning the Japanese 
investment) and expressed the need for in-depth research on a post graduate level. Notably, 
being an ‘outsider’ and representing a UK university has helped the researcher in gaining 
access to the Zone, as the PSEZ administration officer stated that all the publicity the Zone 
received locally and abroad, could bring more investment. All the documents, the letter from 
the University and ID were photocopied. The researcher was provided with the contact list of 
the Japanese corporations’ managers which included general managers, human resources as 
well as administration managers (with email addresses and telephones numbers). Even though 
the PSEZ administration was helpful in providing all the information and gaining the contact 
126 
 
                   
 
details of the Japanese companies was relatively easy, access to the factories themselves was a 
daunting and time-consuming task. 
Japanese corporations are considered to be ’hermetic’ in comparison with European or 
American ones. This opinion is also shared by local journalists who experienced tremendous 
difficulties whilst trying to access the site. Prior to the fieldwork during the pilot study, the 
researcher managed to speak to two journalists, representing major local newspapers (Gazeta 
Pomorska, Gazeta Wyborcza), who specialised in Japanese investment in Toruń. This opinion 
was also shared by a Toruń University researcher, who knew of cases of researchers trying to 
access the site being refused.  
Workers were approached through the regional office of Solidarność in Toruń, which operated 
at two Crystal Park’s factories. The trade union facilitated contact with other shop-floor 
workers in five case study companies. Although access to workers and unionists was relatively 
easy, contacting the managerial class and arranging interviews was extremely challenging. 
Despite this minor discouragement, the researcher emailed HR departments of the Crystal Park 
Companies. Many of the emails were initially ignored. At the same time the researcher tried 
contacting the companies via telephone and again, in many cases was fobbed off with ‘could 
you call later, please’ or asked to leave his details and promises of a call-back, but never 
contacted again. The HR manager in one particular company dismissed the idea of conducting 
interviews. In a very lengthy email (full of methodological jargon and questioning the choice 
of qualitative research method) she refused to organize a meeting with managers and shop-
floor workers. However, not discouraged by this reply, the researcher approached the general 
manager of the same company, who immediately agreed to organize the interviews. The 
managers approached were all Polish nationals as the presence of the Japanese expatriates at 
the site was negligible in 2011. The average number of Japanese expatriates was less than five 
per company. During the first phase managers’ reluctance was caused mainly by suspicion and 
by an insufficient knowledge of the project. Practically, facilitating interviews with managers 
took a few months in mid-2011. Initially HR and administration managers were contacted 
electronically (via email). They were informed about the research objectives and research 
method (interviews) and provided with the ethical approval documentation. Awareness of the 
fact that the first of the companies agreed to participate in the project facilitated access to other 
firms and was encapsulated by the notion of ‘the snowball effect’. Those ‘gatekeepers’ 
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facilitated contact with other managers and finally the management agreed to participate in the 
project.  
 
5.2.3 Interviews 
 
The individual in-depth interview allows the interviewer to delve deeply into social and 
personal matters (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 315). Anderson (2013: 206) suggests 
that a closer level of contact is necessary in order to obtain information of good quality that is 
‘quite detailed, rich and extensive’.  
The semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with local government officials, 
managers and workers at the Crystal Park site in order to investigate the distinctive effects of 
Japanese FDI on managerial policies and practices, and work and employment conditions, in 
selected Japanese-owned factories. The approach to fieldwork was concentrated on in-depth 
and triangulated exploration of social and work phenomena in a relatively small number of 
case organisations. The pilot study was conducted in March and June 2011 and was 
concentrated in the regional cluster of Japanese investment in Crystal Park. The fieldwork 
interviews took place through a series of visits and re-visits to the site in five phases; in 
September, November and December 2011 and May 2012. Follow-up interviews took place in 
July 2014 (on a smaller scale due to the size downsizing, and were conducted by Skype). The 
researcher has interviewed 36 of Crystal Park’s managers and workers and all of the interviews, 
apart from four which were conducted via Skype, were carried out face-to-face. The managers 
were interviewed in Crystal Park; while, in the case of the workers, the interviews took place 
in both Crystal Park as well as at various Toruń locations. The interviews with two of the trade 
union members (both at Kessho) took place in the regional Solidarność office located in Toruń 
Old Town; another trade union member (Matado) was met in a café in Toruń. The researcher 
also travelled to nearby Chełmża (19 km North from Toruń) to speak to two other unionists 
from Matado. These were met in a local ‘pizza place’. The researcher was informed that the 
restaurant we were sitting in owed its revival to many people in the area finding work at Crystal 
Park. It was not very busy before, as people had no money to go out. The interviews with ten 
of the workers were conducted at Crystal Park locations. The researcher was also invited to 
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workers’ private flats (seven interviewees); four other workers agreed to meet the researcher 
in Toruń’s Town Centre and be interviewed over a cup of tea or coffee. It is worth noting that 
majority of the interviewees were not familiar with the qualitative research method and open-
ended questions were treated as novelty. Before Crystal Park workers and managers had only 
experienced questionnaires, which were conducted by the National Labour Inspectorate 
(Polish: PUP - Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy) after the accounts of unfair treatment at the site. 
Generally, both managers and workers were positive about this form of interaction (see 
researcher’s reflection 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and one hour each. Some of the managers agreed to 
speak for more than 40 minutes. For the detailed list of the interviews conducted, refer to table 
5.1.  
The sets of interview questions were different for managers and for workers. The semi-
structured design of the process allowed for flexibility with the order and form of the questions 
(see Appendix 5). Respondents were allowed to elaborate and digress. 
Due to the researchers’ native understanding of the Polish language, language barriers at 
fieldwork level were not present. Most of the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
 
Reflection 2. – The Managers 
 
Being a Polish national from a British University was simultaneously an advantage and 
disadvantage in interviewing managers. On one hand it built up professional relationship, 
managers felt flattered that, the researcher came especially from the UK to speak to them. 
The University of Hertfordshire headed document containing ethical approval and University 
ID were thoroughly scrutinized. On the other hand, managers felt obliged to impress the 
researcher, pointing to their ‘international experience’, and the discussion diverted from the 
topic. On one occasion, a manager referred to his scholarship in Germany, this digression 
took almost ten minutes of the interview. Another time, a manager unnecessarily kept 
inserting English words throughout the whole interview, which made the conversation very 
confusing. Conversely, to the workers and unionist researcher’s personal position did not 
seem to make any difference, and they did not seem interested in the researcher’s background. 
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translated from Polish to English (see Appendix 6). After repeatedly listening to the recorded 
material and taking notes, the researcher was able to identify the main themes and only 
transcribed the parts considered relevant. The researcher was the only person to listen to the 
recorded material, due to the ethical requirements.  
The translation process was challenging, not only in terms of the volume of the interviews, but 
also in terms of usage of informal and colloquial language. For this purpose, the researcher 
sometimes referred to a professional translator for help as there are some concepts that are 
untranslatable (see reflection 3). Much effort was put into preserving as much of the contextual 
meaning as possible. Non-verbal communication was taken into consideration. During the 
interviews interlocutors often expressed their attitude or feelings with a laugh, voice 
modulation, gestures (air quotes; nodding; frowning; winking and so on). Where necessary an 
explanation is given for the readers unfamiliar with Polish culture and language. Again – there 
is a risk of omittance, as being a native researcher at data transcription level I might not have 
found every single aspect that needed additional explanation – some phenomena and attitudes 
that are obvious and self-explanatory to the native researcher may require additional 
explanation to an outsider. It is impossible to remove language barriers effectively (Macdonald 
and Williams, 1992; Hutchings, 2004) or eliminate the translator from influencing the 
translation (Venuti, 1995). 
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Table 5.1 Summary of interviews 
Pilot study 
Institution 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Position held/ duration of the interview 
in minutes 
 
Local government, Kujawy- 
Pomerania  
2 
-legal representative (’25) 
-legal representative (’20) 
Toruń emoployment agency 1 -employment agency represenative (’31) 
Toruń district labour office 1 -managing director (’10) 
Toruń based newspapers 2 
-journalist (’45) 
-journalist (’57) 
Toruń University 2 
-researcher (’25) 
-researcher (’30) 
Fieldwork reasearch 
               
 Company Pseudonym 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Position held/ duration of the interview 
in minutes 
 
Matado 8 
- process manager (’25) 
- process manager (’27) 
- quality controller (’45) 
- quality controller (’23) 
- shop floor worker (’44) 
- shop floor worker (’29) 
- shop floor worker (’32) 
- technician (’39) 
Kessho 8 
- general manager (’65) 
- administration worker (‘40) 
- process engineer (’27) 
- process engineer (’20) 
- shop floor worker (’28) 
- shop floor worker (’34) 
- shop floor worker (’19) 
-shop floor worker (’31) 
Sanoto 8 
- general manager (’30) 
- production manager (’25) 
- production manager (’22) 
- team leader (’31) 
- shop floor worker (’23) 
- shop floor worker (’26) 
- shop floor worker (’21) 
- warehouse worker (’30) 
 
 
Honsiu Plc 
5 
- branch manager (’45) 
- administrative manager (’24) 
- warehouse worker (’25) 
- warehouse worker (’25) 
- warehouse worker (’33) 
Ekitai 7 
- administrative manager (’28) 
- human resources manager (’34) 
- production manager (’26) 
- shop floor worker (’35) 
- shop floor worker (’22) 
- shop floor worker (’24) 
- shop floor worker (’29) 
Source: Author 
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An awareness of the limitations of recording and note-taking from the interviews is important. 
Firstly, it affects both the interlocutor and his or her responses. The issue of the self-
consciousness of the respondents may pose a problem, as people are sometimes reluctant to be 
recorded; hence they are being more cautious with more attention paid to their responses. 
Alternatively note-taking is an option, yet it is distracting to both the interviewee as well as the 
researcher, therefore the record of what was said may only be partial (DiCicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree, 2006), while telephone or, in the case of this project, Skype interviewing, can prove 
challenging in terms of establishing the same level of interaction as its face-to-face equivalent 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2012). The follow-up interviews conducted via Skype were not recorded. 
Additionally the problem of initial distance and trust was almost virtually avoided, as the 
interviewees and the researcher had already met before in the fieldwork and such a relationship 
had already been established. 
 
Reflection 3. – The translation 
Translating the interviews was a long and challenging process. I had not imagined how difficult 
it could be. On a couple of occasions the interlocutors used a concept of the ‘Polish mentality’ 
to give an answer to a question posed. In each of these cases they have referred to this expression 
in a different context. As a Polish researcher I knew exactly what they were trying to say, yet 
when transcribing the interviews I realized it could be unclear for a non-Polish reader. 
Translating vulgarisms also proved problematic in some cases, as these were used in a highly 
emotive manner. Certain idiomatic expressions or deeply embedded in Polish culture quotes 
like: ściemniać (w pracy) – English: something between looking busy at work, slacking off, 
lollygagging and dossing around. I posted this expression on the wall of the Polish Translators 
Group’s facebook page along with a request for ideas. The above given expressions regarding 
‘avoiding work’ are the effect of their brainstorming. On one occasion, during the interview one 
of the workers, to express his attitude to work discipline said: ‘When at work, my name is Marian 
Koniuszko.’ (Polish: ‘W pracy nazywam się Marian Koniuszko’). He was referring to the popular 
communist era TV series (1986), famously the last work of the director Stanisław Bareja, 
Zmiennicy (English: The Subs). The said Koniuszko character was a perfect archetype of 
opportunism and carelessness. He is a bit spoilt, a bit lazy, and only does the bare minimum he 
is required to; yet despite these flaws he always manages to land on his feet. The researcher, 
having seen the series, could not help himself but to add a quote from the film, too; which was 
welcomed by the respondent and contributed to the more relaxed atmosphere during the 
interview.  
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With regards to the situations when using a voice recorder was not permitted, I tried to make 
notes and complete the script straight after interviews, when my memory of what was said was 
still fresh (see researcher’s reflection 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the issue of selection of the case study companies and sampling needs to be addressed. 
For most qualitative research, sampling selection is based on non-probability sampling 
(Anderson, 2013) and this approach was also adopted for the purpose of this research. 
Predominantly, access issues, as well as the size of a Japanese cluster dictated, the above 
choice. While at the site itself, accidental sampling (Swanson and Holton, 2005), dictated by 
access issues, was the only alternative; in the case of trade unions purposive sampling was in 
place. In the case of trade unions people were selected on the basis that they would have 
significant and broad knowledge. This was aided by the fact that access issues were minimal 
and union representatives showed a relative willingness to talk. As already mentioned, a 
snowball effect occurred with access to some of the research participants gained through 
recommendations or the facilitation of people already interviewed.  
 
Reflection 4. – The recordings 
 
I always had two sets of interview schedules prepared, if I was allowed to record the questions 
were not always asked in a particular order and it was simply a list I was referring to while the 
flow of conversation dictated the next steps and the choice of questions. At first I had not 
anticipated the reluctance that some of the people might have towards the interview being 
recorded. After the first such encounter I was left with few notes, fragmented knowledge, and 
lots of unsystematised information. But I learned my lesson and next time, as soon as I was 
informed that I would not be allowed to record, I changed my tactic. For each meeting, just in 
case, I took a slightly modified interview schedule edited in such way that after each question I 
left a gap where I could make a few notes, more often just noting single expressions, themes, 
attitudes on the basis of which I could remember what was exactly said and when. I sometimes 
created simplistic ‘mind maps’ that would allow me to recreate the interview. During the 
interview, but also after most of the interview, time permitting, I have been making notes in a 
research diary that was kept for the fieldwork data gathering period. These were unstructured 
notes on nonverbal communication, my impressions; the physical appearance of the factories as 
I was not allowed to take photographs for both security and ethical reasons. 
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Lastly, in terms of ethical approval, the verbal consent of interviewees was gained prior to each 
interview. These were conducted in accordance with the Research Ethics Policy of the 
University of Hertfordshire. Both workers and managers were made aware that the interviews 
were confidential and would only be used by a researcher. In some cases email consent was 
also obtained. Before each interview the research project was briefly explained to the 
interviewees. They were also informed that should they feel uncomfortable with answering any 
of the questions, or should they want to stop and withdraw, they had right to do so at any time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On multiple occasions the researcher was asked to present the confirmatory letter from his 
supervisors and identification documents. Even after gaining access and upon the presentation 
of the written consent from General Managers, in every factory, as well as some of the public 
offices (Governor’s Office) the researcher’s identity documents were required and photocopies 
were made by the organisations. 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 5. – One picture, many lenses 
 
When I come to think about the interviewing process post-factum, I use a metaphor of 
photograph taking. Capturing the same object with use of a different lens gives different 
perspectives of the same phenomena. Similarly, interlocutors produced different views and 
perceptions of the same problems. I have also experienced different narratives and biases, which 
can be viewed as peculiar ‘filters’ in the same way the photographer would use them. Imperfect, 
yet polarizing, sharpening the picture filter would be that of workers outside the factory settings, 
while enhancement filters would be used by the managers and workers, who were trying to 
colour the picture sometimes – in both negative and positive ways. Yet, there is always a 
possibility, that these ‘enhanced’ testimonies were the accurate pictures of reality as it was seen 
and perceived. With the best efforts to take a standpoint of objectivity, I agree with Steger (2004: 
27) in assuming that the researcher is always ‘a part of their studied reality’.  
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5.3 Researching transforming economies qualitatively 
 
As already discussed, researching in the context of transforming economies may prove 
challenging, especially if qualitative research is being undertaken. It also requires a great deal 
of flexibility, open-mindedness, creativity and non-traditional approach to methodology 
(Lorentzen 2004; Lorentzen, 2002; Pollert, 1999; Andersen et al., 1995; Kvale, 1996). The 
literature on methodological aspects of studying transforming economies context is not very 
rich. For some researchers, qualitative studies of CEE economies have greater validity (see: 
Michailova and Clark, 2004). Lorenzten (2004: 92) argues in favour of a processual view;  
transformation is about emerging structures and processes. These cannot be grasped 
by counting. In the first place it is the content of quality, and not the quantity, which 
is relevant for research into CEE. 
Therefore for the purpose of this project emphasis was placed on explaining the context and 
historic background of the studied reality. Without a deeper understanding of Polish VoC and 
the particularities of Polish capitalism as well as regional and historical particularities, this 
analysis would seem incomplete.   
Lorentzen (2004: 78) posits that in the context of transforming economies, the research is often 
‘produced as an input into political and managerial strategies’, since many Western scholars 
are financed as consultants or researchers by CEE enterprises and not enough attention is given 
to historical and contextual knowledge. Further, the vast majority of such research relies on 
quantitative methods and macro-level statistics. She argues that:  
The lack of historic and contextual analysis combined with the solely quantitative 
methods implies a mismatch between the complexity of the topics studied and the 
narrowness of the methodology that is likely to impede the development of 
sufficiently relevant knowledge and adequate theories. (Lorentzen, 2004: 84) 
Apart from methodological issues the main areas of difficulty experienced by researchers in 
CEE relate to access. Managers are considered more suspicious and less favourably inclined 
towards researchers, as they are under pressure from competition of the global market and 
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therefore the researcher’s presence is perceived as time consuming and as disrupting the normal 
functioning of their company (see: Michailova and Clark, 2004). 
Another problem of conducting fieldwork in transforming economies is the rapidly changing 
field, which researchers sometimes refer to as ‘hunting moving targets’. Steger (2004: 25-26) 
observes: 
Research sites are seldom stable over time, but in the radically transforming CEE 
context, researchers are often shocked by the degree of change when they return to 
the research site after some time away. 
This was an experience of this research as well (see researcher’s reflection 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A common feature of all transforming economies is also a lack of transparency. Therefore 
researchers sometimes experience feelings of hostility, strangeness or uncertainty (see 
Michailova and Clark, 2004: 9). In the case of this project, this last set of obstacles was not 
experienced by the researcher to the same degree that an ‘outsider’ investigating the same 
context would have experienced. However, among the many advantages, such as deep 
knowledge of language and culture, a native researcher in this challenging field may encounter 
 
Reflection 6. – Changing fieldwork  
  
When I first took a decision to conduct the research in Crystal Park (2010) the local 
officials, journalists and the scholars from the local university were all foreseeing the 
success and growth of Toruń’s “Little Japan’ [based on information available in the local 
press]. Confident, that I had plenty of time to think about the research methods and 
conduct the literature review, feeling ‘theoretically unprepared’ to meet the interviewees, 
I decided not to visit the fieldwork for another year. The situation changed dramatically 
at the beginning of 2011 and I realized that I had to start the fieldwork more quickly than 
previously anticipated. After a boom period in 2007-2010 the sites started downsizing. 
Articles in the local press revealed a grimmer picture in terms of Crystal Park 
sustainability. It turned out that investment might be short-lived. At the same time, one 
of the most successful Toruń (Polish-owned) companies - Apator announced its move 
into the Crystal Park, marking the first step towards the ‘polonization’ of the previously 
entirely Japanese site. 
 
 
136 
 
                   
 
many risks. A delusion of familiarity, ‘déjà vu mentality’ and omitting one’s own ‘blind spots’ 
may influence the researcher’s criticality and curiosity (Steger, 2004).  
 
5.4 Internet-based sources of data: reliability and ethical issues 
 
In the context of resistance, recognising the limitations of the interview as research tool, and to 
complement the data gathered during the fieldwork, this research draws on internet-based 
sources. This comprised using internet discussion boards and open forums as valuable sources 
of secondary data. However, the practice of online research or the use of the internet as a source 
of data is in its infancy, but is a growing discipline gaining both recognition and validity over 
the last couple of years.  
Due to the lack of ethical guidelines, Rodham and Gavins’ (2006: 94) recommendations are 
adopted. They argue that: 
The ‘open message board’ is therefore considered to be both a public domain, as well 
as an environment where those posting and/or replying to posts would expect to be 
observed by others. 
Therefore in terms of confidentiality, the pseudonyms of internet users who posted their 
opinions on message boards will be changed to make identification impossible. While in terms 
of consent it is presumed that individuals posting onto open message boards, by the very act of 
posting – are expressing awareness that their messages could be read by others and therefore, 
the latter are ‘deliberately intended for public consumption’ (Ibid). Therefore, as no ethical 
boundaries are likely to be crossed when accessing such data, it is not necessary to seek consent 
of individuals using open message boards (Fleitas, 1998; Rodham and Gavins, 2006), as long 
as the researcher adheres to the usual ethical requirements.  
In terms of research method, a qualitative ethnographic approach was adapted, yet, as argued 
by Kozinets (2010: 5):  
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Online social experiences are significantly different from face-to-face social 
experiences, and the experience of ethnographically studying them is meaningfully 
different. 
A neologism coined by Kozinets (1997; 1998, 2002) – netnography – was proposed to 
emphasise these differences and defined as: 
A new qualitative research methodology that adapts ethnographic research 
techniques to study cultures and communities that are emerging through computer-
mediated communications’ (Kozinets, 2002: 62) 
Netnographic research is a relatively young discipline and has not yet been able to produce a 
significant amount of research (see Kozinets, 2010: 175). The nethnographer relies on the 
‘observation of textual discourse’ (Kozinets, 2002: 64), which may also be qualitatively 
complemented by the content analysis (Berelson, 1952; Langer and Beckman, 2005).  
Internet forums analysis is an emerging field, popular mostly in psychology (see Skitka and 
Sargis, 2006; Holtz et al., 2012). 
For the purpose of this research it is assumed that ‘human communication is context-dependent 
and always organized as a response to someone or something’ (Azevedo et al., 2011: 674). The 
open discussion boards, where workers are talking about the case study companies, are treated 
as ‘peculiar’ expressions of resistance, hence internet forums may be viewed as ‘not moderated 
virtual focus group’ (Moloney et al., 2003; Holtz et al., 2012). Traditionally then internet 
forums are perceived as virtual communities of members. In the case of the discussion boards 
chosen for the purpose of this research, this may not be the case. The threads are in most cases 
reactions to the news published in the local press and are a mode of expression of ideas, views 
and feelings. Workers and, sometimes, others concerned with the matter take the ‘cyber floor’ 
as they consider the subject significant enough to bother about. Literature addressing the above-
mentioned issues is relatively modest, the methodology underdeveloped. For the purpose of 
this research project the contents of the case study forums will be analysed in depth in terms of 
the prevalent discourse and the emerging themes. The main focus will be on the context of 
resistance. Most of the accounts are authored by workers who either work or have at some point 
worked for a Japanese firm at the Crystal Park site. When cited, the nicknames are changed 
and sources are disclosed. Recognizing the limitations of the above-proposed data sources, it 
is presumed, that just as the face-to-face interviews can be biased, the online accounts may 
138 
 
                   
 
have similar disadvantages (Beckmann and Langer, 2005). The research has shown, that 
anonymity and deindividuation influence internet users’ tendency to express more extreme and 
offensive views and statements in the cyber world, than they would normally (Holtz et al., 
2012; Williams et al., 2002; Lea and Spears, 1991).  
Without a doubt the internet research drawbacks are accountability and inhibition related. Suler 
(2004) suggest that in the case of cyber space, the phenomenon of ‘disinhibition effect’ may 
occur and it may take two forms (benign and toxic disinhibition). On the one hand, due to the 
anonymity, internet users tend to be more honest or more generous and kind online; they may 
open to a greater degree and share more personal information (while their personalities are 
disclosed); while at the same time the online presence may also involve the use of 
inappropriate, rude language; harsh criticisms; anger, hatred, or in some cases even threats 
(ibid). This undoubtedly may affect the accountability of internet data sources in a negative 
way.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodological underpinnings of the empirical research 
conducted in five case study firms in Crystal Park. Data triangulation helped produce a more 
comprehensive set of findings (Kuper et al., 2008).  
Firstly, through 36 semi-structured interviews, the researcher sought to gather insights from 
workers and managers employed in Japanese plants. Secondly, in addition to the interviews, 
this chapter has also outlined the methods used in analysing the online discussion boards where 
workers were sharing their experience. Through the novel approach of including internet 
gathered data in qualitative analysis the researcher obtained a more detailed picture of workers’ 
experience and their resistance. Online sources provided very interesting material and 
supported the data gathered during the interviews. This allowed the author to identify and 
examine the patterns of workers’ resistance as well as their attitude towards the Japanese 
practices in the case study companies.  
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Reflecting on the fieldwork and the chosen methodology, one of the main problems in the 
initial phase of the research was the issue of access to the organisations. As suggested by 
Soulsby (2004) the researcher was indeed, often dependent on the goodwill of the gatekeepers, 
and their own views about the purpose and outcomes of the study (Whitley, 1984). 
Undoubtedly, the chosen research method brings some limitations. In terms of qualitative 
research Guba and Lincoln (1994) argued that no single method (or even a collection of 
methods) guarantee the ‘ultimate knowledge’. Additionally, netnography as a method is 
relatively young and requires further development. The main areas of debate concern ethical 
and legal issues, however the authenticity, trust and validity of online research methods are 
equally relevant (Kozinets, 2010; Fielding et al., 2008).   
Therefore a flexible and open-minded approach to both: the research setting and the data 
sources and gathering methods, is necessary (see:  Stebbins, 2001; Soulsby, 2004). The 
researcher has to accept that the research participants (here: the managers and workers within 
the same organisation) may hold different views and construction of reality (see: Bartunek, 
1994; Steger 2004). Another important drawback is the problem of transforming fieldwork 
(Steger, 2004; Soulsby, 2004); the investigated industrial site is under constant change i.e.  
developed, downsized, and restructured. In the researched case of Crystal Park, the plans for 
investment were far more extensive initially, than at the time when the fieldwork was 
undertaken. In terms of the internet data, the inhibition and accountability related issues arise. 
The virtues of the qualitative researcher in the transforming economies fieldwork are said to 
be the openness, modesty, reflexivity and flexibility (Steger, 2004: 37) and this project 
undoubtedly was a lesson of the above for the researcher.  
The two following chapters will present research findings.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE TRANSFER OF JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION 
METHODS 
 
6. 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced the methodology adopted for the purpose of this multiple case 
study research project. The aim of this chapter is to examine the dynamics of transfer of specific 
Japanese employment and production practices to Japanese-owned companies in Poland. The 
biggest cluster of electronics in Poland was chosen for this purpose. The first section (6.2) 
presents the Crystal Park site. Drawing on the observations of the researcher and interview 
data, the next section (6.3) describes the physical appearance of the factories and outlines the 
characteristics of the businesses operating within the cluster as well as inter-firm relationships. 
It will focus on the differences and similarities in functioning, as well as the links between the 
specific firms. 
Next, the typical employment and production practices will be examined based on the findings 
from the interviews conducted with the workers and managers in 2011 and 2012. These 
practices are grouped according to the following categories: recruitment (6.4), training (6.5), 
discipline, pay and incentive system as well as the control and monitoring of workers (6.6), 
and lastly the quality assurance (6.7).  
Two introductory sections provide information about the Crystal Park site in general and briefly 
introduce all of the Japanese firms, while the sections documenting the interview data from 
managers draws on five case study companies. For the purpose of ethical requirements, 
pseudonyms will be used in the subsequent passages. These are as follows, in no particular 
order: Kaiga, Hokkaido, Okinawa, Matado, Efude, Fukui, Honsiu, Morioka, Sanoto, Ekitai, 
Kochi and Kessho. The case study companies are marked in bold. Four of the case study 
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companies are manufacturers; of which two are TV assemblers and two are components 
producers; the fifth one is a logistics company. 
 
6.2 Crystal Park 
 
When established, Crystal Park in Ostaszewo (nearby Toruń), was the biggest cluster of 
Japanese electronics companies in Poland. The core of the site constitutes one of the most 
successful Japanese manufacturers, which started production in December 2006 – a 
multinational corporation founded in 1912 with a long history, which famously introduced a 
variety of inventions: snap buckle, mechanical pencil, and the world’s first calculator. More 
recently, the firm is known for its development in electronics and renewable energy industries. 
 
6.3 Physical appearance of the factories and inter-firm relationship 
 
Crystal Park occupies the rural site of Ostaszewo, seven kilometres from Toruń town centre. 
Despite its close proximity to Toruń, the site is isolated and not accessible by public 
transportation. Therefore the largest Japanese investors have organised and been subsidising 
the transportation for their workers. Many of them commute from remote districts of Kujawy-
Pomerania Province (Chełmno, Grudziądz and Brodnica). However, over the years 2011-12 
the transport provided has been gradually reduced; some of the routes have been cancelled, or 
altered becoming less accessible to many of the workers and more time-consuming to reach. 
Additionally the companies have withdrawn their financial support towards the transportation 
fees, consequently making the transport unaffordable to some low-wage workers, as the fees 
consumed a substantial portion of their salaries and many workers resigned as a result. As the 
new policy affected mostly those who were commuting from remote locations, individual 
workers’ initiatives emerged, as employees started organizing rotational joint car-runs. 
However this did not address the problem of the majority.  
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The land utilized by the Japanese companies was owned by the collective farm (PGR- Polish: 
Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne). Factories are distanced from each other (around 200-300 
meters). The complex occupies over 177.61 ha (hectares; nearly 439 acres) and is not fully 
utilized. For instance, Kessho’s initial plans were to expand its production fivefold. Crystal 
Park’s low density development clearly indicates an unfinished investment.  The National Road 
1 (an ‘A’ road connecting North and South of the country) goes through the middle of the 
industrial zone, which facilitates the logistics functioning of the site. The A1 junction 
motorway is about seven kilometres away. Bydgoszcz International Airport is located 50 
kilometres from the site, which was also an important factor for the Japanese investors (see 
Chapter Two). In 2008 the Japanese expressed their disappointment over the motorway not 
being as close as they have initially thought35. The biggest plant at the site is located centrally 
to other factories. 
Kessho – the first case of the study firm’s factory was built by the Japanese construction 
corporation – Wakayama (pseudonym), which has an established tradition of business 
cooperation with Kessho, contracted to build all of the Kessho factories - built the whole 
factory. The plant is assembling LCD modules for Kessho itself, as well as for two other brands 
- LG and Philips and sales are focused on the European market. The main competitors are 
Samsung, Sony, and LG. Kessho entered Poland’s market relatively late and has a considerably 
weak position in Poland. However, following its cluster investment pattern, Kessho attracted 
other Japanese electronics, chemical and logistics companies.  
Apart from Matado Electric, which could be regarded Kessho’s competitor, all of the Crystal 
Park companies are closely linked to Kessho. Their production volumes strictly depend on 
Kessho’s performance (although they are not exclusively cooperating with Kessho). 
Additionally, the site hosts one Polish company - Apator (since 2012), which is not connected 
to Japanese investors and operates separately. The employment at the site fluctuates and, since 
2012, the site has been downsizing. The largest plants (Kessho, Matado, Ekitai, Sanoto) have 
been employing between 600 and 2,000 workers. During the start-up period (2006-2007), an 
ethnocentric staffing policy was introduced by Kessho and other companies with the majority 
of the management coming directly from Japan. All of the shop floor workers are Polish (most 
of them have temporary, 3-months contracts or shorter), although in the start-up phase of the 
                                                          
35 Based on the interview conducted with local government official in June 2011. 
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operation, some small numbers of Thai and Malaysian workers were temporarily employed in 
Matado. 
Headquartered in Osaka, Kessho is known for its innovation in electronics and renewable 
energy industries. The plant is assembled LCD modules for Kessho itself and brands of LG 
and Philips. Next to Kessho, six other companies have located their operations: Japanese Fukui 
Logistics, Morioka, Efude, Hokkaido and Ekitai, as well as the only Polish firm operating at 
the site Apator (real name), producer of metering devices. The former are producing 
components and provide the logistic services for Kessho and others. There are eleven firms 
operating at the site in total. Famous for Samurai swordsmithing since 1669, Ekitai is a metal 
pressed elements specialist and one of the firms traditionally linked with Kessho for many 
years (cooperation between the two firms goes back to the 1970s). 
Ekitai is also a supplier of car metal components for Wrocław based Toyota Bashioku; in 2012 
it employed over 1,000 workers. Over the years (2010-2012) the importance of Ekitai in Crystal 
Park has expanded and the factory enjoyed a soft landing during the recession thanks to 
diversified contractors and was not forced to rely on a sole source of business.  
The model of the keiretsu, (Kensy, 2001), with its business networks and close cooperation of 
companies, is central to the Japanese system and viewed as a ‘source of Japan’s 
competitiveness’ (Okumura, 2000: 137). These deep, long-term relations between the firms are 
also observed in Crystal Park as reflected in the quote from one of the Polish logistics managers 
who explained that: 
It has been a truly deep affiliation for many years. The company even has a special 
division which is only responsible for cooperation with Kessho. We have two global 
clients – Kessho and Honda. Obviously, when Kessho was investing and building a 
factory in Poland, they were looking for partner firms. As we are a good, trusted 
partner and we cooperate with Kessho investments all over the world, our presence 
at the site is a natural consequence of this cooperation.  
The logistics companies based at the site: Fukui Logistics, Okinawa Express and Honsiu Plc 
operate within a very specific division of labour on this particular site. They have divided their 
competences and specialised in either outbound or inbound logistics in order to facilitate 
smooth running of the entire cluster. Polish PKP Cargo, a state-owned rail transport company, 
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has bought a plot of land at the site, however is reluctant to invest. As Crystal Park’s logistics 
manager explained: 
Every few months we have PKP officials visiting us. They are always asking the 
same set of questions, wanting to know what is our turnover volume. They simply 
cannot decide whether it is worthwhile to invest or not. They don’t want to start the 
project and be left with no business. I personally think there is no room for another 
logistics firm here. We are struggling enough already. There is not enough work for 
the three of us here anyway.  
Another large manufacturer present at Crystal Park and the first which was built is Matado – 
the TV sets and modules producer. Its factory is adjacent to Kessho’s site and a neighbour to 
Okinawa Express and Honsiu Plc. Matado was very successful at the beginning (according to 
the firms’ process manager), but limited production in early 2011 due to the fall in demand; 
however, did not close their operation on the site. In front of the Matado’s main gate, apart 
from Polish and Japanese flags, a Thai flag is also flying, to show the link with the Thai 
subsidiary (the majority of manufacturing components were coming from Thailand). The 
General Manager explained that the firm was hoping to resume production and reemploy 
workers at the pre-crisis level as soon as the global economy and demand have improved. The 
manager’s high hopes were mostly based on the prediction that European and World Cup 
Football championships would generate the raise in demand for flat screen TVs 36 . An 
aggressive advertising campaign was also launched in 2012 just before and during Poland and 
Ukraine hosted the 2012 Football Championships, with Kessho being one of the main sponsors 
of the event. This, however, did not increase demand to the level expected and in 2011 
production volumes were already diminishing on the whole site. This trend has been evident 
since 2010 after the global crisis hit the industry and is reflected in a contraction in employment 
on the site.   
Sanoto and Kochi are big LCD component producers. Sanoto Poland, established in September 
2006 in Crystal Park, is part of one of the biggest Japanese keiretsu – an IT related chemicals 
producer. As a subcontractor in delivering LCD components (polarizing films), Sanoto’s 
decision to invest was fully dictated by the presence of Kessho at the site. The firm employed 
600 full-time workers in 2011. In contrast to other firms: Kessho, Matado, and Ektiai, where 
                                                          
36 See Ciechoński (2011).  
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the manufacturing process was the assembly line; production in Sanoto was organized in 
batches, where individual machine operators and several teams worked together on completion 
of the tasks. Although the firm did not receive direct government support, in contrast to other 
Crystal Park-based companies, it took advantage of the preferential tax regime. Sanoto excels 
in ultra-high standards of cleanliness (the researcher was asked to wear protective shoe covers 
even in a conference area of the plant), more like a hospital than a factory. Whereas Kessho 
appeared huge in comparison to Sanoto, it was Sanoto which attracted most of the positive 
media attention. Some of the interviewed workers (not only Sanoto workers, but also other case 
study companies’ employees) were convinced that Sanoto was the best company at the plant 
to work for. However, those who made such claims were unable to support them with evidence 
other than the, colloquially speaking, ‘word of mouth’.  The average worker in Sanoto is well 
aware of corporate culture; the emblems, the history, the connection with Japan. Japanese 
slogans and symbols are placed all over the site. The presence of Japanese connections is much 
greater in Sanoto than in Kessho. 
Kochi is the smallest company at the site and occupies a one storey small warehouse. In 2011 
it was employing only 36 workers.  
All firms maintain very high levels of security. To access the factory visitors have to get a 
permit and every entrant’s identity is checked by a gate guard. A second security check is 
undertaken at reception. In the case of manufacturing companies the reception areas were 
welcoming, bright and ultra clean, almost luxury hotel-like, which contrasts sharply with the 
dark in appearance, and reserved assemblers - Kessho and Matado.  
From observation of the physical appearance it was clear that the specifics of the firm in terms 
of their production imposed a disparate work culture and environment. Cleanliness standards 
are amongst the most important in manufacturing electronics, and the employees were obliged 
to wear protective clothing and overalls. However, this feature is not just confined to Japanese 
practices, but a common standard in manufacturing generally. Logistics workers wear 
uniforms, too; however drawing a distinction between the operation and style of management 
in Japanese and European logistics companies is almost impossible. As Shinohara (2006: 8) 
argues: 
European logistics management is more advanced than the Japanese one. In order to 
rationalise supply chains, the Japanese are adopting more of the European methods, 
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and not vice versa. Therefore, the European logistics management still remains as the 
model for a better logistics in the future. 
The aforementioned trend can be observed at the site. While Crystal Park manufacturing firms 
are ‘Japanized’ in both appearance and management practices, the logistics ones appear to be 
lacking this influence. However, although one manager appeared to be deeply aware of 
Japanese culture and practices, having spent several years in Japan working and learning the 
language, as well as being married to a Japanese wife, during the interview the notion of kaizen 
had to be explained to him. Another Polish logistics manager admitted: 
Actually, we are trying to do everything but the ‘Japanese way’. [emphasis and 
laughter] This is very peculiar system. Personally, I think that sometimes it brings 
more chaos than order.  
Entering any of the manufacturing factories operating at the site creates an impression of 
stepping into a different world. Many of the interviewees shared this view and were full of 
admiration for this cleanliness and order, and at the same time, strongly aware of the colossal 
cultural gap. The distinction between a Polish and Japanese workplace is very obvious in terms 
of physical appearance. This is illustrated by one of the Crystal Park’s shop-floor workers: 
Ever since I have entered the factory, I knew it was going to be something different. 
I used to work for the Polish companies only, so I found this very attractive for 
multiple reasons. I was very proud to work for a foreign company. I was always sure 
I wouldn’t come across any mess here. You can see it at first glance.  
It is worth mentioning that the adjective ‘foreign’ in Polish has a strong emotional connotation 
and is often used as a synonym to ‘western and of a better quality’. The semantics is strongly 
linked to transformation and the post-transformational uncritical attitude of admiration for 
‘capitalist’ economies. Anything produced or coming from across the Iron Curtain was (and, 
especially amongst the older generations, still is) considered ‘better’ than domestic. This is 
reflected in the pride expressed by the interviewee, who was convinced that the foreign 
company prospered better and was better organized in comparison to the Polish ones she had 
previously experienced. 
Each production hall has trilingual posters in Polish, English and Japanese with the shop floor 
housekeeping method (5S) – sorting, stabilising, sweeping, standardising, and self-discipline – 
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everywhere. Additionally, the workers are constantly able to familiarize themselves with 
corporate culture and history through omnipresent emblems, logos and expositions. Each 
reception area has a visual display of the company’s achievements and innovations. The 
researcher was shown a lump of pure red copper exhibited in Sanoto, whose first business 
activity was copper mining. Also – a Japanese kanji painted by the company’s CEO during a 
visit at the factory, had been framed and hung at reception in order to commemorate the 
significant moment and remind the workers about the chairman’s ‘contentment’. Photographs 
documenting the visit are also exhibited. Another of the managers (Ekitai) kept mentioning the 
fact that the formation of the company dated back to the seventeenth century – repeating this 
four times throughout the duration of an interview. He was also very proud [I noted in my 
research diary: ‘manager fascinated with the samurai swords’] of the original katana set 
displayed in the main hall. Similarly, Kessho’s manager expressed admiration for the firm’s 
innovations and its contribution to environmental sustainability. 
Japanese symbols are present in every factory. Polish and Japanese and (in case of Matado also 
Thai) flags are flying in front of each plant’s entrance. Honsiu’s office area has clocks showing 
time in Warsaw, Tokyo and New York. Sanoto appears to be the firm with closest links to its 
mother company in Japan, even in terms of appearance - minimalistic decor, bonsai trees at 
reception. In Sanoto complex – each of the meeting rooms is named after a geographical 
location in either Japan or Poland: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Bydgoszcz and Toruń. 
Safety calendars and reminders are present everywhere with all firms paying enormous 
attention to the safety issues. The companies are proud to advertise ‘without incident’ periods 
and encourage workers to share this enthusiasm. The ‘achievement boards’ are updated daily 
and usually displayed in visible places – either in the production hall or on the way to the 
production hall. For example in Sanoto, according to the general manager interviewed, during 
the briefings managers and team leaders always remind their teams about the ‘praiseworthy 
count’ – number of days without an accident – and express the hope for another accident-free 
day. 
The following paragraphs further analyse the multi-firm case study in terms of Japanisation, in 
particular focusing on the specificities of transferring Japanese workplace institutions. The 
context of Japanese influence in management will be considered in terms of recruitment and 
training practices; the issues of monitoring and discipline, quality assurance, as well as 
management’s attitude towards the trade unions presence in the workplace. Table 6.1 compares 
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the presence of Japanese practices with regards to the discussed areas: recruitment, training, 
pay system, company welfarism and quality assurance across the five case study companies. 
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Table 6.1 Research sites’ overview (in terms of selected peripheral Japanese practices). 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
COMPANY Kessho  Matado  Ekitai  Sanoto  Honsiu Plc  
PRACTICE 
Recruitment -Direct  
-agency  
(more than 50 percent 
of workforce) 
-Direct 
-agency workers during 
the start-up period 
-Direct 
-agency (more than 50 per 
cent of workforce) 
-Direct only Direct only 
Training OJT OJT OJT, short induction  
(one week). 
-Induction and OJT 
Engineers and managers 
were sent to formal three 
months induction in Japan, 
during  start up period 
-OJT 
-adaptation period 
Pay system -Small bonuses based 
on performance 
-Small bonuses based on 
performance 
-Small bonuses based on 
performance 
-Small bonuses based on 
performance 
- Small bonuses based 
on performance 
Company 
welfarism 
- Subsidized 
transportation 
-Social Fund 
-Holiday allowance 
- Subsidized 
transportation 
-Social Fund dissolved  
 
- Free transportation 
-Social Fund 
-Holiday allowance 
- Subsidized transportation 
-Social Fund 
-Holiday allowance 
-No transportation 
-Social Fund 
-Holiday allowance 
Quality 
assurance/ 
Lean 
production 
-JIT 
-5S 
-Narrow application of 
kaizen 
-JIT 
-perfunctory application 
of  5S kaizen 
-JIT 
-strong emphasis on 5S 
 -modified kaizen 
-JIT 
-5S 
-Kanban method 
- Application of kaizen 
-No formal, ‘Japanese’ 
quality policies 
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6.4 Recruitment 
 
6.4.1 Profile and skills 
 
Most of the Crystal Park companies share a similar employment profile. They employ workers 
from an area of fifty mile radius and the majority of the employees are recruited from the high 
unemployment rate districts (over 20 per cent). Between 60 and 70 per cent of the shop-floor 
workers are women, many of whom have a degree (HR departments are not able to provide the 
exact number, but are aware of such regularity). The average employee’s age is 35. The 
managerial class and highly skilled engineers are recruited from all over the country, as the 
Toruń region is deficient of highly-specialised engineers. The local university, the Nicolaus 
Copernicus University (UMK), does not educate these groups of workers, as Toruń lacks a 
Polytechnic and other higher technical schools. However, the existence of the Crystal Park has 
significantly changed the situation of the graduates from the Faculty of Physics, Astronomy 
and Informatics, as well as the Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science at the local 
University. Many of them have successfully applied for engineering jobs in Crystal Park, 
whereas before, they were forced to look for employment in more industrialized towns in the 
neighbouring Bydgoszcz or Poznań. Many graduates now are settling down in Toruń. Japanese 
companies are also interested in recruiting graduates from Toruń vocational technical schools. 
Some of the big manufacturers organized ‘Open Days’ at Toruń Mechanical, Electric and 
Electronic Schools, encouraging pupils to compete for employment at Crystal Park after 
graduation. Apart from shop-floor workers, administration workers, and engineers, Crystal 
Park hires interpreters and translators. However there are only a few interpreting posts available 
and not in a full-time capacity. Eventually interpreters employed at the site had to be re-skilled 
and were delegated to other departments. A number of students enrolled on a newly-established 
Japanese Studies course at the University of Toruń (UMK). It was assumed that the course 
would give an advantage in the region’s job market shaped by Crystal Park and ensure high 
employability. However, in the case of highly-skilled specialists employment opportunities 
were not as significant as it was predicted. Most of the know-how arrived from Japan with the 
Japanese managers, who were training production managers, engineers and technicians. When 
asked whether his former experience and education pattern helped in understanding the work 
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duties, one of the ‘fresh’ university graduates, an MA in Technical and Applied Physics 
working in Ekitai said: 
We were shown everything during the training with the Japanese manager. We 
assembled the line and serviced the machines together. I do know the main principles 
of the mechanics and know how the engine works, but everything I needed to know 
I have learnt from the manuals provided and the Japanese engineer. It was hard at 
times, cause he didn’t speak very good English. Luckily with the machines you can 
just demonstrate a lot of things. Sometimes we talked like kids. [laugh]. 
For the manufacturing workers in Kessho the recruitment process itself consisted of an aptitude 
test (potential candidates were timed to put little plastic elements into the bigger block). Ability 
to meet the required speed was said to be the main criterion of a successful appointment. One 
of the Polish office workers at Kessho remembered that she also, apart from a regular interview, 
underwent the above-mentioned test. She laughed, when talking about it, as she found it 
infantile and a ‘waste of time’. She did not see any point in this practice, as her position did not 
require any such skills, she concluded. 
The Visual Quality Control Technician (Polish) at Sanoto said he and a few of his friends were 
recruited directly from school. He completed all his A-levels (Polish: matura) in May and was 
already working when the summer holiday started. He said, he was planning to go to University 
at some point, but as work was available his further education was being postponed. He started 
considering part-time weekend university courses. He and his peers who took employment in 
Japanese companies were strongly aware how hard it was to find jobs when young and 
inexperienced. The young technician (20 years old), said, that it was hard to believe that 
Japanese companies would want someone so inexperienced, but he also admitted that there was 
no way any school could prepare for the specificities of such jobs. He has learnt everything 
during his training. 
Generally speaking, the workforce for the Japanese plants was either recruited directly (job 
advertisements – internet and local, as well as national press) or contracted through temporary 
work agencies. In some cases potential candidates were also taken on after recruitment sessions 
in local vocational schools. However, according to the District Labour Office (Polish: PUP 
Powiatowy Urząd Pracy) clients have not been overwhelmed with job offers from Japanese 
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investors. During the preliminary fieldwork the interview with PUP’s managing director; 
revealed: 
The hopes were high, but we didn’t get a lot of business from the Japanese firms. 
While we expected that engineers and highly specialised technicians would be in 
demand it turned out that Japanese investors were mostly looking for young, 
inexperienced, flexible and prepared to work for national minimum wage.  
 
6.4.2 ‘Flexibilising’ the labour force through employment agencies 
 
A major feature of the recruitment and employment process was the use of temporary contracts 
through employment agencies which was the dominant trend for the majority of the employees 
- including all the shop-floor workers. The presence of staffing agencies is a relatively new 
phenomenon in the CEE countries (first appeared in 2004). Yet, as Coe et al. (2008: 1412) 
posit, Polish market is likely to be dominated by temporary staffing business. From the 
perspective of both the staffing agency and their customers, who are interested in cheap labour, 
flexible and deregulated labour markets and enhanced economies of scale (Coe et al., 2008; 
Peck et al., 2005) Toruń is a perfect place of business. Three main agencies are cooperating 
with the Crystal Park companies on a regular basis – Manpower, Start People and Randstad. It 
is worth noting that the global scale of investment at Crystal Park and the employment 
fluctuations, created by the presence of the Japanese electronics in Toruń, had an enormous 
boosting effect on the agencies’ operation scale, never present before. They have been 
operating in the Toruń region since 2005, but on a limited scale. A recruitment consultant in 
one of the biggest staffing agencies said: 
We are very pleased with the investment. It has resulted in an unprecedented growth 
and we are expanding like never before. It is challenging at times, as finding three or 
four dozens of people with a couple of days’ notice is very hard, but we are doing 
our best to meet all those requirements. Sometimes it is hard to fit the exact profile, 
but we have a really large base of potential candidates, even from quite remote 
locations, like Grudziądz or Brodnica. They know there is work in Crystal Park and 
they register with us hoping to find employment. 
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There were periods of time when the recruitment firms were required to supply over several 
hundred workers on a daily basis. Japanese companies were expecting to get a new workforce 
within a period of three days. The biggest recipients of such an employment solution were 
Kessho and Ekitai, whose personnel consisted of temporary work power in 50 per cent or more 
at times. On average a worker was contracted for the duration of two weeks, and then reengaged 
on another contract at a later date, depending on demand. In this respect it could even be 
classified as ‘seasonal’. For example, one of the students (however, her experience was not 
entirely negative) who, contracted by the same agency, found work on the assembly line twice 
during the same summer with two different companies (when the contract with Kessho was not 
extended, she got the same job at Ekitai) explained:  
To me it doesn’t matter. It’s only a summer job. I go back to Uni in October and just 
want some money to get by until I get my scholarship and student loan again. It’s not 
much but enough to pay for the basic stuff. It’s a shame I can’t be with the same 
company, cause I liked the girls there; but there are many like me. And I feel sorry 
for them. They can’t be sure what happens tomorrow, some of them have kids and 
families and so on. It must be hard. I wouldn’t want it as a normal job. It’s only good 
for a short period of time. So for me it was ok. 
The logistics companies, however, did not systematically rely on the services of the 
employment agencies. Honsiu’s Logistics Manager expressed strong reservations about the 
effectiveness of agency workers, suggesting that it was not appropriate to logistics in that 
workers who were not sufficiently qualified or trained could not be trusted with handling 
equipment and commodities: 
I won’t let anyone from the agency come and operate a forklift or pump truck. We’ve 
got some expensive stuff in the warehouse. The risk is too high. It’s not worth it.  
Conversely to Kessho, two other manufacturers, Sanoto and Matado, had a policy of non-use 
of temporary workforce. Matado used it only in the first few months of the operation in 2006 
and 2007; Sanoto never used employment or recruitment agencies for regular workforce. They 
only hired the translators and interpreters at the very beginning on a temporary basis. 
Employment in Sanoto is characterized by long-term cooperation with the employees. A Polish 
human resources manager explained that: 
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The efficiency and attitude of the temporary workers is much lower than that of 
employees directly hired by Sanoto. While, in our case, one well-trained employee 
is sufficient; at the same time Kessho needs to hire three agency workers. This kind 
of ‘outsourcing’ is too risky for us. We have different corporate culture to Kessho.  
In case of the firms reliant on flexible employment, after a certain time, the workers had a 
chance of being hired by the firms directly. The institution of ‘probation period’ as well as 
Polish deregulated employment law ensured flexibility of employment at the site. In some cases 
‘probation’ lasted eighteen months. Agency workers were employed on two-week or one 
month contracts. It has to be stressed that these kinds of polices are widely practised in Poland, 
not only among Japanese corporations. As already mentioned, Poland has the highest share of 
temporary contracts among EU Member States (see Chapter Three). Kessho cooperates with 
only one employment agency, Manpower. Kessho’s management defends this recruitment 
policy explaining that it is enforced by inevitable market fluctuations. However, Sanoto’s, 
being completely dependent on Kessho, hence indirectly affected by those fluctuations, still 
maintains a long-term employment policy. This view was also supported by Polish HR 
Manager at Ekitai:  
The specificity of this industry is not without importance here. Huge seasonality of 
production makes the permanent employment impossible. There is only a small 
group of core workers, with stable employment status. Of the 1,000 people working 
for us at the present moment, we are directly employing 300. We are the second 
largest employer at Crystal Park. We may require only 300 people at one time, while 
a moment later we may find out that we need another 500 or 1000. We are using two 
employment agencies.  
At the same time, when asked about the qualities the firm was looking for in an employee, the 
manager expressed the firm’s willingness to employ the most committed agency workers and 
those interested in a long-term relationship with the firm, personal growth and development. 
Paradoxically, while taking advantage of the flexible local job market, the Polish manager 
supported the Japanese and company’s philosophy of long employment. 
This apparent disparity between the recruitment practice at the site and the well-known 
Japanese attitude towards long-term employment is an evident reflection of a changing global 
economy where the notion of life-time employment is increasingly a theoretical concept. The 
use of core and peripheral workers is extensive and an important part of recruitment practices 
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all over the world. Japanese firms in Poland are not an exception and the Polish labour market 
facilitates these practices of flexible employment.  
Employment flexibility in Crystal Park was pushed to its limits as temporary workers were 
contracted on one-month contracts, which could have been extended every month. To avoid 
permanent employment (according to Polish employment law, an employer is required to 
provide permanent employment after eighteen months of temporary employment), Japanese 
companies either laid workers off after the eighteen-month period had expired, or re-employed 
them on a new contract. The whole eighteen-month cycle started again. One of the workers in 
Kessho explained: 
Here it hasn’t happened yet. But you never know with them. In Matado, you hear 
things. My friend’s wife worked there for some time on a temporary contract, but it 
was not extended. She is a good worker. And her manager said he was unable to 
reemploy her on a contract, but told her to come back through Manpower. This is a 
joke. 
 
6.5 Training 
 
In respect of training the Crystal Park case study companies applied different policies that were 
closely linked with the nature of the recruitment model they pursued. Generally speaking, the 
more flexible workforce the company used, the more limited the training. For shop-floor 
workers in most of the manufacturing companies induction was short and usually restricted to 
one day course usually provided at the Crystal Park site. Mainly during the start-up phases, 
managers and engineers occasionally participated in training at Japanese HQ or other 
subsidiaries. Sanoto was the only firm to send the majority of the engineering staff for a three-
month period of training abroad during which time employees experienced working along with 
their colleagues in a Japanese sister plant. One of the Polish engineers reminisced:  
The work was the same. It wasn’t stressful or difficult at all. We were doing exactly 
the same we would be doing in Poland. We were getting to know the machines and 
the production process. There were only two differences I can recall: the routine of 
the morning assembly and the daily gymnastics and our manager telling us a short 
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parable after this ‘muster’. I remember one of them was about smoking, I think. I was 
not paying too much attention, I guess.  
Sanoto sent its engineers and managers for training in Japan every time a new method or 
production line was being introduced. At the very beginning about 20 per cent of the workers 
underwent training in Japan. The management fully endorsed workers’ participation. 
Working at Sanoto is not a simple, mindless process of throwing things around the 
factory. Employees have a chance of influencing their workplace. This approach 
gained workers’ enormous popularity. 
                                             (Polish Human Resources Manager at Sanoto) 
The Polish production manager at the same firm added: 
Our factory does not resemble the set of old movies with Charlie Chaplin, where 
workers are only turning their screwdrivers like robots. It is far more complicated 
than that. You wouldn’t be able to walk on the shop floor now and stand by the 
assembly line and start working immediately. It is not a doddle [Polish word used 
here was ‘piaskownica’ – English for ‘sandbox’]; training is a must.  
Generally, however, management favoured On-the-Job Training (OJT) to formalize 
professional training sessions, highly regarded in Europe: 
Here (...) the OJT – so ‘on the job training’ – is the principle. Therefore everything 
the employees ought to know, they should get to know through their supervisors. 
The supervisors should ‘enlighten’, if you like, their subordinate workers with 
knowledge in order to pursue their occupational growth. This should allow them to 
reach the heights of perfection, leading to the mastery of their job skills. This is the 
Japanese approach and it took us ages to convince the Japanese, that this is not the 
method accepted in Poland, in our culture and that we would like more training.  
(Kessho’s General Manager - Polish) 
Highly-skilled engineers had to organise their training trips to Japan and China directly through 
the Japanese HQ. One of the Polish process engineers at Kessho explained: 
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We were about to open a new production line. We wanted to go to Kessho’s Chinese 
plant, where the same line had already existed. Only thanks to our determination, 
we were able to convince the management of the importance of technological 
training. Eventually, they agreed and we went for a two week training session in 
Kessho’s factory in Nanjing, China. 
The importance of training and learning the company’s philosophy from the very beginning is 
highly regarded in Sanoto. One of the Polish managers describing workers attitude to induction 
training underlined: 
They see our philosophy. They become a part of it. The workers see that everyone 
is following the same rule, whether it’s the supervisor, the director or the CEO. No 
matter the position, when we are here – everyone behaves the same. There is no 
distinction. When in the production hall we all behave as production operators do. 
There are no better or worse. 
Among the shop floor workers education or history is of lower significance, as the managers 
emphasize paramountcy of the OJT. Polish manager at Honsiu stressed: 
I don’t really care about the background of the employee. Someone can be a classicist 
philologist or a hermeneutical philosopher; if I see they want to make a difference I 
will employ them. All the necessary training will be provided. They will pick 
everything they need to know on the job. I know instantly who’s good and who’s not. 
All you need in this job is commitment and passion. 
In all the case study companies many of the shop floor workers were local Univeristy graduates. 
This reflects a tendency growing over the last few years in Poland, whereby a growing number 
of graduates are forced to seek employment below their qualifications. The Polish job market 
lacks sufficient graduate posts; or, as Kabaj (2010) suggests, the Polish education system is 
ruled by individual interests of tertiary education providers and the personal aspirations of its 
‘customers’, and is therefore incompatible with the market demands. Thus, to make the system 
more efficient and sustainable, it should be based on the needs of the economy and industry 
instead (Ibid). With the production of more graduates than economy is able to absorb, the 
situation aggravates; particularly conspicuous in Toruń, where the University injects the 
overcrowded job market with hundreds of new graduates every year. As Polish manager at 
Sanoto said: 
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We have a couple of people with PhDs in our warehouse. As far as I remember one 
in history, another in philosophy. Plenty of workers have master’s degrees. 
Another important feature mentioned by the interviewees is the relationships between training 
and worker efficiency. Managers are aware of the time workers need to adjust to specific 
requirements and quality standards and, in order to meet the demanding Japanese criteria, 
workers need training as well as encouragement. ‘Probation’ and ‘adaptation’ periods are in 
place and can last anything from a few weeks up to two months, as explained by the Polish 
manager at Honsiu: 
We have an adaptation period, while the workers are being trained to do their job as 
we want them to. For example a forklift operator, even if he knows how to operate 
the vehicle still he needs about two months to adjust to our efficiency standards, our 
health and safety procedures and quality requirements. When it comes to an office 
worker – the process is not as time consuming. Initially it takes about a month or so. 
To get accustomed to more advanced procedures and skills may take up to two 
months on the top of that. We don’t expect the impossible. This system has worked 
for years and is there for a reason.  
Although all the firms recognise the necessity of workforce training, some of them appear to 
be more ‘Japanized’ than others in this respect. Kessho and Matado are favouring typically 
Japanese OJT, while Sanoto has got a formalized program of induction and training. Kessho’s 
and Matado’s recruitment policies are related to their approach towards training, as it is 
undoubtedly difficult, uneconomic and ineffective to maintain a training regime with high 
workforce turnover due to the use temporary contracts. Ekitai has a moderately short induction 
and adaptation period (limited to basic health and safety and a brief history of the company and 
corporate philosophy). Employees are often re-employed directly by the company after having 
worked there already through an employment agency. Honsiu Plc. is also adhering to the OJT 
method and offering an adaptation period for the new workers that last up to two months. 
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6.6 Discipline, monitoring and pay and incentive system 
 
Working for a multinational corporation in Poland’s post-communist economy is still regarded 
a privilege, and can often increase the social status. This perception is amplified in depressed 
regions of Poland B. As one of the Polish shop-floor workers at Matado stated: 
There is no comparison to the Polish company I worked for before, everything is 
different. I understand that this requires different rules and regulations. I was struck 
by the level of professionalism from the beginning. How this company is organized 
was quite impressive. However there were also some muddles in the start-up period. 
Sanoto management believes that Japanese rules, if introduced from the very beginning rather 
than gradually implemented, cannot meet any resistance. They are convinced of these rules’ 
effectiveness and overall benefit, and therefore fail to imagine anyone opposing ‘good 
practice’. The Polish Human Resources manager at Sanoto explained: 
...if something is being introduced from the very beginning the worker accepts this 
as something natural. If we employ someone now, they will see that everyone works 
a certain way, such an employee won’t argue with it. But now, if I suddenly decided 
to teach them some new practice, if I for example said: Let’s implement kaizen; 
everyone would turn up their noses at it, they would say it was another silly idea of 
mine, and Leave us alone. Typical for the Polish nation. (...) if there is an idea, a 
concept from the very beginning how it’s all meant to be done then no one can 
question it as there is no point to do so. There are some rules to be obeyed. Full 
stop. [exclamation added] Like the ‘shoe rule’ - which everyone must accept. (...) 
as these rules have been introduced since the very beginning it was accepted as a 
matter of course. Therefore no one demurs at changing their shoes or something else. 
They just come and do it. 
Most of the managers and workers in Crystal Park had never worked for Japanese companies 
before. ‘Japanese methods’ are well-known and popular in theory, however not many of the 
employees have experienced real Japanese practice. The presence of the Japanese managers at 
the site is limited, usually with only a few managers working in a Polish plant at the time. Most 
of Japansese expats were Kessho’s managers. While in other Crystal Park firms the Japanese 
were mostly represented at senior level, at Kessho Japanese team leaders were also present at 
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all stages of production. Polish workers at Kessho worked alongside their Japanese managers 
at times, while in other firms the Japanese were mostly present during the important meetings 
and seldom had a chance of direct contact with their colleagues at junior level or the shop-floor 
workers. Managers communicated with Polish co-workers in English or through interpreters 
(the latter at start-up phase only).  
In the eyes of Kessho’s Polish manager, the peculiarity of Japanese monitoring and discipline 
seemed to meet workers resistance. He admitted that the main problem they had faced was the 
lack of discipline. The manager did not, however, associate it with Japanese methods, as he 
explained:  
I do not really think that it's about the Japanese, Chinese or Swiss regime. There was 
a regime and this was the problem. Suddenly it turned out that there is a need of 
working within the 'from - to' frame and that the workers couldn’t themselves decide 
where they are at the certain times. For example: I suddenly wish to have a cigarette 
so I go and have a smoke, I wish to have a little break, walk around in the factory - I 
do so. Why it was a problem, is the question. Up until that time these people worked 
for less demanding employers, mainly illegally, so when they gave those jobs up - 
they weren't losing a lot. Or they worked in agriculture - when someone wants a break 
on the field - they just take it. And suddenly it turned out that one has to arrive at a 
specific time, at a specific time one has to appear at their work post, there is a specific 
dress code, an obligation to wear working clothing. Even now it still happens that I 
spot the worker without the protective clothing on the shop floor. When I ask why 
they are not wearing their overalls, I hear: "I washed it; I have forgotten; forgot to 
bring it; etc."  There are many different stories. We had to introduce the rules for 
smokers, too. There’s been a huge protest over it. 
The same manager failed to observe a direct relation between workers’ disobedience and legacy 
of communist mentality, using the abstract of ‘Polish mentality’ to explain it: 
This is ‘Polish’ mentality rather than communist one. Of course, somewhere deep – 
the old rule must have had some influence. Not to mention this 1970s expression: 
‘Whether you stand or whether you lay, you are entitled to a thousand quid pay!’ 
(Polish: Czy się stoi, czy się leży: tysiąc złotych się należy), but I wouldn’t say it has 
such a significant importance in this case. I am convinced that people just weren’t 
used to so much discipline in the workplace and weren’t familiar with the character 
of this particular industry. 
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Workers were aware of the different standards present at each plant. They had to obey strict 
rules; from clothing and physical appearance restrictions and regulations, like make-up ban in 
some firms, to specific work rhythm and corporate culture. For instance workers in Matado 
wore different coloured caps, depending on the role. The shop floor workers had grey caps, 
engineers - orange, and the management blue. One of the Polish workers did not appreciate this 
‘stratification’ and expressed her disapproval during the interview: 
I think this is some very silly idea. I understand that it improves the order, and maybe 
makes finding people easier, for example when you need to speak to the manager 
you just look for a ‘bluehead’; but on the other hand it unnecessarily divides people. 
Well, but that’s the Japanese company, they have they own way of doing things. So 
we wear these stupid caps like it mattered at all.  
There are no exceptions and every worker is very closely monitored, which constituted a 
novelty for the employees used to the Polish workplace practices. Sanato’s Polish General 
Manager emphasised the necessity of discipline and early introduction of control mechanisms 
and argued that only transparent, even if harsh, rules of workplace discipline introduced 
immediately and accurately would not meet the resistance, despite initial reluctance. The Polish 
Production Manager added: 
Straightaway, during the induction, the worker sees our attention to detail in every 
aspect. Even such a little thing like the shoes matters. New employees can’t just enter 
the factory, but have to get changed. They can see everything is controlled and non-
random. We also try to raise awareness of the reasoning behind such a high level of 
control. 
Kessho installed a CCTV system to monitor the assembly line workers, however, the presence 
of video monitoring in other case study companies was not revealed to the researcher for the 
security and policy reasons.  
At Kessho shop-floor workers were assessed twice a year. Manual performance tests were 
conducted, whereby workers were asked to assemble a particular component. Their 
performance was timed and then evaluated against the quality and efficiency requirements. 
Kessho’s Management and Administration employees were assessed on the annual basis with 
their performance measured by other criteria (based on financial and production targets 
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achieved). An assessment report in writing was available for workers to access and a positive 
performance review attracted a bonus (see table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.2 Performance related pay scheme at Kessho (as per 2011). 
 
Category Bonus/Incentive 
O                ----------- 
B                ----------- 
A Additional 100 PLN per month 
A+ Additional 150 PLN per month 
S Additional 150 PLN per month and direct employment with Kessho 
Source: Author based on interview with a union representative. 
Additionally, every month random efficiency checks were conducted among the shop floor 
workers in Kessho and Ekiai. A Polish shop floor worker at Ekitai shared her view about such 
practices:  
We knew we were going to be checked. That was a normal procedure. Every month 
or so, our foreman used the stopwatch in front of us, while we were assembling 
components. On many occasions she was doing exactly the same, but not openly and 
apparently [laugh] without our knowledge. We still saw her using her stopwatch, and 
it really looked funny – her struggling to pretend she was doing something else and 
not paying attention to us. Our results were never revealed. 
Sanoto’s employees were assessed on an annual basis, but there was no financial reward. 
Employees had to pre-assess themselves and their assessment was compared, discussed and a 
final report written by the managers. Based on the results of which workers are divided into 
three categories: ‘Good Enough’, ‘Committed’ and ‘Distinctive’. During the prosperous period 
every April, Shunto-alike practice took place, as Sanoto increased wages annually until 2011, 
(it was only a nominal amount, and, as one of the Polish engineers said – ‘more of an ‘inflation 
adjustment’ than a pay rise’). This however, contrastingly to the original Japanese practice, 
was not a negotiated change but automatic. 
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Unskilled workers earned the national minimum wage (1,386 PLN gross in 2011). Seniority 
does not make much difference. A store keeper with six years’ experience earned 1,990 PLN 
gross (2011). A senior technician with five years’ experience at Matado earned 1,780 PLN 
gross (2011), while the monthly remuneration of  a process engineer at Kessho (with the same 
experience period) equalled 2,800 PLN gross (2011)37. Agency workers were paid 100 PLN 
bonuses for punctuality, non-absenteeism and perfect attendance. But this additional sum was 
paid directly by the employment agencies. In addition some elements of company welfarism 
were introduced. All case study companies (apart from Honsiu Plc.) organized the transport for 
workers (between 2007 and 2011) and a fixed amount was deducted from the monthly wages. 
This sum varied from 25 PLN to 140 PLN, depending on the distance and the level of company 
subsidies (in the case of Ekitai transport was free of charge). Most interviewed workers 
regarded this arrangement as very convenient. One of Polish technicians at Matado stressed: 
I live sixty four kilometres from Crystal Park. I used to spend a fortune on petrol (I 
own an old Volvo estate, which is not very economic) commuting every day, and I 
was hardly breaking even. What’s left of my wages was just not worth it; sometimes, 
literally, pennies. I felt like I was just working for the sake of it. Now, with this 
organized transportation I manage to save a bit more. Still, it takes around one hour 
and half to get to the factory by bus. 
From the management’s point of view the provision of transportation was a necessity: 
Local authorities did not care much about the transportation. They did not provide a 
single bus stop by the site which employs more than four thousand workers. [Vice 
raised and turns her head expressing disbelief, expects the researcher to comment] 
Can you imagine? Are we in the middle of nowhere? No! Just, but only just, by the 
main road. So, we were forced to organize it ourselves. Generally, we have to cover 
more than half of the cost; the rest is paid by the workers. On the other hand we do 
not experience problems with punctuality, as the whole workforce comes at once.  
                                                          
37 PLN 1,386 in 2011 was worth approximately 308 Euros and £270; PLN 1,990 respectively 443 Euros and £387; 
PLN 2,800 – €623 and £545 (calculations based on the exchange rates available on the European Central Bank 
Website). 
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(Polish Sanoto Manager) 
On occasions when production at Crystal Park peaked (2010), and employers were desperate 
to organize over-time workers, mini-cabs were ordered. One of the technicians at Ekitai 
recalled: 
I remember once, on Saturday morning I received a call from my foreman. She asked 
me to do some overtime. I said that I had no mean of transport to get to Crystal Park. 
She said: Don’t worry, we are sending a taxi for you.  That was quite awesome! To 
be honest, I don’t get a chance to ride a taxi, quite often I just can’t afford it. 
Japanese companies also provided other forms of benefits. That included: Toruń swimming 
pool membership, affordable lunches at the factories’ canteens (cost from 4 PLN to 9 PLN) 
and holiday allowance (in Sanoto and Kessho). These schemes were well-received, as they are 
not very common in the Polish workplace, especially in the private sector.  
 
6.7 Quality assurance 
 
Crystal Park’s managers boasted about the implementation of quality policies. The Polish HR 
and Administration Manager at Ekitai proudly said: 
We are currently implementing very advanced TS 16900 quality standard. It is a car 
manufacturing standardisation, necessary to manufacture components and gain new 
contractors. When it comes to the car industry it is a standard more advanced than 
ISO. It will hugely influence our production process. 
The most basic quality assurance method is 5S Workplace Housekeeping, which was a standard 
in all of the firms researched and was adopted wholly by every single case study firm. Workers 
in each firm appear to understand the necessity of 5S and appreciated its practicality. The only 
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exception was Honsiu Plc; the logistics company which did not implement 5S rule the Polish 
manager explained: 
Actually we don’t have many of Japanese ‘features’ here. I used to work for the 
European corporation, Unilever. I came across all of typical Japanese production 
methods: lean manufacturing, JIT, kaizen there. So in fact Anglo-Dutch Unilever is 
much more ‘Japanese’ than our company. I have never filled a kaizen here [laughter]. 
The extent to which kaizen was introduced, its adaptation and the gap between rhetoric and 
reality are important themes in examining the transfer of Japanese workplace institutions. 
Kaizen is one of the most important features of quality assurance and Japanese economic 
success itself. It is the philosophy of continuous improvement, in which all staff constantly 
considers methods of improving quality and efficiency (Hollinshead, 2010). The five main 
elements of kaizen are; team work, personal discipline, improved morale, quality circles, and 
suggestions for improvement. The improvements sought through kaizen include maximum 
utilization through the elimination of unnecessary movement and idle time (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992). Kaizen is very formalized and embedded in Japanese culture. Clearly, 
Japanese companies need to adapt it to European conditions. Generally, in Japan, workers do 
not expect any personal benefits from the accepted and introduced ‘improvements’. Only few 
Crystal Park based companies decided to introduce kaizen. 
Ekitai’s management was very optimistic about implementation of kaizen. The philosophy of 
continuous improvement was broadly recognised among employees at all levels with the 
majority of innovative ideas coming from shop-floor workers. The Polish maintenance 
manager suggested that: 
Kaizen is a matter of course for employees. 
The kaizen system is also being implemented in Kessho. Employees are fully aware of the 
procedure; kaizen forms. They even participated in Kessho’s worldwide kaizen competition: 
There is a contest for the best innovation or improvement. Workers can be organised 
in teams of 3-5 people. All the projects are assessed by the Japanese, the best are sent 
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for the international Kessho Kaizen contest. When someone has got granted a patent, 
then he or she is a getting bonus every month. The Polish team were already awarded, 
and sent abroad. 
                                                                             (Kessho shop floor worker) 
Some workers perceived the kaizen initiative as empowering:  
I’m a kaizen-woman! I had a chance to prove myself. I came up with few very good 
ideas. I made some alterations to the machines we are using (to cut filters), other in 
ergonomics, moving some of the machines around, it made our workplace more 
functional and safe. I like mechanics. I was not really appreciated in the Polish 
company I used to work for. Here, people don’t mind women working with 
screwdrivers.  For me it is more important to be valued by managers, I didn’t care 
much about how much money I would get for kaizen. 
(Polish shop floor worker at Sanoto) 
Although fairly small, money awards were given for introduced kaizen innovations in most of 
the manufacturing companies. This illustrates the way in which firms had to adapt to Polish 
expectations as workers in Japan do not expect any personal benefits from the accepted and 
introduced ‘improvements’. A Polish HR manager at Ekitai explained:  
There was an attempt to implement kaizen, in the same form as is functioning in 
Japan. It absolutely did not work out, as it did not match with Polish reality. We had 
to take up some modifications, to ‘polonize’ it. In Japan it is quite natural from the 
philosophical point of view. It is based in culture. In Poland it is different. We treat 
it as another system, which has to work, but nobody knows why it is in place. 
He continues explaining the differences in kaizen perception:  
There are differences. Firstly, the Japanese have kaizen targets. They expect to 
receive certain amount of forms for every specified time period. For example, in 
Japan, every month one employee of each department has to come up with a kaizen 
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suggestion, end of the line. In Poland, half of the people will find the idea mad and 
ask “Why bother with kaizen? If I have a good idea, I simply implement it. No need 
to write a book about it, why formalize? If I want to improve my work, I just do so. 
Besides, I won’t just fill the forms for the sake of it”. In Japan it’s almost ‘art for art’s 
sake’. If by the end of the month the kaizen target isn’t met, employees have to 
volunteer and ‘produce’ the expected number of kaizen forms. And even if it’s 
moving the plant from one side to the other, the form is filled in. We smell 
‘communist regime’ here straight away. Too much pointless bureaucracy. In Japan 
the whole process is deeply formalized, also in terms of quantity. 
Another Polish worker, a quality controller in Matado, was very sceptical about the kaizen 
initiative: 
People are very reluctant to do this. And I am not surprised. Why would you do it 
anyway? You are not getting paid for that. I am not taking any initiative for free. I 
am very ambitious, but working for free... In my opinion shows lack of respect for 
your own person. If employers want to motivate us they should pay us accordingly. 
Our management does not award us, and there are no kaizen initiatives. The whole 
idea of kaizen is baloney.  
Therefore a major ‘modification’ to the Japanese workplace institution of kaizen is the 
provision of financial incentives. However, time-consuming procedures and the relatively 
small financial rewards alienated many employees. Logistic companies at the site have not 
introduced kaizen yet, although at the time the interview was conducted, they had plans to do 
so in the future. A Polish branch manager of Honsiu Plc explained:  
Polish workers are not prepared for such an initiative yet. We have to precede it with 
a series of training programmes. The Polish mentality is quite different. At the 
moment we are in touch with other European subsidiaries, which are sharing their 
experiences of kaizen with us. We are hoping to implement kaizen in our firm in 
2013.  
The Polish General Manager of Kessho expressed his cautiousness on kaizen implementation: 
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 Few propositions were received, of course. However kaizen is such a popular form 
of gaining or releasing, if you like, the rationalising (as it was once called) of energy, 
that it is used by many firms. The only problem is of nomenclatural nature – whether 
we call it kaizen or rationalisation. Rank-and-file initiatives sometimes appear as the 
workers trying to improve their workplace. We had our own kaizen programme at 
the beginning but it hasn’t caught on. We had to make some changes. Currently we 
are about to reintroduce it. We will have to wait for the results and see. 
Not only the attitude to kaizen in Poland-based companies had to be adjusted, but also the 
procedure has been slightly simplified. The submission process was shortened and practically 
all workers were permitted to explain their ideas to their team leaders directly, rather than in 
writing on the form. The kaizen submission form in Ekitai (see Appendix 1) was abridged and 
looks nothing like its equivalent in the Japan-based plant. A big part of the form is dedicated 
to the award the worker receives for a successful and cost efficient idea. 
Typical ‘quality circles’ (which are more common in Japanese automobile industries) as such 
are not present at the site. Quality is maintained through the 5S teams and ‘Safety patrols’. 
However, a Polish production manager (Sanoto) explained that: 
‘Quality circles’ are just one of the terms used in production management. They are 
present in Toyota under this name. In our company, when in effect of the production 
team meetings the project comes out, or necessity of improvement in any area, it is 
put on the task schedule. Sometimes it takes a month, sometimes it’s a half of year 
job. An interdepartmental team is created for such a task, someone from production, 
someone from QC, and i.e. someone from Production Planning and Business 
Coordination to work on the project. The analyses are being carried out and obviously 
when the project is accomplished, and had succeeded, we analyse the outcomes and 
the benefits drawn, etc., so it’s just called differently but it operates in a very similar 
way.  
However, the comments of some workers revealed a gap between the rhetoric and reality of 
kaizen implementation. For example, a Polish shop-floor mechanic (Matado) expressed his 
doubts regarding quality assurance: 
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The whole quality policy [air quotes by worker] is only in place when we are 
expecting an inspection from Japan, or from of our contractors. Then everything is 
organized. For most of the time our quality policy, to put it simple, only works on 
paper.  
 This was confirmed by Polish quality controller in Matado: 
There was so much emphasis on the quality in the beginning phase, when the 
Japanese were here. Now, since they are gone, we are more concerned with the 
quantity, rather than quality. Quality-aware detection works only theoretically. Many 
of our products are poor quality, and nothing is done about it. We detect a problem, 
we report it, but management decides to send it anyway, because we have to meet 
the quota and the figures have to match.  
During the interview with a Polish process manager in Matado, he quoted an example of his 
university friend, who also worked as a process manager in a different Crystal Park firm 
(Kessho). The company had a financial scheme which allowed a purchase of a TV set with a 
significant discount (around 20 per cent). The Matado manager said: 
And he bought this TV set, even though I warned him. His wife was very unhappy 
about it [laugh]. I know how they are being produced and I would never buy a TV 
set from our factory. I got myself a nice flat screen from our competitor. I paid a little 
bit more, but I am sure the quality is better. You don’t want to waste so much money 
on poor quality products. Still, he says, it makes no difference, as apparently he saw 
components for different brands produced in the same factory in China, where he 
went for training.  
The examples given above show that quality policies varied between the case study 
firms and that further, there was no particular method to enforce quality assurance. 
Workers were mostly sceptical about implementation of these practices. Table 6.3 
presents the main Japanese management and production practices present in the case 
study companies. 
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Table 6.3 Transfer of Japanese practices to the Polish workplace (based on case study Crystal Park firms) 
 
Extent to which embedded in case study firms 
Management 
Practice/ 
Elements of 
organisation culture 
Fully embedded and 
adapted without 
alterations 
Accepted in a changed form Not accepted at all 
Kaizen 
 
  
Firms:  
None of the case 
study firms have fully 
adapted kaizen in the 
form that is present in 
its Japanese 
counterpart. 
Common practice, however 
with alterations; workers 
discouraged initially by the 
lack of appraisal and 
recognition, expected financial 
incentives, too formalized for 
Polish liking, kaizen forms 
had to be simplified.  
 
Firms: 
the manufacturing companies: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado 
Firms:  
logistics company -
Honsiu 
The 5 S System Completely. Only 
logistics company did 
not apply formalized 
5S system. 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, 
Matado  
Not formally referred to as 5S. 
One element of 5S – Seiso 
(Sweep/Sanitize/Scrub) 
mentioned as important in the 
warehouse. General health and 
safety rules present.  
 
Firms: 
Honsiu  
  
Kanban  Present only at one 
manufacturing company. 
 
Firms: Sanoto 
 
Quality Circles   not present due to 
industry specifics 
Reflection meetings 
(hanseikai) 
 Present as practice, workers 
unaware of its deeply 
embedded in Japanese culture 
character, not regular, 
sometimes held due to 
obligation rather than for 
learning purposes, only on 
managerial level, shop floor 
level absent 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado and 
Honsiu 
 
Genchi genbutsu (go 
and see, get your 
hands dirty) 
 The managers would 
sometimes help workers if the 
problem occurred in the 
production line 
 
Firms: 
the manufacturing companies only: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado 
 
Job rotation  
 
 Not present 
 
Continued on the next page 
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Table 6.3 continued 
Team work Fully embedded 
 
Firms: 
the manufacturing 
companies: Sanoto, 
Ekitai, Kessho, Matado 
 Not present in 
logistics company  
 
Firms:  
Honsiu 
On the job training  Most of the training conducted 
this way, workers often asked 
for formalised training, highly 
regarded in Poland. 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado, 
Honsiu 
 
Enterprise unionism   No enterprise 
unionism, low level 
of unionisation –
national 
confederation 
present 
Loyalty to 
organisation, level of 
integration 
 Workers not as devoted to 
their workplace as their 
Japanese colleagues. Due to 
difficult economic situation in 
Poland and high 
unemployment workplace is 
still, perceived mainly in 
terms of wage- labour nexus 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado, 
Honsiu 
Agency workers: 
Difficult to achieve 
due to character of 
employment 
 
 
 
Firms: 
Ekitai, Kessho 
Motivation  Small financial incentives for 
non-absenteeism. 
 
Firms: 
Kessho, Matado 
 
Work station-how it 
looks 
Cleanliness principle 
understood and 
highly regarded 
 
Firms: 
the manufacturing 
companies: Sanoto, 
Ekitai, Kessho, Matado 
Workplace improvements 
sometimes implemented ad 
hoc by workers directly, grass 
root initiative, without going 
through bureaucratic machine 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai 
 
Hierarchy  Workplace highly stratified, 
Polish workplace 
hierachisation level is higher 
than Japanese, seniority 
regarded, however experience 
is often of lesser recognition 
than education and social 
position 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado, 
Honsiu 
 
Peer Supervision and 
self-control 
  Not present, peer 
supervision idea not 
welcomed by 
workers.  
Continued on the next page 
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Table 6.3 continued 
Communication  Face-to face, however based 
on hierarchical relationship 
imposed by Polish 
management. 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado, 
Honsiu 
 
Punctuality Enforced by workers 
relying on company 
transport. 
 
Firms: 
Manufacturing 
companies: Sanoto, 
Ekitai, Kessho, Matado 
  
Discipline No discipline 
problems, workers 
fully adhere to the 
rules of workplace 
discipline. 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Honsiu 
Initial problems with toilet 
and cigarette breaks. Workers 
rigorously time managed and 
checked. 
 
 
Firms: 
Kessho, Matado 
 
Pay system  Flat pay plus incentive system 
 
Firms: 
Sanoto, Ekitai, Kessho, Matado, 
Honsiu 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
The transfer of Japanese workplace practises to Polish firms in the case study companies can 
be placed in three broad categories; those practices that were unproblematically transferred; 
those practices that had to be adapted to a greater or lesser degree and those practices that 
displayed a sharp divergence from those associated with the Japanese model. 
At a symbolic level all case study companies clearly manifested their ‘Japanese heritage’ 
(Japanese flags in front of each plant’s entrance, clocks showing time in Tokyo; bonsai trees at 
reception, the corporation specific artefacts exhibited – for example samurai swords in Ekitai, 
pure red copper in Sanoto). However, the extent to which Japanese practices were implemented 
was much less substantial and varied significantly between the case study firms.  
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First, the only practices that were transferred unproblematically were soft housekeeping 
practices. The manufacturing companies at Crystal Park quite effortlessly implemented the rule 
of 5S- workplace organizational tool. Ekitai, Kessho and Sanoto put great emphasis on 
implementation of 5S, conducting regular training, and workers’ assessments in this respect. 
5S was also generally well perceived by workers, who associated it with basic health and safety 
regulation. At Matado 5S was present, but was not accompanied by systematic training. Honsiu 
Plc, the only logistics case study company did not introduce typical Japanese 5S practice. 
Another practice which was unproblematically applied in all of the case study firms was On-
the-Job-Training (OJT). Additionally in the case of the manufacturers - Ekitai and Sanoto OJT 
was enhanced by more formalised training and induction (for the duration of one week). 
Arguably OJT is not uniquely Japanese practice but can be found in other western countries 
(Mitani, 1999). 
Second, kaizen was adapted and rebranded to varying degrees by all firms. Initially, Polish 
managers were under pressure from their Japanese line managers to implement ‘continuous 
improvement’. It was quickly apparent that Polish workers found the idea of kaizen hard to 
comprehend. In Ekitai, management stressed that the Japanese form of kaizen would not have 
been accepted in the Polish workplace and therefore a process of kaizen ‘rebranding’ took 
place. Kaizen was renamed ‘Workers’ Ideas’ in line with workers’ council and accompanied 
by additional training and small financial bonuses. The number of kaizen applications in all of 
the case study firms has been decreasing significantly from 2010. Further, there were disparities 
evident between the rhetoric of its adoption and how systematically it was applied in practice. 
At Honsiu Plc the kaizen initiative was not considered a priority and was suspended and 
management explained that it was awaiting an implementation strategy and that further 
planning was necessary. The implementation of other quality policies was common, but at the 
same time showed a degree of superficiality. Only in Sanoto the ‘safety patrols’ (far removed 
from traditional Japanese quality control circles) had the role of inspecting and improving 
occupational safety in the factory. Sanoto was also the only Crystal Park company fully 
employing kanban logistic method. Management in Crystal Park was using the rhetoric of 
quality, however workers stressed that maintaining quality was often compromised by the daily 
rate of output. The importance of quality assurance diminished significantly after the start-up 
period, with the decreasing presence of the Japanese management. Considerably greater accent 
on the quality present in Sanoto and Ekitai can be explained by the high demand of quality in 
the chemical and metallurgical sectors. Moreover both companies were forced to expand their 
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business activities outside the cluster and to win new customers, including Japanese companies 
located in other special economic zones in Poland.  By contrast, in the two largest case studies 
companies- TV set manufacturers, Kessho and Matado - the quality was less important.  The 
competitive environment of the LCD manufacturers (Poland, not without reason, is nicknamed 
a ‘LCD country’) enforced a policy of flexibility and cutting costs, including compromising 
the quality. 
Third, the starkest example of a workplace practice that diverged from the Japanese classical 
model was the extensive and systematic use of flexible labour sources from employment 
agencies. However, it is arguable whether ‘life-time stable employment can still be regarded 
as a feature of the Japanese model’ (Hollinshead, 2010). Several authors (Coe et al., 2009, 
Suzuki, 2010; Hamaguchi and Ogino, 2011) point to the deregulation of the Japanese 
employment system and the increasing number of ‘dispatch workers’ (Japanese: haken) 
Therefore, the firms at Crystal Park’s easily adjusted to Poland’s ‘flexible’ labour environment, 
and took advantage of its benefits for the employment of low-skilled manual labour by relying  
mainly on an agency workforce, which in the periods of increased production accounted for 
more than 50 per cent of the workforce.  
However, the use of agency workers and flexible contracts was not consistent throughout all 
firms. While Kessho and Ekitai outsourced shop-floor staff to a greater degree, Matado used 
an employment agency only during the start-up period. Sanoto and Honsiu Plc on the other 
hand entirely followed the ‘classic’ Japanese path. Although these latter companies were 
similarly exposed to fluctuations in the electronics market, to the same extent as Kessho, they 
tended to maintain traditional Japanese practice of long-term employment and broadly 
implement the policies of HQ.  
The characteristics of employment relations in Crystal Park suggest that the Japanese model of 
management is a ‘peripheral’ one (Dedoussis and Littler, 1994). Japanese companies have only 
tried to ‘transplant’ a few practices, such as 5S, kaizen, and team work. The interviews suggest 
that there was no intention to introduce the full spectrum of Japanese managerial and 
production practices. This conclusion accords with the findings of Elger and Smith, (1994) that 
Japanese firms are presumed to install different factory regimes in their subsidiaries depending 
on various factors, the host society practice being one of them. Although a degree of conformity 
is likely, it is important to discern and distinguish the differences between the subsidiaries 
across the countries.  
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Generally, employment at Crystal Park was characterized by low job security and a high 
turnover. Some of the agency workers were contracted on a two-week or one month basis. 
Furthermore, employment at Crystal Park was exposed to regular redundancies from 2011 
onwards. For instance employment at Kessho decreased from over 2,000 in 2010 to just 1,000 
in 2011, in the case of Sanoto, fluctuations were even more severe, from 600 in 2010 to 150 in 
2012. Redundancies affected both agency and permanent workers. The precarious character of 
employment and extreme numerical flexibility exerted an influence on working conditions. 
These were the vehicles for the workers’ subordination. Unsurprisingly, the discipline in 
Crystal Park was maintained not only by insecurity and flexibility, but also by management’s 
monitoring and surveillance. In all case study companies workers were subject to assessment 
and performance tests. This practice was the most rigorous in Kessho. Crystal Park’s workers 
did not remain entirely passive. The next chapter moves beyond the standard approach to 
Japanisation and will explore the conflict and resistance by workers at the Japanese 
‘transplants’ in Toruń’s ‘Little Japan’.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SITES OF CONTESTATION. THE EMPLOYEE EXPERIENCE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Six discussed the extent to which ‘typical’ Japanese workplace practices were 
transferred to their subsidiaries in Poland. It was argued that the model of Japanese 
management at the site was peripheral and the transfer was only successful in terms of soft 
quality policies, while less eminent with regard to quality circles, and superficial in terms of 
kaizen.  
The focus of this chapter is on the individual and collective responses of workers. Chapter Four 
discussed the way in which early studies of the Japanisation of the labour process (such as the 
lean production method) had positive attributes for employees. This idea was based on the 
purported negation of Fordism and end of monotonous repetitive tasks and the increased 
autonomy and respect experienced by workers. It was posited that ‘Japanese-style work 
organisation’ could be ‘empowering’, ‘enriching’ and an alternative to the alienation and 
degradation associated with conventional Taylorism (Womack et al.,1990; cited in Danford, 
1999: 2). However, this view was challenged by Stewart et al. (2009), who argued that, ‘lean 
production is a managerial agenda for restructuring in the face of declining profitability’ (ibid: 
9), and further it ‘can be seen as creating a range of organisational and ideological resources 
for subordinating opposition to the rule of capital’ (ibid: 9). 
In their extensive study of the Japanese manufacturing sector in Britain, Elger and Smith (2005) 
point to the significance of active processes of management debate, conflict and uncertainty 
within these enterprises, rather than any smooth and straightforward process of either 
transplanting or hybridisation. ‘The literature on the relationships between the Japanese and 
local (British or American) managers has been that resistance to the implementation of 
Japanese methods has come more from the local managers than from local workers’ (Ibid: 305). 
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Studies on the transfer of Japanese management practices to and in Poland have not 
investigated Japanese subsidiaries as potential arenas of conflict and contestation. Rather, 
research has been focused on the cultural dimension of Japanisation of Polish workplace as 
well as the advantages of lean management (Krasiński, 2012a; 2012b; 2014), and total quality 
management (TQM) policies (Bugdol, 2005; Szczepańska, 1998). Little research has been 
conducted from a non-managerial perspective. The exception is the valuable insight into 
working conditions in Polish multinationals by Mrozowicki and Maciejwska (2013), who have 
researched the harsh conditions characterized by extreme work flexilibility and precarity in a 
non-Japanese electronics company located in a Special Economic Zone in Southern Poland. 
Their study suggests that workers’ resistance is present in flexible working regimes and can 
emerge even in ‘non- or weakly unionised and labour-intensive factories.’(ibid: 207). However, 
the problem of conflict and resistance in Japanese-owned Polish workplaces has not been 
sufficiently researched. To address this lacuna this chapter will pay attention to workers’ 
experiences and perceptions of working for Japanese-owned companies as well as their 
collective and individual resistance.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First it will describe the working conditions at the site 
(7.2). This section of the research will draw on the secondary data found in the local press, 
while the subsequent passages will draw on the qualitative data gathered during the fieldwork. 
Issues of work intensification and workplace bullying will be discussed (respectively 7.2.1 and 
7.2.2). Section 7.3 will outline trade union activity at the site, while in section 7.4 the spotlight 
will be put on workers’ unorganised resistance in both its collective and individual forms. 
Finally, to enhance the picture of workers’ experience in the five case study companies, the 
chapter will be supplemented with the data gathered online from the threads of Crystal Park 
workers’ internet open discussion boards.  
 
7.2 Working conditions at the site 
 
The scale of the Japanese investment in the locality raised hopes and expectations, mainly as a 
prospect for reducing high unemployment rates in the region. However, from the very 
beginning of the operation, Japanese companies also attracted some bad publicity. Just a few 
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months after the site was opened, an abundance of gloomy accounts on working conditions 
flooded the media. In 2008 the local press suggested that this has also led to the resignation of 
two Japanese directors. Press releases described working conditions as harsh, for example they 
reported that (in January and February 2008) ambulances were called ten times to resuscitate 
women who had fainted because of high temperatures. It relayed on the complaints of 
employees concerned with the frequency of breaks, and toilet facilities and medical care that 
was insufficient for the needs of 2,000 workers. Some of them described an oppressive regime 
in Crystal Park’s factories. 
For every 8 hours of work we are only entitled to a single 25 minute break. Most of 
the workers remain standing by the production line, dressed in overalls, face masks 
and special boots. They find those boots extremely uncomfortable and causing corns. 
There were cases of fainting. 
(Marwitz, 2007) 
Other demonstrated antagonistic industrial relations; pointing out that cultural differences were 
the source of the problem: 
Insane castigation (for workplace discipline), labour camp (for the factory), Polish 
kapos (for the foremen), exploitation (for the wages on the verge of national 
minimum) – these expressions very quickly took over. The first two years in Japanese 
factories were marked by the clash of Japanese work culture and Polish reality. Both 
parties are responsible for the escalating conflict  
(Oberlan, 2011) 
In-depth journalistic investigation was conducted by the aforementioned Gazeta Wyborcza 
reporter Aleksandra Leśniewska, who managed to be hired and work for several weeks 
undercover in one of the Japanese factories. Her report (2007) brought insights into the 
extremely stressful conditions on the shop floor: 
The production line is divided into small parts. The worker, who receives the set 
stops the line for the duration of his task. When he/she is done, the individual turns 
the line on again. In the middle of the hall a screen is installed. Three target numbers 
are displayed: planned daily rate of output, number of the sets which should have 
been assembled already, and the virtual output. It’s 11 o’clock. Nobody is rushing, 
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however, by the end of the production day, 1,000 televisions are to be assembled. “It 
is possible,” young Danuśka tries to convince me, who’s been working here for two 
months. “Firstly they gave us the target of 400 sets and every day they were 
increasing it. Before Xmas the Jap came and said: ‘you are too relaxed before 
Christmas, I am not happy. You are assembling 900 televisions. It’s not enough. You 
have to do 1000!’ Can you imagine what was happening here? We were working like 
crazy. When we were near the 1,000 some Japanese managers came out their offices, 
put their gloves on, pulled their clean sleeves up and started working along with us.  
(Leśniewska, 2007) 
Following these publications and scrutiny of the workers’ grievance procedure, the Polish 
National Labour Inspectorate (PIP - Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy) surveyed working conditions 
at the two biggest plants (in the years 2008-2011). PIP officers confirmed practices of 
workplace bullying (Polish: mobbing). Workers were assigned to too many duties, ordered to 
undertake meaningless tasks, their decisions being disputed and impugned. Cases of shouting 
and insulting employees were also noted (See appendix 2). PIP has discovered some 
irregularities in the electronic work time register whereby quarters of an hour were not counted 
as a working time. A key question is, whether cases of bullying and other oppressive 
experiences can be solely attributed to Japanese management; or do they just constitute the 
landscape of the degraded labour relations, which is prevalent in the private sector where work 
is intensified under conditions of competition. 
The picture painted with sensationalism and the PIP’s quantitative and legal approach provides 
a good starting point for the following sections, which draw on workers accounts gathered 
during the interviews at Crystal Park case study firms. 
 
7.2.1 Work intensification 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, Crystal Park’s employment was characterized by extreme 
flexibility in the case of two case study companies (Ekitai and Kessho), which relied 
extensively on employment agencies. Even the remaining case study firms Sanoto and Matado, 
which were in favour of a direct employment, were exposed to lay-off policies since 2011. 
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Honsiu Plc was the only case study firm unaffected by the crisis, where employment can be 
described as stable. Its operation was independent of the Crystal Park firms’ performance as 
Honsiu Plc managed to establish business relationships with companies outside the SEZ.  
The precarious character of work enforced the pressure on workers to work harder, faster and 
more efficiently. Additionally, at the regional level, the unemployment rate remained relatively 
high, which decreased workers’ bargaining power and limited job prospects. The fear of being 
unemployed was reflected in workers’ interviews. Even though the work at the Crystal Park 
sites was hard, workers quite often referred to the Japanese investment as ‘salutary’: 
I can’t imagine the region without these factories. The town where I live, Chełmża 
(19 kilometres from Toruń) literally revived because of the Japanese investors. In my 
block of flats, the majority of dwellers are employed in Crystal Park. Before, they 
[Japanese] came there was no work at all.  The sugar-refinery, the biggest employer 
in town, employs workers for only three months during the sugar beet harvest, that’s 
it. Crystal Park factories are our saviours. 
(Sanoto shop-floor worker) 
The assembly line female worker at Matado also pointed out the tragic employment situation 
in the region and expressed that she could see no choice apart from having to work at Crystal 
Park, which was also quite a remote location for her to commute. She said: 
The economy is struggling and we are struggling. You know how it is. Money is 
money. I have to work here, I have no alternative. I have kids. I work here because I 
have to make a living, not because I like it here. Of course, the work is very hard and 
stressful. But where else will I go? There is nothing in my town. 
This notion is very common among the interviewed workers, who refer to unemployment and 
‘having no choice’ as the main sources of motivation to endure working conditions they are 
not always happy with. One of the shop floor workers in Matado when asked about the general 
mood at the site with regards to employment and the future prospects of the Crystal Park site 
said that initially people were convinced that they would work at the Japanese companies until 
their retirement, but since 2011 this mood was overtaken by growing uncertainty and fear of 
redundancies.  
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In manufacturing companies, where production was organized in continuous flow (Matado, 
Kessho, and Ekitai) daily output targets were displayed in the main production hall. The rates 
of output were very strict. Each worker had to produce a certain amount of LCD modules, 
depending on the target. These targets, however, were constantly changing and sometimes, as 
one of the Kessho workers reminisced, there were quieter times. The work itself was physically 
demanding, especially for women. In Kessho and Matado women carried forty two inches LCD 
screens. One worker from Kessho explained:  
You have to be very fit; otherwise you won’t make a shift. Carrying stuff around 
(screens) for several hours is unbearable. It’s not surprising that before I was 
employed during the health check a doctor thoroughly examined my spine. [By the 
provisions of Polish Labour Code (Add. 229 of Labour Code Act 1974; in: Dz. U. 
[Journal of Laws] 2011, No. 36, Item 181); before the worker is employed, he or she 
is obliged to undergo an initial medical examination.] 
An Ekitai shop floor worker said: 
Our daily rates of output are very demanding, especially for new workers. We have 
to make 30 bezels per hour. Luckily in our department (paint shop) girls are very 
helpful. If someone can’t meet their target, the girl who is slightly quicker and got a 
spare one, just passes a finished component to the slower worker to make up the 
difference for them. Of course we have to do it in a clandestine way, without the 
leader knowing about this ‘assistance’. 
Another young woman, a student employed by agency in Ekitai for a couple of months, shared 
her experience, explaining sarcastically that; 
This work is like constant arm-wrestling, or sort of sport for people who enjoy 
‘fitness’. I don’t need a gym any more. Not that I was able to afford it anyway. 
[Laugh] My body has changed. I observed that with every day my triceps were 
becoming bigger and bigger. My brother was getting jealous. [Laugh] I managed to 
stay there for just seven months.  
In Ekitai, the pressure on speed and daily rate of output evoked frustration among workers, the 
workers felt under pressure. The same woman, even though she only worked for a short period 
of time and knew that she was going back to university after the summer, said that she felt 
deeply affected by the stressful mood. She told the researcher: 
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We were not allowed to talk; the forewoman had a little notebook in which every 
time she caught us talking she made a note. Whether she really was making these 
notes I don’t know; so we were only chatting when we knew she couldn’t see us. 
Everyone one was stressed out, sometimes the team leaders were shouting at us to 
hurry up. I am young and strong, I picked up the speed quite quickly, but I felt really 
sorry for some of the girls, especially the older ones. I couldn’t imagine my mum 
working there or my nan. 
One of the Matado workers told a story of his wife, who was also employed by the same 
company. She was a production line sub-leader. One time, when the factory was very busy and 
production demand really high, she was so stressed that her line did not meet the required 
output that she felt forced to cheat. He said: 
My wife was pregnant then, but she had not told them about it yet but was about to. 
There were four lines. She was responsible for one of them. The production target 
was divided by the lines and each line had to produce a certain amount of tellies. At 
the end of the shift during the final count, she realized that there was one TV set less 
in her batch than she was required to deliver. She assumed that someone from another 
line must have taken it, as the main target was met and on the screen everything was 
correct. The telly was there somewhere, but she did not have enough. She panicked 
because this meant trouble for her. So she figured out that the only way was to nick 
one telly from another line. [the Polish word used here was ‘podebrała’ (English: to 
nick) – which cannot be translated exactly as ‘nicking’ or ‘stealing’, it is rather taking 
something without a consent but with good intentions or without causing harm; while 
‘to figure out’ was used to convey the meaning of Polish ‘zakombinowała’. This is 
an untranslatable concept, a semantic enigma, which in a nutshell means ‘sort out’ or 
‘or figure out’ in an illegal way yet has a positive connotation.  It is said to be a legacy 
of communism and meant ‘outwitting’ the authorities under the communist regime 
for all those years.]  
He explained that after what his wife did was discovered she was accused of stealing and forced 
to resign. She left voluntarily, but felt her dismissal was unfair and started legal proceedings 
against the company, as what she did should not have been considered a theft. After a few 
weeks she was reemployed at the same position as the management realised that they were at 
fault in this case and would not be able to win. The worker admitted that his wife was not 
entirely blameless in the whole situation, and she deeply regretted what she has done. But 
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having worked for the company himself, he understood exactly what she must have gone 
through upon making such a decision and that the stress and fear were the main reasons of her 
behaviour.  
An overtime policy was in place during Crystal Park prosperity era in 2009-2010. One of the 
warehouse workers at Sanoto explained: 
Obviously it is better for the employer to pay overtime, than to employ some extra 
staff. 
In the case of agency workers it was expected that they would agree to work overtime. Agency 
workers in both Ekitai and Kessho who refused to take extra hours were not given contract 
extensions. One of the Ekitai workers said: 
On one Friday we were gathered by the management and told that there were some 
extra hours to do on Saturday. Volunteers’ names were registered. In two weeks’ 
time we found, that those who did not volunteer, were not working with us anymore. 
Since then people generally ‘agreed’ to take over-time. At least we were well paid 
for that, so I did not mind.  
Despite workers being happy with an opportunity to earn extra money, some workers were 
reluctant to work extra hours. Those who relied on organized transportation were left out on 
the site with no means of transport to return home, until the next shift finished. One of the 
quality controllers in Matado recalled: 
I was forced to stay longer, as we had to deal with some quality complaint. In such 
situations you could not have just left at 4 PM. You had to stay no matter what. 
Managers were not interested how I was getting home. By 5 PM, all buses were gone. 
I finished at 6, so with no public transportation, I had to hitch-hike back to Toruń, 
where I live. This happened to me several times. 
The employees were also not fully convinced of the need for the performance monitoring 
systems, which they considered ‘stressful’ and ‘unnecessary’.  
I really don’t understand why we have to be tested every half a year; this is very 
challenging, and stressful. There is a lot of work, and it’s hard enough as it is. We 
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are doing everything they want us to and how they want us to and additionally we 
have to be tested. It does not make sense.  
                                                                 (Kessho shop-floor worker) 
The warehouse supervisor at Sanoto, who dealt with stock dispatches considered his work very 
stressful, while at the same time he was convinced it did not have to be: 
On my first shift I was given a tip by a friendly colleague [air quotes]. He said: Can 
you deal with stress? Be prepared. In THIS company the job is going to be stressful. 
It’s how this place is. Deal with it. I don’t think the duties are stressful at all. The 
people make it stressful. My manager for example, every time I sent the dispatch 
invoices out, came to my office after having checked them at his desk and if he found 
even a minor spelling mistake he made a huge fuss and shouted at me.  
Management by stress is imminently present in intensified lean production workplaces (see 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Delbridge and Turnbull, 1992) Moreover, control is ‘extended 
over and above task time and performance’ (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992: 73). 
Not only was this reflected in workers’ experiences with regards to job intensification or speed, 
but even kaizen initiative, where it was present, was affected. The quality controller at Matado 
recalled the time, when, in the start-up phase of Crystal Park operation, management was 
devotedly trying to introduce a continuous improvement policy. However, this resulted in 
workers engaging in, what the aforementioned worker described as ‘kaizen-wars’ [with an air 
quote]. He said: 
There was an enormous pressure for kaizens, I can’t really explain it; it was like a 
‘rat race’. I know of cases when people were stealing each other’s ideas. ‘Kaizen-
wars’. For example you could suggest something to someone, and next time you hear 
your own idea is being implemented just how you suggested it, but by the person you 
shared it with and they wouldn’t want to admit it. One senior manager stole his 
subordinate’s idea and submitted it as his own kaizen and got some award for it. 
People were very angry, and we stopped coming up with kaizens; there was no point.  
One of the team leaders at Ekitai said that initially, management’s approach towards kaizen 
was quite demanding, yet after some time it eased: 
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The Japanese management wanted us to come up with a certain number of kaizens 
every month. It does not work in Poland like that. We can’t really plan how many 
kaizens will appear. It took several months for the Japanese to understand that. Now, 
they are not expecting any ‘monthly rate of kaizens’. 
This workers’ attitude is explained by Bobosz-Bourne (2007), who lists the typical Polish 
values related to creativity, present in workplace organizations. The managers hold in high 
esteem such features as freedom versus obedience, creativity versus organization and planning, 
and finally polot (‘imaginativeness’-the closest English equivalent) versus dullness. These 
values express independence and the virtue of avoiding subjugation, which are inbuilt in Polish 
culture. These qualities could be beneficial but also destructive in conjunction with Western or 
Japanese management. Pure imposition of Western techniques and a ‘cultural gap’ (Holinshead 
and Michailova, 2001) could bring the risk of ineffectiveness.  
However, most of the Crystal Park workers had not been properly introduced to the system of 
‘continuous improvement’.  The precarious character of employment at the site could explain 
this tendency. The agency’s employees do not identify themselves as ‘members of the 
organization’ (especially those employed on very short contracts), and do not feel they have a 
duty to contribute to the company’s prosperity. 
 
7.2.2 Bullying and ‘mobbing’ 
 
Practices of mobbing are common practice in Polish workplaces; according to Cireniak-
Emerych (2011), who analysed available Polish research on the subject, this ratio may be as 
high as 17 per cent (of all working people in Poland experiencing some form of mobbing at 
work). 
In case study companies some forms of workplace bullying were also present. In addition to 
those, reported by local newspapers and investigated by PIP interviews with workers repeatedly 
confirmed the occurrence of such practices blaming the pressures of production pressure and 
an intensive work regime. However in the workers’ opinion this was not attributed to working 
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for a Japanese company, rather their immediate supervisors were mostly held accountable for 
the mistreatment at work. 
Conflict between workers themselves is an emerging theme. This division was caused by 
divisions between permanent employees and agency workers on one hand, and different levels 
of educational attainment on the other.  
Those employed directly by the company felt ‘more at home’ than agency workers. As one of 
the shop floor workers employed by the agency at Ekitai said: 
We are treated differently by our co-workers, only because our contacts are different, 
and we are employed on a short-term basis. We always know that we might not be 
here tomorrow. It is very difficult to make friends. 
Similarly, a Kessho agency worker stressed: 
It feels there is a wall between us. Suddenly when an agency worker is employed 
directly it changes everything, and he or she is ‘on the other side’.  Sometimes I feel 
I am a second class citizen.  
This artificial division between workers influenced the shopfloor relations, but also 
successfully prevented unity. According to the trade union leader at Kensho, many agency 
workers were unaware that they could be members of the union. She said: 
People tend to think that only full time contracted employees can join the union, but 
it’s not like that. We fight for workers’ rights in general, and whether one is 
temporary or full time or unemployed, it doesn’t matter. We are always in the same 
boat. But it is difficult to engage agency workers; they do not feel part of it as much 
as we do I think. Someone told me once that we could not do anything for them, so 
there was no point. I did not reply then, but now I would tell him that the upstairs is 
brainwashing us and that’s what they want – for us to think we’re a lost cause.  
In addition, there were divisions between workers who had a degree and those that did not as 
the following example illustrates. 
187 
 
                   
 
Workers of Kenssho and Matado confirmed the existence of a toilet register, which prevailed 
in the first three years of the site operation. One of the Matado shop floor workers expressed 
anger at being line managed by someone with an inferior education: 
That was really ridiculous. I had to ask for permission of foreman, who has only 
secondary education, to go the toilet. As he was some sort of god, who decides about 
our fate. This was the form of bullying and humiliation. This has got nothing to do 
with discipline. I think these ‘procedures’ was middle managers’ and the foremen’s 
‘invention’, just to humiliate the workforce. I don’t think this is really part of 
Japanese culture. 
In Ekitai there was an official ban on conversation in the production hall. If a worker dared to 
speak to his or her colleague, he or she was immediately reprimanded by the foreman, and 
reported in the special notebook. One of the Sanoto workers told the researcher that loud 
laughing was not allowed in the production hall.  
Shouting and humiliation were common practices in Matado according to the sub-leader: 
Once, only because this one batch was delayed, in front of co-workers, my line 
manager yelled at me: You are an idiot! My cat is smarter than you! No one really 
reacted, no one dared.  
When asked if there was any reaction from the Japanese management, she replied: 
The Japanese are gone. I think they know about this sort of behaviour. They are just 
pretending it does not exist. 
On another occasion in the same company one of the team leaders was threatened by the 
production manager. He remembered: 
I was sworn at. I was shouted at. He silenced me saying: ‘Shut your f***** mouth 
or I will mess your face up.  
 Almost every shop-floor worker interviewed in the manufacturing and assembling case study 
firms was able to give an example of similar maltreatment. In logistics it was not the case.  
The following sections turn to examining workers’ resistance to these workplace conditions 
and practices. 
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7.3 Workers’ resistance 
 
Stories of interviewed workers confirm the presence of misbehaviour (Thompson and Ackroyd, 
1995) or, in a broader understanding following, Karlsson (2012: 185) resistance understood as;  
anything you consciously are, do and think at work that you are not supposed to be, 
do and think and which ia directed upwards through the organisational hierarchy 
As discussed in Chapter Four, workplace resistance or misbehaviour can take many forms. 
Firstly, the organised resistance trade unions’ at the site will be discussed; then definitions of 
resistance will be extended to consider unorganised forms of opposition that are more 
inconspicuous, subjective, subtle (Fleming and Sewell, 2002; Edwards et al., 1995) are 
presented.  
The context to trade union organisation is that industrial action in Poland, and in the private 
sector in particular, is low. In 2012, only 18.7 thousand (out of 12.2 million labourers) 
undertook strike action in Poland (GUS, 2013). Although there was no attempt to organise 
strike action in Crystal Park, nevertheless, workers expressed their discontent through other 
forms of direct protest. One trade union recounted the following: 
We were working in really difficult conditions. Wearing overalls and face masks we 
were literally boiling. People were fainting and feeling unwell. Nothing was done 
although we have made the management aware of the problem. They could see the 
problem themselves. They knew how many times they had to call an ambulance over 
last few months. Still no action was taken. One day we had had enough. When the 
temperature reached 32 degrees, all the shop floor workers just spontaneously walked 
off. We have never been so unanimous. Not a single person stayed behind. And you 
know how it is. There is always someone scared, thinking of kids, bills and losing 
their job. We just forgot the fear. Dropped whatever we were doing and put all our 
eggs in one basket. Next day fans were installed. 
This spontaneous action made the workers aware of the necessity of the trade unions and 
consequently a, Solidarność branch was established. The next section looks at trade union 
activity at the site. 
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7. 4 Trade Unions in Crystal Park 
 
Solidarność was the only trade union operating at the site. The union has relatively high profile 
in the Toruń region and is quite well organised and active (see Appendix 3), especially in the 
manufacturing sector and for that reason it may have become a union of first choice for Crystal 
Park employees rather than OPZZ. Due to its heritage Solidarność is generally better known 
and prominent as a union and managed to form branches in two of case studies companies 
(which also were the only two in the Crystal Park). 
 
Table 7.1 Trade unions in Crystal Park (in the period of highest density) 
Company Trade Union Union density (2011) Members in 2011 
Kessho Solidarność 10 per cent 180 
Matado Solidarność 30 per cent 170 
Source: Author based on data drawn from interviews with trade unionists. 
According to some negative media PR about trade unions and broken (mostly due to unions 
taking sides in political debate) public trust have led to ‘degradation’ of trade unionism (Ost, 
2005). The case of Crystal Park casts new light on union’s public profile, at least when it comes 
to regional level where political affiliation is less evident and has less influence on workers’ 
choice to join. Recognition and familiarity factors are far more important, especially amongst 
younger generations. Explaining his choice, one of the workers said: 
I don’t care about politics. I just wanted to do something for my workplace. For my 
colleagues. For myself. The firm’s financial situation is quite bad and we just want 
to protect ourselves. (...) The managers don’t respect workers’ rights. There were 
many cases of unlawful practices. (...) My friend suggested Solidarność and as I have 
heard of that union before and knew it had already existed on other sites here; I 
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presumed it was the strongest union in the area and the best choice for us. It’s quite 
well known I think.  
Solidarność managed to establish a branch at Kessho in the late 2007. Approximately 10 per 
cent of the Kessho employees belonged to the Solidarność. Between 2009 and 2011 there was 
a rising tendency, but only few members were recruited from engineers or administration. 
Kessho Solidarność union leader admitted: 
Workers are not so mistrustful about the union, as they were before. We want to 
contact other European Kessho’s branches. No success so far. We have only managed 
to contact the European Trade Union Confederation. Still, we are in contact with 
unions located at other electronic plants (Like LG in Kobierzyce, where unionisation 
rate is much higher). So we know what’s going on at other factories in terms of 
condition and pay. But only Solidarność is fighting for a pay rise. We have to 
approach new members, still it’s very hard. 
The majority of the workforce did not join the union and some of the non-members treated 
union activity with suspicion: 
The union has no significance. Enrolled workers are only seeking job security. Most 
of them are just sluggards. (Kessho process engineer) 
Another Kessho shop-floor employee admitted: 
It is very difficult to get a new job with the ‘union past’. Employers always check on 
your papers. What’s the point of risking? 
The company’s management and Japanese board of directors accepted the presence of the 
union. Kessho general manager explained that the Japanese;  
(...) are aware of it and have accepted union’s presence. Besides, our European HQ 
is in Germany, where unions are very strong. Germans have these union councils etc. 
So the Japanese were familiar with it. It was nothing new to them. We had meetings 
with the unions. There were even meetings at the regional level. Our directors were 
having meetings with them, too. The Regional Council has also organised an 
introductory dinner for our directors. The Japanese didn’t treat union activity as 
anything strange. However the dialogue with unions is left for the Polish part to deal 
with. 
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One trade unionist described the relationship with the management as ‘faultless’. Although 
there were some serious issues regarding the lack of translating service, when Japanese were 
present during the start-up period. A trade union leader said that the trade union was: 
 (...) facing some problems while negotiating with Japanese management. Seldom 
can we afford to contract a professional interpreter. The management has its own 
translators. We do not believe in their impartiality. There are also some ‘language’ 
difficulties on the shop floor, where we cannot freely approach Japanese technicians 
and engineers. The English evening classes would be very helpful; unfortunately the 
management does not want to provide them. 
The biggest challenge for Kessho Solidarność was negotiating a pay increase, which had to be 
discussed with the board of Japanese managers. Not having the resources for hiring a 
professional interpreter was another issue; Solidarność asked one of the local academics to be 
an interpreter during the negotiation. A trade unionist recalled: 
We weren’t able to get a professional interpreter. It’s too much money. We do speak 
some English, but this is serious matter and we needed someone trusted and ‘cheap’. 
Luckily one of the teachers at UMK [Local University] agreed to help us for free. 
Solidarność in Kessho managed to convince the management to give a small pay increase in 
2011, however, the fact that this success was not reflected in increased membership frustrated 
the trade union leader; 
People should really understand that the union is a good thing, and actually we are 
making things better. Everyone can benefit from a pay increase. It’s a shame that we 
have not managed to attract more employees. 
In late 2011 the second branch of Solidarność in Crystal Park was opened in Matado. It took 
workers nearly five years to ‘make up’ their minds. The establishment of a trade union 
coincided with the deteriorating economic performance of the company and consequent 
redundancies. Although to many workers Solidarność seemed the only hope, this was not 
reflected in attracting new members. The decision to join was not easily taken as the quote 
below illustrated: 
We had to take the risk. Our jobs were at stake. No one wants to make such a decision. 
Only very few of us had enough courage to do that. Establishing a union meant we 
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were prepared for the possibility of losing our jobs. I guess we were so desperate, 
that we didn’t care so much in the end. 
Trade Union Rep in Matado  
He also attributed problems of ‘decisiveness’ to gender structure of the shop floor workers in 
Matado. 
The majority of our workers are women. I think that women are more cautious, and 
more pragmatic. They do not want to get involved. They won’t do anything that could 
jeopardise their stability, and jobs.  
The main organizer and subsequent union’s secretary at Matado found it very challenging to 
establish the union. The main obstacle was the management’s attitude: 
Prior to the establishing of the union I had several meetings with the General 
Manager. Even though he agreed that the idea of establishing a trade union was 
justified, he was very reluctant and suspicious towards trade unions generally. On a 
few occasions he even proposed opening ‘the independent’ trade union organization. 
He said: Why do you have to pay your contribution to some bunch of bureaucrats in 
Warsaw. You will be much better off and more efficient being independent here. 
Naturally I didn’t agree with him. I received a lot of help from our regional branch, 
and finally I have managed to open Solidarność in our company. 
Matado Solidarność secretary 
Very quickly membership in Matado grew and peaked at 170 members (which constituted one 
third of the workforce). However, after a few weeks membership had decreased substantially 
due to the union’s ineffective response towards redundancies; many members were 
discouraged and left the organisation. Further, some members were unable to cope with paying 
membership fees. As Matado Solidarność secretary explains: 
You know, 14 PLN a month may not be a lot; however when you earn little above 
national minimum wage, 14 PLN make a difference. You have to support your 
families; you have all sorts of expenditure. I fully understand that they could not 
contribute to the union. 
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After the union was finally established another set of problems emerged. The trade union’s 
activity was seriously obstructed by the management who put obstacles in the way of the 
‘Solidarność’ secretary performing his basic duties: 
I had to explain myself in front of the General Manager as to what my union job was 
all about. I have decided not to take the full-time post as trade union secretary, even 
though I could have done,  just to avoid provoking the management, and being called 
‘sluggard’ or ‘bureaucrat’. Instead I’m currently combining my job at the shop floor 
with my union duties, which is very hard. 
Both Solidarność branches (Matado and Kessho) were cooperating together quite closely. 
Trade unionist interviewees also expressed their optimism regarding the possibility of one joint 
Crystal Park union: 
We are hoping that the news will spread, and other workers from other Crystal Park 
companies will hear good things about the trade union’s activity and join us. 
Especially because we work in the same industry -electronics. 
Matado Solidarność secretary 
There was no distinct attempt to establish a trade union in other factories. Generally, managers 
were convinced that union’s activity at the site could be a response to the hard working 
conditions. In other words, the lack of union in the workplace is regarded as proof of decent 
employment relations and management’s efficiency in dealing with employees’ issues. Ekitai 
Human Resource Manager explained: 
There was no such initiative. We have no trade union and I am hoping we will not 
have one for a very long time, as our cooperation with the Workers’ Council is 
flawless. We have not had any serious issues related to working conditions or pay 
system. 
The workers themselves are not convinced about trade unions. As one of the warehouse 
workers said: 
I don’t think there is someone who dares to establish a trade union here. We have got 
a Social Council where most of the important decisions are made. At this stage that’s 
enough. 
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Therefore only two branches of Solidarność were opened in the Crystal Park in Kessho and 
Matado. The Kessho branch was established relatively early just after the start-up period, 
whereas Matado took another five years to be unionized. The trade unions, however, did not 
manage to protect workers from massive lay-offs in 2012-2013. In 2011, to avoid redundancies 
packages, Matado management laid off just below thirty workers, on a weekly basis. According 
to Polish law, a company (employing more than 300 workers) is obliged to pay a financial 
package when terminating contracts with more than thirty workers (see: Termination of an 
Employment Contract with Notice Act, 2003). 
 
7.5 Signs of unorganised resistance in Crystal Park 
 
The next sections draw on interviews conducted outside the workplaces. Workers were more 
open when interviewed outside the factory, as they did not feel threatened by any form of 
workplace surveillance; while those designated by the management to participate in the 
research and interviewed during their working hours in the factory settings, were less critical. 
Further, the data presented below mostly come from the workers that the researcher was put in 
contact with through the snowball technique. Through these recommendations, the researcher 
was vouched for by the workers interviewed before, and in some cases, due to these 
endorsements, was granted with workers’ unconditional trust. Two of the workers interviewed 
during the follow-up series, were not working at the site anymore and, to recall their words 
‘they were not afraid to talk any more’. 
Trade unions managed to attract less than half of workforce in Matado and Kessho. Although 
many workers, remained sceptical about trade union organization, it does not mean that they 
remained passive with regard to workplace discipline, job intensification and working 
conditions. In this respect the boundaries of the ‘contested terrain’ (Edwards, 1979) of 
workplace relations are expanded. What follows, are accounts of individual or collective action 
independent of trade union influence as workers contest both workplace organisation and 
personal mistreatment on the shop floor (Roscigno and Hodson, 2004) through sabotage, 
humour and the use of internet sites. 
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7.5.1 Sabotage 
 
Following the definition of Giacalone and Rosenfeld (1987: 367); for the purpose of this study 
workplace ‘sabotage’ is understood as:  
any behaviour by a payroll employee which is intended to inflict a production or 
profit loss for the targeted organisation.  
In the modern workplace industrial sabotage does not necessarily mean machinery smashing 
as suggested in Mellor’s classic Direct Action (1920) (see Brown, 1977). However, this 
‘archaic’ form of action involving damage to machinery took place in one of the case study 
firms. One of the Polish engineers at Kessho, who was sometimes required to work a night 
shift recalled: 
In the middle of my night shift I was called to the production hall. The night shift 
leader reported that the transmission belt had broken. Production stopped and 
workers stood by the line or sat on the floor. They knew they had a couple of hours 
before we will even get it back to work. When I checked the damage I knew 
immediately that it was not accidental. Someone deliberately did it! I have seen many 
similar kinds of damage and can tell a genuine one from the one that was ‘helped’. 
Basically if you cut, file or burr the edge; at some point, if untreated it will lead to 
the damage. Also, we had to examine the belt before the shift started, check the belt 
tension was correct, whether it’s not too worn – edges wavy; whether the rivets are 
not loose and so on. One of the engineers would have spotted it and fixed it in no 
time before the real damage would be caused.  And even if there is a fault it takes its 
time before the damage happens. The belt that would burst from natural causes 
wouldn’t have a clean 5 cm cut ... Physics! What did it mean for us? Obviously we 
had to fix it; the line was stalled for another couple of hours, or even whole morning 
shift. It was always very stressful. You can’t rush these things or you don’t do a 
proper job. Sometimes I had to dismantle some of the machines in order to replace 
the belt. Production was getting angry as they were delayed. What is funny, when 
they come up with it [the workers] they did not stop at one time ... There was one 
night when they really ‘took the mickey’ [Polish ‘lecieli w kulki’ – in this context it 
means something between ‘joking’, ‘going too far’ and ‘messing with somebody’]. 
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The belt was cut in several places. I managed to fix one bit and another one was 
going. It really annoyed me then. I had to spend extra hours in the shop floor.  
The same engineer, asked about his attitude to workplace discipline and the obligation to report 
to the management how the damage was caused, quickly replied: 
When at work, my name is Marian Koniuszko! [laugh; (Polish: ‘W pracy nazywam 
się Marian Koniuszko’). He was referring to the popular communist era TV series 
(1986), famously the last work of the director Stanisław Bareja, Zmiennicy (English: 
The Subs). The said Koniuszko character was a perfect archetype of opportunism and 
carelessness. He is a bit spoilt, a bit lazy, and only does the bare minimum he is 
required to; yet despite these flaws he always manages to land on his feet.] 
He went on to add;  
At some point someone must have reported their suspicions to the management 
because one day some chaps came and installed the CCTV. The transmission belts 
‘accidents’ stopped. But in the beginning when the production was very busy, it was 
quite common. 
Another Kessho engineer remembered that the line was also stopped once, because: 
One of the operators tried to be smart [air quotes] and changed the power supply 
settings in the computer. The computer was used to scan the produced modules in 
the system and label printing. There is a little switch on the back of the computer and 
he changed the settings from 220 V to 110 V, what caused the closed circuit, basically 
– burnt the computer, and the line stopped. Bad luck; it was all recorded on the 
CCTV, so they found out who was responsible and he was sacked. [The above 
excerpt is conveyed in translation with as best as possible accuracy in terms of facts; 
however it needs to be explained that when describing the situation, the interviewed 
engineer used Polish expression ‘koleś się zrobił’, which cannot be exactly translated 
into English language. It means that someone was ‘caught at doing something bad or 
illegal’, yet the person was not blamed for what he/she has done, but for the fact that 
was not careful enough to get caught. The researcher’s understanding of what was 
said is that the account expresses some degree of understanding and solidarity with 
the worker in question, even though the interviewee’s attitude towards such 
behaviour is negative in general].     
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The same engineer also mentioned that during one of the routine inspections of the production 
line, he encountered an almost impossible occurrence. His duty was to check the valves and 
service accordingly should they need to be adjusted. On this shift he has done all of them, as 
all seemed too tight. Back home, he received a text message from his colleague, who accused 
him of being lazy and having left all the valves for the next shift. When he explained that he 
had done them all, the other engineer checked the CCTV and it turned out that one of the 
production mechanics went after him and changed the valves back to the initial settings. 
Another account of evident sabotage was given by Matado technician. He explained that:  
There were these safety buttons that stopped the assembly line, EMO [Emergency 
Machine Off]. When for example someone is caught by the machine, or there is an 
accident, pressing it stops the machine. But people were randomly using it to stop the 
machine for non-emergency reasons. Especially during the night shifts. When it was 
too busy, or for a joke, or because they wanted a break. I don’t know. They have been 
doing it in a very smart way and no one was ever caught. Each emergency button has 
a little light indicator as well, so the help would know where to go. But people were 
unscrewing these light bulbs, so even if they pressed the button and stopped the line 
we wouldn’t know which one of them was pressed. Otherwise light would have 
indicated it. And there are dozens of EMOs per each line, so you can imagine it was 
wild-goose chasing. Production had to stop, but there was no one to blame. Fajrant 
[laugh; Polish: ‘fajrant’ means ‘free time’, ‘knocking-off time’].  
Apart from evident sabotage – intended to slow the pace of work or gain workers some free 
time in Matado and Kessho, workers admitted knowing about practices of deliberate 
carelessness when handling the finished products or unloading the delivery. One of the shop 
floor workers at Kessho remembered a couple of occasions when a delegation of workers and 
managers from Efude (a Crystal Park Company contracted by Kessho to produce plastic and 
metal components for LCD television sets) came to examine the delivery after Kessho 
complained about the quality of the received items. He admitted that he felt sorry looking at 
the surprised workers’ faces: 
They were opening boxes with holes and dents in them. Taking the parts out and 
seeing they were broken or scratched or literally in pieces and I knew it’s our 
warehouse to blame for this, not them.  
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Warehouse workers were tossing boxes with finished parts, exposing them to certain damage. 
The boxes were also kicked, pallets transported without due care. The same worker admitted 
that he himself during the delivery unloading observed people ‘dropping’ the boxes by 
‘mistake’. Another form of ‘taking revenge’ was the practice of screen scratching. One of the 
workers in Matado confessed: 
This was normal. Not a big deal. The deserved bonus was not paid and some got 
angry and disappointed. And to get revenge they would scratch the screens or frames 
sometimes before packing tellies in the box, so the company would get a return. They 
are not going to pocket our money. If we are not getting it, they are not getting it 
either. If we are not earning; why should they? Tit-for -tat.  
Many interviewed workers expressed disapproval of such practices; yet at the same time there 
was an understanding for the ‘rebels’. When asked why such practices took place explanations 
varied. Some blamed bad working conditions and mistreatment, some boredom (if someone 
could think of doing things like that it meant that they were not working hard enough); some 
others the repetitive character of work and simple boring tasks: ‘doing this for eight hours 
would turn everyone insane’; lastly, enigmatic ‘Polish mentality’ and ‘it’s not mine, I don’t 
care’ attitude, attributed to communism were also listed as reasons of the above-mentioned 
behaviour. 
  
7.5.2 Sarcasm and workplace humour 
 
Humour was another form of resistance. One of the engineers at Kessho also remembered a 
time, when at the beginning, Japanese managers came, and talked a lot about the necessity of 
waste avoidance and quality, and they became a laughing stock of the entire factory, because: 
There were quite a few Japanese managers at the beginning. I think they must have 
come to the new factory to show their directors back in Japan how devoted they were 
and so on. And sometimes to prove their imaginativeness and how well things were 
going here, they ordered a lot of unnecessary stock. And by a lot I mean like worth 
of PLN100K or 200K. A Japanese manager would place the order, the stock would 
arrive, and as it would not be needed, it would have been transported to the 
199 
 
                   
 
warehouse, and never even see the production line. So every time we heard that the 
warehouse was supposed to be empty and etc. someone would have mentioned ‘Just 
like our exemplary warehouse’. Honestly, some of them had no idea what they were 
doing; and there was more of waste than anything at the beginning.  
Another Japanese policy that was the subject of derision was continuous improvement. As 
revealed in the previous chapter, the kaizen initiative was only superficially introduced in four 
of the case study companies, while in one it was not implemented at all.  
Employees at Honsiu plc were asked to fill kaizen proposal forms, and put it in the special box. 
The response was not impressive. This initiative was largely ignored or even mocked. Many 
forms came back blank or with doodles. One of the workers submitted a form that stated: 
kaizen-shite-zen (Polish: kaizen-srajzen). The manager who emptied the box was not very 
impressed, but unsurprised: 
This couldn’t have worked here. Simple as that. Perhaps we will give it another go, 
but not very soon. 
Meanwhile many workers have introduced some improvements autonomously, without a 
formalized process or reward, mostly to their own benefit. Workers explained that they did not 
see the point of seeking management’s approval of every idea that they found helpful in making 
their job tasks easier, quicker or less stressful. Waiting for an implementation of the approved 
kaizen idea meant that, until the change is introduced, they would have to follow the initial 
procedure which they felt required improvement. Sanoto shop-floor worker explained: 
Now if I want to improve something in the production line, I don’t need the kaizen 
form. I just do it. It’s just much quicker than a kaizen procedure. I was waiting for 
consideration of one of my suggestions for nearly one year. Eventually, when they 
came back to me I forgot I had submitted a kaizen application.  
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7.5.3 Absenteeism 
 
Absenteeism was a common in some of the case study factories, however, this was not 
consistent across all Crystal Park companies. For instance in Matado workers reported not 
wanting to risk losing bonuses for non-absenteeism. As one explained: 
People are afraid to do that. Here, every penny counts. You won’t risk it. I did not 
take a sick leave since I have started here. If you take a sick leave, you would not get 
a permanent position. They will keep extending your three-months or six-months 
contracts. At least, they have given me a proper contract now.  
Also Sanoto and Kessho process engineers confirmed this. They said that, because perfect 
attendance was rewarded with a bonus, everyone was trying their best to receive this extra bit 
of money. One of them recalled however, that: 
Production never had a full team present, someone was always missing. But I don’t 
really know why. I suspect that agency workers were not always very reliable. In our 
department we didn’t want to put too much strain on our colleagues. It’s us, not the 
company, who suffer most when people are missing because we have more work to 
do between less people. 
 
7.5.4 Alternative strategies of collective resistance 
 
Apart from sabotage or coping strategies involving use of humour, sarcasm or rejection of 
culture change efforts (kaizen-ridiculing) workers also engaged in forms of collective 
resistance or misbehaviour. A process engineer at Kessho explained how he and his colleagues 
managed to negotiate both a pay rise and promotions.  
In my department the biggest resistance was present in the beginning. And only then 
we felt we could push the boundaries and get what we wanted. The factory was new, 
most of the people in my department had a degree in engineering, yet our job titles 
stated: ‘production technician’. We knew we were more than technicians, but were 
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happy to have the job and contracts. At some point we found out that in production 
people (with the same or lower education) were ‘production engineers’ and they were 
better paid than us. We were really pissed off [Polish swearword used here]; we got 
together and wrote a letter to our supervisor stating, that if we weren’t promoted and 
given a sufficient pay rise, we would all resign. All for one and one for all [laugh]. 
We knew we couldn’t just give it to him like that. Probably wouldn’t be listened. We 
decided collectively that we were going to wait for the best moment to give him this 
letter. After an extremely busy night shift, when the conveyor belt was cut several 
times, and the production was insanely trying to catch up after hours of stoppage, my 
colleague and I calmly left the letter on the boss’s desk before going home in the 
morning. One or two weeks later each one of us was promoted to junior engineer and 
given a 40 per cent pay rise. But this was the beginning; we wouldn’t be able to pull 
it later. No one would be stopped then. The mood was like ‘If you want to leave, feel 
free and go ahead and bon voyage!’ When the company was growing it was possible 
to win a fight, but after the crisis, not even worth bothering. We all knew that.  
An Ekitai shop-floor worker said that with the knowledge of inevitable redundancies, the 
workers in an adjacent factory came up with a solution to be able to avoid working for two 
months and still get paid. Especially if they knew they were on the ‘redundancy list’, workers 
would seek to obtain a doctor’s note. However, only mental illness guaranteed that the doctor’s 
panel would not be able to verify one’s ability to work. The Ekitai worker, a psychology 
student, remembered advising her friends who worked for the other company, on how to be 
diagnosed with depression:  
This is how I instructed my colleagues how to get a longer sick leave. 
Everybody knew that the best way was the doctor’s note confirming depression. 
Firstly, it’s very difficult to verify, whether one actually is depressed or not. There is 
no doctors’ panel which can prove that. Secondly, it’s relatively longer than a normal 
note, unless you really are very ill. So even if you are fired, you will get one or two 
months of sick leave and your ZUS paid [Polish ‘ZUS’ – in this context means SSP 
– Statutory Sick Pay]. You just have to visit a psychiatrist and answer a standard set 
of questions. That was a common knowledge how to answer these questions. ‘Are 
you feeling depressed? – Yes.’; ‘Do you have suicidal thoughts? – Yes’; ‘Do you 
have problems at work? – No.’; add a few prepared sentences and you are officially 
diagnosed with a depression. As she knew I was studying psychology they came up 
to me for advice on how to simulate depression, so I have given them some extracts 
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from Saligman’s Psychopathology, chapter on endogenous depression to make it 
sound real. 
When more and more workers called in sick, or rather ‘got depressed’, managers panicked. 
They did not know how to stop this ‘endemic depression’. Eventually, they stopped informing 
people whether their contracts would be extended or not. Everyone was finding out on their 
last day whether they are staying or going.  
Another Ekitai shop floor worker said that, just like her, most of her female co-workers were 
employed by the agency. The contracts’ duration varied from very short to one or two years 
long. If a worker got pregnant while employed on a short term contract, she never revealed this 
information until she was in the second trimester of the pregnancy, and the date of contract 
extension was due after the first three months of pregnancy passed. This was very stressful, as 
the most popular form of ‘śmieciówka’ [English: junk contract] in Poland is a one month 
contract. Therefore in such situations there were three occasions for the contract not to be 
extended and the workers were informed whether they are given the next temporary contract 
only one or two days prior to their last working day. If the management found out the worker 
was pregnant her contract was not extended, regardless of her job performance. However, if 
the contract termination date came after third month of pregnancy, it was automatically 
extended until the due day. Therefore, to secure their employment for a slightly longer period 
during the crucial first trimester of pregnancy, many Crystal Park assemblers were working as 
hard as normal, in a very job-intensive environment, with limited toilet breaks. They could not 
share their good news with work colleagues or work at a slower pace and rest accordingly, out 
of fear and not to provoke any suspicion.  
 
7.6 Online discussion boards as platforms of workers’ passive contestation 
 
Internet posting has become a subject of growing interest amongst scholars; with the rise of 
social media and the era of unlimited communication workers gained a new powerful tool in 
their struggle and blogging is seen as a new form of employee resistance (Richards, 2008), 
which, although still underestimated and insufficiently researched, should not be treated as 
separate to traditional forms of employee resistance. 
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Internet-based resistance makes an important contribution to the story of Crystal Park workers. 
In comparison with the data gathered during the in-depth interviews, many critical views, 
especially in terms of working conditions, are predominant on the numerous employees’ 
discussion boards. The reason for this may be fear-related, as during the interviews, especially 
those conducted in the workplace, workers may have been reluctant to talk about negative sides 
of employment. The internet gives anonymity and discretion in this respect. The discussions 
were spontaneous and spread through many sites. Most fruitful proved to be discussion boards 
connected to the main regional newspapers: forum.gazeta.pl/, forum.pomorska.pl/, 
nowosci.com.pl/komentarze/ as well as regional and national internet forums: 
www.skyscrapercity.com/, forum.e-kwidzyn.pl/ and the workplace rating website gowork.pl. It 
has to be stressed that some of these discussion boards are already off-line (2015). For the 
purpose of this research, the sources of this blog sites and real users’ nicknames are concealed.  
Activity on blog sites normally picked up after publications reporting the poor conditions at 
some Crystal Park factories. However, they also are informal advice and discussion boards, 
where workers exchange information, gossip or rate workplaces in terms of wages, company 
welfarism and general workplace conditions. Often those interested in working for Japanese 
companies would test the waters through posting a set of questions on a discussion board to get 
an insider view, before they applied for a job. One of the forums was following and 
documenting the establishment of the site, users were regularly taking and posting pictures of 
building works updates, as well as discussing the political and economic impacts on the region. 
The forum’s lifespan starts from the moment when gossip about Japanese investment in Toruń 
had spread across the city, up to the delivery of sad news and reporting of the subsequent 
withdrawals of Japanese investors from the site. The initial excitement was replaced by 
frustration, criticism and a feeling of betrayal. There may be a hidden sarcasm in a quote from 
Orwell’s Animal Farm here, as many threads reveal disapproval of Polish state policy towards 
foreign investment in general. The posts argue that the regulations are too flexible, taxes too 
low and the investors only become interested to take advantage of the state’s help and cheap 
workers but once the state’s help is no longer available, there is plenty of cheap workforce 
elsewhere.  
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(...) There are always the equal and more equal. (...) Nobody cares about us in 
Warsaw. (...) No more tax breaks, and the firm will move their business elsewhere 
(...)  
[WB1] 
Another blog makes a similar point; 
In 2013 the property tax breaks and investment subsidies /around PLN 30MIL/ and 
all other subsidies will end and the firms are running away. Polish local government 
is falling for foreign investment, for us it’s always pig in a poke [Polish: wyjść jak 
Zabłocki na mydle; untranslatable idiom, in a nutshell meaning the ‘lost investment’ 
or ‘profitless investement’], without government’s help Poland is simply unprofitable 
for them anymore, and under the guise of crisis they can feed our naive politicians 
any lies they want to.   
[WB2] 
Working conditions at the site were also being reported constantly. In some cases discussion 
was a cry for ‘justice’ from desperate and frustrated workers, other times those reports appeared 
as an answer to enquiries of prospective Crystal Park employees. Those who could find 
employment elsewhere are advised to do so.  
Adduced below are just two of the examples illustrating workers’ frustration: 
Enough is enough. No more slavery. No more indignity and humiliation. We are 
forced by these thieves to work twelve hour shifts and Saturdays. 980PLN per month! 
Where is the Labour Inspectorate?!  
[WB3] 
We are humans. We are not robots. Sometimes I am working for two. The assembly 
line is ‘overclocked’. 1,400 sets per shift. Unbearable heat, no air-con. What kind of 
place is this? 
[WB4] 
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The bleak and gloomy picture emerges. It is not as much of a deterrent to jobseekers as rather 
an account of workers’ helplessness. Often vulgar, full of irony and cynicism the blog sites 
become a mean of silent protest to many workers.  
Several discursive patterns emerge from the contributions to the blog. Crystal Park firms are 
often compared to concentration camps, kolkhozes or third world sweat shops. Equally often 
workers are seeing themselves as ‘slaves’ or ‘robots’. Agency work is ridiculed and workers 
employed in such manner compared to ‘cheap prostitutes’ whose pimps (the agency) are taking 
the lion’s share of their hard-earned pay. In one of the accounts the factory was called as hot 
and cramped as a ‘tin of sardines’. 
Hi, I work for Matado and it’s true they are paying peanuts and treat people like s***, 
especially those higher up, uni grads, don’t know how to behave. I don’t recommend 
working there. I’ve worked there for a long time so I know how rubbish it is. They 
give you a ‘warning’ for silly things, often with no grounds but if you won’t sign it, 
you will be hauled on the carpet. I won’t even mention the sanitation standards (...) I 
would like to come back to the bullying issue. It is true that it happens constantly. 
There is no day without something going on. Workers are treated like concentration 
camps’ inmates. It is horrific that in the 21st century employees are still being treated 
this way. We are not some third world country. Help! 
[WB5] 
Another account was even more explicit in reference to concentration camp, the internet user 
compared Kessho to Auschwitz-Birkenau: 
Kessho is a big pile of sh***. The sign from Auschwitz [Arbeit Macht Frei sign was 
stolen from Auschwitz in December 2009 to be sold to a private collector, and was 
retrieved thanks to the cooperation of Polish police and Interpol and restored in the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum], was stolen to be hung over Kessho’s main gate. It’s 
getting worse every month; agency workers are being intimidated, that if they don’t 
stay for twelve hours’ shift, they won’t be employed directly through the company. 
Warehouse workers are getting warnings for everything, even for too much stock and 
not enough space. If you complain - warning (...) Production flow is most important 
for them. To them we are nothing more the the black slaves were to cotton 
plantations, who should work twelve hour shifts and Saturdays. The forewoman 
punishes everyone who won’t stay for twelve hours shifts. Two people’s job is often 
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done by one, like carrying 40 to 52-inches televisions (...) And the one-month 
contracts. They are having a laugh. 
[WB6] 
Beneath the thread the author wrote: ‘Auschwitz-Birkenau –Arbeit Macht Frei’ and pasted the 
original logo of the Japanese company (see Appendix 4).  
WB7 wrote: 
(...) I am just about to start another late 12 hours shift until 2 am ... overtime is 
compulsory because apparently the firm is in crisis ... I can’t see this crisis anywhere. 
I have been there for 10 months now and I have 3 written warnings already ... because 
I don’t agree for some of their whims. I am not a robot. I have recently received a 
warning because I took my phone out of my pocket to check the time. This place can 
be described in two words: Auschwitz Birkenau! 
Another account discourages from working at Matado in a sarcastic tone, comparing 
low wages to slavery: 
Go to Matado then, you are going to find out how superb it is there. You slave away 
for 970-1000 zloty [approx. €239 or £177] and no more. Count in bullying, horrid 
bitches there. I have worked there for a short period of time and had enough. I don’t 
recommend it to anyone. 
[WB8] 
Kessho is not work, it is SLAVERY. Money is rubbish and lots of injustice there. 
[WB9] 
DO NOT COME AND WORK HERE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Do not copy our mistakes. 
Regards from the slave. 
[WB10] 
Working conditions in Crystal Park are compared to:  
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Butchery – People, do not go and work there – the monotony of doing the same thing 
for 8 hours – standing all the time – wage about 7.25 before tax – this money is a 
joke, but what’s the most important – with your nose put to the f****** grindstone 
all the time. There is one good thing though, weekend overtime pay. 
[WB11] 
In another post, a person interested in working for Kessho, is asking whether the gossips about 
the firm’s bad reputation and appalling work and pay conditions are true. 
Is it true that Kessho is such a bad place to work at? Apparently they are cheating on 
wages and a lot of people have resigned. I’ve heard that people were getting as little 
as 500 PLN in some cases. I have also heard that they do not care about those 
resignations as they want to bring their own people on board.  
[WB12] 
The answer given is not very optimistic: 
Regarding Kessho, this is a just one big labour camp! This is a slavery, there is no 
time to yawn, you work constantly for eight hours, with just one break (25 minutes, 
this a laugh), you are being admonished, you are late just a few seconds, there is a 
heat, people are fainting. There is no way to get a glass of water, without Japanese 
managers and the rest of Polish foreman screaming at you. 
[WB13] 
Temporary contracts and work offered by the agency are also being discussed. According to 
most of the board’s users the ‘junk contracts’ are ‘a joke’. One of the users compared agency 
work and pay arrangements to cheap prostitution. And called the practice of flexible 
employment ‘disgusting’.  
Half of the workers are pimped away by the agency .... Disgusting! [Untranslatable 
pun comparing agency workers to cheap prostitutes, as word ‘agencja’ in Polish may 
refer to both – employment agency and an ‘escort’ agency]  
[WB14] 
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This martyrological narrative is present in almost every chat. Holocaust, slavery and 
exploitation rhetoric, however, is not directed at Japanese practices and culture. Rather, the 
employees are angry with their immediate superiors, team leaders and Polish management. 
These negative opinions are however juxtaposed with the ‘new-order’ guardians, attacking 
every such complaint with a neoliberal mindset. The latter argue that ‘the times of money for 
nothing’ have gone with the fall of communism. ‘Those who don’t want to work, won’t work.’ 
says ‘WB15’. Another account states: 
Who doesn’t want to work, won’t earn a lot. People should start working properly 
instead of being off sick or on holiday. As if they took a night shift or overtime they 
would get overworked.  
[WB16] 
A difficult situation on the job market is blamed for the bullying and poor conditions; 
The unemployment is high, so the employer is exploiting employees as much as 
possible. Who doesn’t like it is free to go. Go ahead and resign! 10 others are queuing 
for your job already. So the workers are grinding their teeth, biting their tongues and 
looking down when being bullied and get on working without a word, so they 
wouldn’t lose their jobs. How would they buy food for their kids when sacked, and 
unable to find another with this unemployment!? LIFE SUCKS NOWADAYS! 
[WB17] 
Some of the workers talk about their recalcitrance openly and with a certain degree of pride. 
They see themselves as tough and individualistic and immune to workplace disciplinary 
policies. 
While workers at Ekitai were forced to work throughout the Easter Holiday, and their holiday 
forms were refused, many of them used ‘a day-off on demand’ right, with the provisions of 
The Polish Labour Code (1974). Possible consequences were considered of less importance 
confronted with the satisfaction from resistance and being able to outsmart management. Not 
without sarcastic remarks, ‘WB18’ wrote: 
(...) [our manager] decided to integrate us in keeping with Japanese rule that work 
integrates best and refused us all holiday requests for Easter. During my Easter 
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confession I sadly had to tell my confessor that I was sinful and not ready to accept 
all these good things our Manager and Board of Directors graced us with, and instead 
of integrating at work I have handed in a day off on demand form, along with almost 
all my work colleagues. I bet the production was not very efficient throughout the 
festive period. What I am trying to say is that our manager must have forgotten the 
tit for tat rule. You don’t play fair; you shouldn’t have changed the rules in the middle 
of the game. You will probably have hearing for that, but I bet that you won’t be able 
to do anything to US. You can’t sack us, not having enough people anyway. You 
should just try to work in a better atmosphere at work and a better opinion for Ekitai.  
Workers often mention job hunting and resigning. It is important to note that due to high 
unemployment and the structure of the job market in the region, the practice of quitting might 
be the last resort in terms of workers’ resistance. Talking about it however might just be the 
vent eluded by Richards (2008). As the below example illustrates: 
The most humiliating of all things there is to have to ask the team leader’s permission 
to go to toilet. This is beyond human dignity. On the top of that you are going to get 
this look, like a toilet break was something abnormal. The team leader’s opinion is 
taken into account when the pay rises are decided. The rises were supposed to be 
equal for everyone, if they will even be granted. Where are the promised bonuses? 
I’m sure I won’t get one because I don’t lick the team leader’s boots as some people 
do. Regarding the holidays, there is a problem with that, too. You will get your time 
off in July and if you need to take holiday after – no one cares. I am also looking for 
another job :/ but it’s not easy to find anything and it’s probably the only reason why 
I still work here :/ as soon as I find something I will say bye byes to Ekitai. Do not 
make the same mistake :/ (...) 
[WB19] 
Equally often workers ‘name and shame’ the ‘capos’ as they sometimes refer to their foremen 
and team leaders. One of the commentators (Kessho worker) promises to write regular weekly 
threads (Titled: The History of Slavery at Kessho) and encourages the exchange of 
information and whistle blowing. She wants all the bad practice in her firm to be exposed and 
is critical that the press is not interested in Crystal Park any more. Finally, the blogger 
wonders what kind of character it takes to be a bully team leader at Kessho. Comparing the 
foremen to ‘herding dogs’ and providing various accounts of workers mistreatment, the post 
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concludes with a  cynical critique of overtime policies suggesting that it is an exciting option 
for ‘slaves’ and the difference in pay is so insignificant that it simply is not worth it. 
An eight-hour working day in this sweatshop is exhausting enough, not to mention 
the twelve-hour one. And to a slave, extra PLN 200 on the top of the peanuts is just 
not that significant, it is not making any difference to have it or not. With this extra 
200 a month my family will not buy a new car, pay a mortgage or go for an exotic 
holiday. We will not even be able to buy one of the tellies I make. 
[WB20] 
Not only blog sites show employees’ resistance. Other internet resources also come to rescue. 
One of the Crystal Parks firms’ Facebook profile does not enjoy popularity, with less than a 
hundred ‘likes’. One of the workers posted following comment on the main wall: 
Whoever ‘likes’ [here the name of the firm] must be f***** insane. [WB21] 
Also a popular meme38 was created, which the forum users were reposting. In this case it was 
a picture of a man who ‘knows it all’. The main message is that, the person in the picture knows 
very well what they are talking about based on a certain experience. In case of the Crystal Park 
firm in question it explained: 
I worked at [company name] so I know what a concentration camp is, b****! 39 
By sharing similar experiences, internet users can relate to the medium (here picture) and, as in 
the case of Crystal Par workers, find it humorous, however an adequate description of their own 
situation.  
Based on above accounts, which are only a representative sample of the contributions available, 
it is possible to distinguish the main purposes that posting about work in the cyber space may 
serve.  
                                                          
38 ‘Memes’ in the context of internet are activities, concepts, catchphrases or pieces of media which spread, 
often as mimicry, from person to person via the Internet. The term was first coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins, 
as an example of replicator, information copied in evolutionary process. Examples are habits, skills, stories, or 
games passed on by imitation (see Kariko, 2013). Internet meme is based on a presumption that shared 
understandings will spread within the internet and will be replicated.  
39 Meme available at http://memy.pl/mem_167432_pracowalem_w_sharpie (last accessed in February, 2014) 
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Firstly, they are used to raise awareness outside the workplace – in this respect – they are almost 
chroniclers and have a role similar to journalistic investigations. Secondly, those working at 
the site are receiving the words of encouragement from other commentators – not working at 
the site, but interested in the subject or involved. Symbolic workers’ unity outside the 
workplace is getting its foundations through this solidarity. Additionally the attitude towards 
redundancies is shown. Also in the ‘naming and shaming’ parts of the discussions managers 
are rated, often first names are used, malpractice accounts are brought up. Workers express 
hope that the directors would read the content of the blog and react to it by dismissing the bullies. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter focused on the workers’ experience of Japanese investors in Crystal Park. The first 
sections discuss the working conditions. The subsequent parts analyse the various forms of 
resistance found in Crystal park companies. 
Interviews and working blog accounts confirmed that Crystal Park employees were exposed to 
a shattering rhythm of work. This was the case especially in the two biggest manufacturers, 
Matado and Kessho. This harsh regime and monitoring was not generally associated with the 
‘Japanese style’, as the presence of the Japanese management on the shop floor was minimal, 
and mainly during the start-up phase. Additionally employees experienced cases of bullying 
and intimidation. Both poor working conditions and bullying were reported and investigated 
by the National Labour Inspectorate (PIP). Furthermore, as it was outlined in Chapter Six, 
employment in Crystal Park was characterized by instability and extreme flexibility. Workers’ 
reaction was twofold; firstly, they organized themselves in trade unions (which was the case of 
two companies); secondly, they responded collectively, but through less formal, alternative 
forms of resistance. 
Trade unions were operating at the site but only in two companies - Matado and Kessho. 
Matado constitutes an interesting case in terms of union development. Matado’s management 
tried to impose on workers a passive way of organizing by proposing an ‘independent union’, 
rather than affiliation with national confederations (this could be regarded as some variation of 
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Japanese ‘enterprise unionism’). Workers were even discouraged from joining established 
national unions, as management argued that the workers would not have any real power and 
the high membership fees would be wasted on supporting lazy Solidarność bureaucrats, who 
from their ‘cosy seats’ in Warsaw, did not appreciate real problems and did not care about 
anyone but themselves. The management’s ‘offer’ was rejected by Matado employees, who 
established a Solidarność branch. Moreover, this trade union organization very quickly 
attracted one-third of the Matado’s employees. Even though both organizations in Kessho and 
Matado failed to protect their employees against lay-offs, it showed that Polish trade unions 
have not disappeared from the private sector and they are still able to attract new members. 
This is in line with a body of work that points to signs of trade union revitalization in Poland 
(see Mrozowicki and Maciejewska, 2013; Mrozowicki, 2011; Hardy and Kozek, 2011; 
Mrozowicki et al., 2008; Meardi, 2007).  
This small union density rate did not, however, diminish workers’ collectivism. Workers in 
Crystal Park organized their disapproval of ‘management style’ and job insecurity through 
alternative forms of resistance. Some workers did not hesitate to use the acts of sabotage as a 
form of resistance, while others turned to absenteeism or sarcasm and humour. Furthermore, 
dozens of workers focused their discontent online and numerous workers’ discussion boards 
raised awareness about conditions in the factories outside the workplace. This chapter points 
to the importance and the potential of the new communication technologies (blogging) for 
workers’ resistance.  
This chapter argued that the resistance should not be associated solely with union activity. 
Crystal Park is an example of a low unionized environment, where employees found alternative 
forms of organizing. There is strong evidence in support of the collective character of workers’ 
resistance in the case study factories. Generally, in what they considered ‘crucial matters’ 
employees resisted as a group – when the physical conditions in the factory were unbearable 
or when the wages had not come through on time they had all stopped working without a second 
thought. Another time, a group of women, whose team leader would not accept any holiday 
requests before Easter, did not turn up at work after previously agreeing that they would all call 
and request a ‘day off on demand’ (as per provisions of The Polish Labour Code). There are, 
however, other more subtle manifestations of collective resistance present, even in individual 
acts of resistance. Sabotage (cases of destroying TV sets, or deliberate damage to a 
transmission belt) was never reported and as no workers responsible for the damage were ever 
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found and punished, management installed a CCTV. The form and extent of resistance in the 
case study firms demonstrated that even if unions are weak or absent, resistance will emerge.  
Stephenson and Stewart (2001) suggest ‘going beyond the factory gate’ through a broader 
approach to workers’ resistance and collectivism itself. Linking the internal world of new 
production regimes and the wider social domain of which they are a part. They distinguish 
three forms of collectivism: trade union collectivism, workplace collectivism and the 
collectivism of everyday life (ibid). Subsequently, in the case of Crystal Park companies, 
workers’ collectivism is not confined to trade unionism, it has also taken another form – the 
solidarity and sense of common identity observed on the workers’ discussion boards is very 
inspiring. Online blogging was not only a ‘metaphorical punch bag’, which allowed workers 
to ‘let the steam off’ (Richards 2008: 102), but also provided a platform through which workers 
could connect with each other. Importantly, the blogs reached employees across the whole 
cluster of firms. Thanks to these online initiatives, workers (but also members of the public, to 
include prospective employees or applicants) were well informed about the shop-floor 
conditions, pay system and management in each one of the Crystal Park companies. Moreover, 
workers’ activity online suggests the existence of collective identity. The discourse of division 
‘us’ (workers) and ‘them’ (managers and directors) was common in workers’ online 
discussions. 
The working conditions at Crystal Park do not diverge drastically from those that are 
predominant in the private sector in Poland. Irregularities and breaches of employment law 
were investigated by the National Labour Inspectorate. The harsh economic situation (the threat 
of being unemployed) was advantageous for the employers and allowed an authoritarian style 
of management. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, workers collectively resisted the 
rule of capital in a variety of forms, from the traditional (unionism) to the more subtle and 
unconventional (sabotage, absenteeism, internet-based resistance).    
The next chapter will outline the overall conclusions of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reflects on the research questions of the thesis and presents the final conclusions. 
It builds around the following themes; firstly, the notion of Japanisation in relation to lean 
production and the problem of transferring what are regarded as typical Japanese practices to 
foreign subsidiaries is reviewed with special attention paid to the examples of the case study 
companies of Crystal Park site. Secondly, the focus moves to the workplace itself, as the nature 
of workers’ responses to Japanese management practices is discussed. This passage 
concentrates on the collective and individual aspects of the resistance and considers the 
relationship between these two approaches. This thesis argues that the labour process and 
workplace resistance have not been completely individualised and that the collective worker, 
even when union activity is restricted or limited, is still present and so is workplace resistance. 
In the context of the ongoing debate on the post-transformation variety of capitalism in Poland, 
thirdly, this chapter reflects on the relevance of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature. In 
particular it examines Polish capitalism and modes of industrial relations which influence the 
workplace and workers. The last sections of this chapter outline the limitations of this study 
and contribution to knowledge. 
 
8.2 Japanisation  
 
8.2.1 Japanisation and lean production 
The remarkable success of Japanese corporations in the 1970s and 1980s appealed to the 
Western world. The way that Japanese companies were organized was considered to be 
superior to European or American firms. It was asserted that Japanese methods of production 
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and management were a new alternative to obsolete forms of Fordism (the so called ‘crisis of 
Fordism’). Additionally, growing competition after the crisis of the early 1970s pushed 
Western companies towards the Japanese management paradigm. Flexible production systems 
attributed to Toyota became the benchmark, not only for the automotive industry, but it was 
considered that adequately emulated labour productivity and the quality of products could be 
increased across a range of sectors. Consequently scholars started gauging the extent of 
Japanisation in the Western economies (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988). Moreover, as Stewart 
(1998) observes, it was assumed that convergence would take place and the Western industrial 
world would be ‘Japanized’. This notion corresponded with the propagated globalisation thesis 
of the time, as knowledge about management techniques was purported to spread across 
national boundaries. The principles of Japanisation were endorsed by the governments 
pursuing a reduced role for the state agenda, for example elements of Japanese industrial 
relations (no strike deals or enterprise unionism) were much admired by Thatcher’s 
government in the United Kingdom (Turnbull, 1986).  
However defining the concept of Japanisation remained problematic or even ‘chaotic’ (Dickens 
and Savage, 1988). The scale of Japanese investment - direct Japanisation following the 
typology of Ackroyd et al. (1988) in Western Europe, and especially in the UK was 
overemphasized (Procter and Ackroyd, 1998; Stewart, 1998). This was also the case in Poland, 
where Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in fact constitutes only a small fraction of the total 
inward investment. Japanese investment has tended to be concentrated in particular industries 
(mainly automotive and consumer electronics) and to locate in certain areas, particularly 
depressed regions, with a high unemployment rate. Further, in the case of Poland the 
government provided support for businesses in Special Economic Zones. This has given 
Japanese investment ‘visibility far out of proportion to its actual scale’ (Procter and Ackroyd, 
1998: 241). Significantly, only Japanese investment is labelled in terms of its cultural 
background and the term ‘Japanisation’ is used (or even over-read) in this context, while other 
FDI – greater or similar in terms of volume – for example Dutch, British or French – are not 
seen as leading to respectively Dutchisation, Britishisation or Franconisation.  
There is a problem with identifying production practices as ‘truly Japanese’. The origins of the 
flagship Toyota Production System can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s in the American 
factories of General Motors and Ford (Coffey, 2006). Williams et al. (1992) argued that 
organization of production at the Ford factory in Highland Park was actually ‘proto-Japanese’. 
‘Just-In-Time’ serves as an exemplar of another misinterpretation, as it was wrongly accredited 
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to the uniqueness of Japanese culture; while it was in fact developed during post-Meiji 
capitalistic transformation and under substantial American influence (Ikuko, 1999). 
Nevertheless the ‘Japanisation’ paradigm had faded in profile by the early 1990s. The Japanese 
economy entered an era of stagnation and so-called ‘Japanese success’ was far less convincing, 
with conflicting images of hyper-efficient production on one side and a bubble economy on the 
other. Even proponents of the concept recognized that the full scale transfer of Japanese 
management was unrealistic, because typical Japanese practices are embedded in the unique 
socio-economic system which cannot be reproduced in Europe or America. The nomenclatural 
aspect became an impediment for introducing flexible methods of production, as ‘Japanese’ 
was no longer explicitly associated with success. Therefore in some respects Japanisation 
paved the way for the lean production; in other words, Japanisation significantly marked the 
early phase of the lean production (Stewart et al., 2009). The philosophy of lean production 
fully emerged with the popular book The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al., 
1990). The key argument that the authors presented was that lean production could have been 
implemented anywhere, despite its allegedly Japanese roots, it did not require the Japanese 
cultural environment to be embedded. At the beginning of the 1990s, just as the free market 
economy was considered the only alternative for democratic societies (Fukuyama, 1989), lean 
production was seen as the best way of organizing efficient and cost-effective production. The 
reality of lean was, however, different from that described in The Machine That Changed the 
World. The role model of the lean production or the ‘leanest producer’ – Toyota ‘was a far cry 
from introducing it by the early 1990s’ (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1996: 6) and the apparent 
superiority of ‘lean’ in terms of production was questioned (Coffey and Thorneley, 2006). 
Neither did lean production bring worker empowerment and job satisfaction. Rather, 
Japanisation and lean production were responses to specific crises in the capitalist world; in 
particular the falling competitiveness of Western firms, and the industrial downturn in Japan 
and Japanese plants all over the world (Coffey and Thorneley, 2006). Both pioneered neoliberal 
polices at the shop-floor level. 
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8.2.2 Japanisation in Crystal Park 
 
The Polish workplace is no exception to this rule, as the post-transformation neoliberal agenda 
has brought a new capitalist regime and a new model of workplace relations. In Poland, a 
dogmatic understanding of ‘laissez-faire’ economic liberalism has become a dominant tenet. 
After decades of a ‘command economy’ Poland has shown a neophyte commitment to the free 
market economy as the only alternative model of socio-political organisation. The triumph of 
neoliberalism in Poland is attributed to the fact that it was seen as ‘an exact opposite of the 
“communist” poverty and oppression’ (Sowa, 2012: 178). Similarly, individualistic pressures 
and the cult of the ‘self-made man’ started influencing the workplace, the power of capital at 
the expense of labour and job insecurity being the main characteristic feature of workplace 
relations in Poland. 
In general the findings of this thesis support Paul Stewart’s conclusion that;  
(...) lean production is a managerial agenda for restructuring in the face of declining 
profitability. As such it can be seen as creating a range of organisational and 
ideological resources for subordinating opposition to the rule of capital.  
(Stewart et al., 2009: 9) 
This thesis argues that in the Polish context, particularly in the case of the Japanese firms 
researched, the rule of capital, embodied in the competitive electronics industry, was to invest 
in deprived areas, with a high unemployment rate and to rely on cheap, unskilled labour. The 
potential for taking advantage of attractive state policies regarding FDI (tax breaks and 
government subsidies) was also of significant importance. In essence, Japanese capital was 
solely interested in extracting surplus value, in contrary to the assertion of the transfer of 
technology and creation of long-term and stable employment.  
In the case of Crystal Park, from the workers’ perspective, the style of management was 
attributed exclusively to the Polish managers and rarely associated with the ‘Japanese regime’ 
or ‘lean management’. Apart from the start-up period, the presence of Japanese managers was 
minimal and the initiative was left to the Polish managers. It is also important to note the 
existence of ‘variegated Japanisation’ in the case study firms embracing different levels and 
forms of Japanese management and production techniques. The logistics company - Honsiu 
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Plc failed to introduce typical Japanese managerial methods at all and the introduction of kaizen 
in Honsiu proved to be infamously unsuccessful. Managers openly stressed that the firm needed 
to follow the European rather than Japanese model. Over the years Honsiu managed to attract 
more business from the non-Japanese companies located in the region and in the country. In 
fact Honsiu was one of the first companies located in the Crystal Park which started cooperating 
with Polish and European companies. Management was given carte blanche; Japanese 
headquarters did not directly impose the Japanese style. Manufacturers (Sanoto and Ekitai), 
however, did try to organize production in the ‘Japanese way’. These two companies 
implemented for example typical Japanese housekeeping practices and some of the quality 
policies. Both of them organized formalized training, including three months induction in Japan 
for senior engineers. The largest manufacturers in Crystal Park - Kessho and Matado - can be 
placed in the middle of the ‘Japanisation scale’, perfunctorily applying only some of the 
associated managerial methods. With some difficulties Kessho and Matado introduced several 
quality policies. At the same time, it was Kessho, the biggest employer within the cluster, that 
had represented the extreme case of numerical flexibility and precarious employment. Workers 
were hired on two week or monthly contracts. This policy hindered the transfer of the Japanese 
(in a traditional sense) methods, as short-term and agency employment had led to workers’ low 
attachment. Moreover, enforced by companies’ employment policies, high turnover and ‘lean’ 
(very brief, on-the-job) training did not create a ‘Japanised’ employee. The awaited, textbook- 
style ‘Japanisation’ (with its emphasis on quality) of the Polish workplace was also 
compromised by an emphasis on the scale and quantity of production: this was most evident in 
the assembly factories – Matado and Kessho.   
Generally, there was no intention to fully transplant Japanese practices into the Polish 
workplaces. Chapter Six argued that a peripheral model of Japanese management was adopted 
across Crystal Park’s companies with Polish managers successfully imposing ‘soft’ quality 
assurance policies, but at the same time ‘hard’ quality policies were introduced only 
superficially. Kaizen initiatives, if not rejected by Polish managers, had to be adapted to the 
Polish environment as workers needed to be incentivized with small financial bonuses and 
rewards. After some time, kaizen ‘died from natural causes’, and managers lost interest in 
introducing this Japanese flagship method. 
The Japanisation phenomenon in Poland has been mostly analysed from a managerial 
perspective, predominantly focusing on model-based applications of ultra-efficient Japanese 
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methods (Krasiński, 2014). The contribution of this study is firstly to challenge the notion of a 
simple transfer of management practises and secondly, to reassert the way that the workplaces 
are indeed the terrains contested in a variety of individual and collective ways. 
In the case of the researched factories, labour subordination was not entirely enforced by the 
principles of just-in-time or lean manufacturing and pressure on quality (Garrahan and Stewart, 
1992; Delbridge, 1995), but rather by extreme flexibility and job insecurity. The intensification 
of work played a more significant role than quality and waste management in Japanese factories 
in Poland. Surveillance policies were also present: however not through team work or ‘check 
your neighbour’ policies, but directly through the management control (including the CCTV), 
and significant impact on output – which can suggest that the Japanese investors’ concern was 
with the productivity expressed in the scale of production, rather than ‘transplanting’ the  
Japanese methods or ‘work culture’.  Interviewees confirmed that on many occasions quality 
was compromised in order to meet the daily rate of output. In short - the Polish macroeconomic 
context (high unemployment rate) facilitated the control of labour and its subordination. To 
express it in the Marxist terms - Poland’s ‘reserve army of labour’ helped capital to maintain 
workforce control without resorting to the sophisticated ‘machinery’ of managerial discipline 
and surveillance, which was indeed present, but to a smaller extent. Drawing on the concept of 
‘management by stress’ (Parker and Slaughter, 1990), in case of Crystal Park the overall 
practice could rather be named ‘management by workers’ desperation’. 
The nature of this contestation is problematic on many levels. Therefore it is necessary to 
explore the issues of control and resistance of workers in the context of the labour process. 
 
8.3 The labour process and control and resistance of workers 
 
The specificity of Japanese methods of production requires refined management control and 
surveillance (Wilkinson et al, 1995; Delbridge and Turnbull, 1992). Insufficient attention has 
however been paid to this facet of the labour process by the proponents of the Japanisation and 
lean production paradigm who have argued that this new type of organization will end the 
conflict between labour and capital (inter alia Womack et al., 1990). Similarly it was argued 
that Japanisation was equally beneficial for both employers and employees. However, conflict 
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did not disappear and there is evidence that workers oppose the ‘empowering’ Japanese 
methods (Stewart et al., 2009; Palmer, 1996). Capitalism constantly provides structural 
conditions for the emergence of workers’ resistance and organisation (Atzeni, 2014), when 
exploitation in the form of extracting value is implicit.  Hence, the issue of resistance holds a 
salient place in contemporary labour process theory (see Bacon and Storey, 1993, 1995; 
Martinez Lucio and Stewart, 1997; Stewart, 2006). In the context of this research, special focus 
is placed on the following aspects of the resistance debate. Firstly, the nature of resistance, 
workers’ self-organisation and representation requires attention. Secondly, the relationship 
between collectivism and individualism in the context of workers’ resistance is explored, both 
conceptually and operationally. Thirdly, special attention should be paid to the Polish 
workplace and its distinctiveness in terms of workers’ and managers’ agency and resistance to 
the imposed practices. 
 
8.3.1 The demise of the collective worker? 
 
Since the 1980s there has been a growing confidence in the assumption that collective labour 
and class based workers’ agency is a relic of the past (Silver, 2014). With the growth of global 
capitalism the notion of increasing individualism and decreasing collectivism has been widely 
stressed (inter alia Lash and Urry, 1997; Knights and Wilmott, 1990; Giddens, 1990; Bauman, 
2001; Beck, 2000; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), in both a more general and specific 
workplace relations context. In the narrow sense individualisation is concerned with the 
production process, in the broader perspective individualisation has to be understood in the 
context of the modern society (Madsen, 1997). Both meanings are interrelated and identifying 
the difference between collectivism and individualism constitutes a conceptual problem 
(Healey and Calveley, 2001). Moreover, the relationship between individualism and 
collectivism is ambiguous. Some researchers claim that there is a decline in workplace 
collectivism and that the emerging new management strategies are reshaping the employment 
relationship in terms of individualism and collectivism (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995; Bacon 
and Storey 1995). Bacon and Storey (ibid) see the fracturing of collectivism as an inevitable 
change, but also a threat and challenge to trade unionism; at the same time they identify 
collective representation and individual rights combined as the future trend and suggest that 
there is a ‘strong possibility that employees could display dual commitment to both the union 
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and the company’ (ibid: 72). While there has been much emphasis put on the management as 
a dynamic and active agent in the labour process, the agency of workers should not be 
underestimated.  
This notion of collectivism without the ‘collective worker’ is disputed by Martinez Lucio and 
Stewart (1997), who argue that the mainstream understanding of collectivism (and the 
relationship between the notions of collectivism and individualism) is simplistic, or as they put 
it ‘stereotypical’ (ibid: 59), as it fails to address political and social dimensions as well as 
contextual complexity of conflict in the labour process. While the scale of direct collective 
action such as strikes has drastically fallen in industrial economies in recent years (Joyce, 
2015), the decline of union membership does not lead to the demise (or fracturing) of 
collectivism as was suggested by Bacon and Storey (1995). In the British context Japanese 
firms are considered ‘a prime example of combining weak collectivised industrial relations 
with ‘collectivised’ work organisation and individualistic personnel practices’ (Martinez Lucio 
and Stewart, 1997: 66). The emergence of neoliberal politics and economic globalisation have 
influenced management’s approach to workers. Yet there is a contradiction in that at the same 
time the necessity for team work or kaizen can only be successful when the collective of 
workers cooperate. Thus, following the Marxist definition, Martinez Lucio and Stewart argue 
that the process of capitalist production is always collective, as it is undertaken by a ‘collective 
labourer’. While the issue of individualistic and collective responses to conflict are widely 
explored in contemporary debate, few academic contributions have focused on the issue of 
collectivism in the context of restricted trade union behaviour (Stephenson and Stewart, 2001). 
With UK based Japanese factories as an example, Stephenson and Stewart’s (2001) study 
demonstrates a plethora of different manifestations of collectivism - both in and outside the 
labour process. They argue that conflict is no longer the only conceptual lens to determine 
presence or absence of collectivism in the workplace and a broader definition is needed. Three 
patterns of collectivism are thus identified: 'trade union collectivism'; 'work place collectivism' 
and the 'social collectivism of everyday life' (see ibid). The typology suggested by Stephenson 
and Stewart is applicable in the case study Polish workplaces. While it is difficult to distinguish 
purely collective or individual forms of workers resistance, there is evidence of the presence 
of collectivist inclinations among workers and thus the existence of collective co-operation and 
inter-worker solidarity.  
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Following Stephenson and Stewart’s typology (2001) examples of trade union organisation, 
work place collectivism and the social collectivism of everyday life, discussed in Chapter 
Seven, are explored further in the next section. 
 
8.3.2 Workers’ resistance and ‘collectivism’ at Crystal Park 
 
First, examples of trade union collectivism appeared in a few of the case study companies. In 
the biggest plant at the site – Kessho – a trade union was established almost immediately after 
production started (2007) and that operated at the site until 2013. Trade unionists were recruited 
from relatively young employees, not associating Solidarność with a political movement, but 
strictly with the workers’ organization. In the Matado Plant (the second biggest factory) a trade 
union was established in 2011 and for a short period of time managed to attract approximately 
30 per cent of its workforce, while Kessho’s union density was only 10 per cent. However, 
considering Polish legislation, these numbers are quite significant. According to the Polish 
Trade Union Act (1991) employees on temporary contracts were not permitted to join the trade 
union at their company (this was changed in June 2015 by the jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of the Republic of Poland). Around 50 per cent of Kessho workforce was employed 
on ‘junk contracts’ through an employment agency and therefore, effectively unable to join the 
trade union. During the time of their operation trade unions were taking part in pay 
negotiations, actively engaged in a protest against mass lay-offs and organised additional health 
and safety training and English lessons so the workers could communicate better with the 
Japanese managers and co-workers. Members of Solidarność had knowledge of working 
conditions and pay in different electronic manufacturers at the site. Moreover, Crystal Park 
trade unionists took part in nationwide protests and demonstrations and collaborated with other 
trade unionists in the electronics sector across Poland.  There was no direct action during that 
period; however trade unionists, joined by non-unionised shop floor workers, led a stoppage at 
one of the plants, when working conditions became unbearable. The latter example confirms 
Stephenson and Stewart’s (2001) claim that even if workers fail to involve themselves in trade 
union collectivism, they still display collectivist attitudes towards their colleagues and the 
workplace.  
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Second, not directly associated with the trade union activity, other examples of ‘workplace 
collectivism’ were also noted. Defined as ‘willingness on the part of employees to provide 
support for each other in the workplace around work or non-work issues’ (ibid: 6.9) workplace 
collectivism in the companies studied had many facets. A strong sense of ‘togetherness’ was 
manifested in many interviews and also on the internet discussion boards. There was far more 
co-operation than there was competition and peer supervision between the employees, this was 
manifest in covering work and not reporting acts of sabotage. For instance, when someone was 
struggling to meet the required rate of output it was usual that the next person on the assembly 
line would help. Management was unaware of this practice. Acts of sabotage on the assembly 
line were never reported as non-accidental by the engineers’ team who had to repair it, despite 
them knowing that deliberate damage had been caused by the assemblers. Everyone knew 
about the warehouse workers’ ‘careless handling’ manner, yet none of the workers had reported 
it – moreover, with frustration caused by low wages and unfulfilled promises of an annual 
bonus, it was considered ‘revenge’ on the company. These ‘individual’ acts of resistance - like 
sabotage - when present, were not seen as a crime against company property and hence were 
not reported to the management. They were tacitly supported by other workers who showed 
‘understanding’ of such actions; even if they would not for personal moral, or other (fear of 
losing job) reasons have committed such acts themselves.  
There were cases when groups of workers were uniting and acting together. For example, when 
a whole team of engineers threatened to jointly hand in their notice, management acceded to 
their demands. Another example was when an entire team collectively called in sick on the day 
before the Easter holiday break because the workers’ holiday requests had been refused. At the 
same time management who attempted to counter collectivist initiatives were often 
unsuccessful. There was a reluctance to implement the kaizen initiative, workers’ councils 
meetings were not attended and the company-sponsored social events outside working time 
were never attended. 
Internet discussion boards are a further example of collectivism, in both the workplace and 
everyday life. Despite the relatively short time of operation, many of Crystal Park workers 
became friends. The company commuting scheme and car sharing may have contributed 
greatly to these relationships. Company-financed transportation was a good platform for what 
Stephenson and Stewart (2001) term the 'social collectivism of everyday life'. Sharing a ride 
home on a bus full of fellow workers, not only allowed integrating better as colleagues, but 
also created many friendships. Before the company provided the transportation, workers 
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organised car share, as commuting to work individually was too expensive (in Poland the price 
of petrol is considerably high in relation to real wages, especially for those on minimum wage). 
Many interviewed workers stressed that if they were not sharing the cost of transport before 
the company introduced the bus scheme, they would not have been able to afford to commute 
to work at all. Some of the co-workers knew each other or were even friends for several years, 
as for many workers coming from the communities with high unemployment Crystal Park was 
often the only available option of employment. One of the interviewees joked that in her block 
of flats every floor had someone working for Japanese companies in Crystal Park. 
The working conditions, and exhausting rhythm of work at the assembly line, but also the 
precarious character of employment in Crystal Park met workers’ resistance. Workers 
responded to harsh conditions and management control with both individual and collective 
resistance. As it was pointed out previously, the limited union activity and low unionisation 
rate does not prove the absence of workers’ collectivism. Therefore, these forms of workers 
resistance not directly connected to trade union agency are not necessarily individual as such 
– in fact they are (in Marxist understanding) collective. New workers’ initiatives emerged, both 
online and in the workplaces. Crystal Park’s trade union activity can serve as an example of 
being relatively short in operation, but attracting young workers, who do not associate with the 
old Solidarność and its wider political agenda, but recognise the need of trade unionism in the 
workplace. Their involvement in the real problems of workers’ at workplace level was stressed 
during the interviews. This thesis augments critical discourses and voices the experience of 
workers, particularly in the context of the intense sectoral competition that has led to extreme 
flexibility and precarious employment.  
Although Solidarność could not prevent the massive layoffs they made a contribution to 
rebuilding workers’ confidence and consciousness and demonstrated that it was possible to 
organize in the private sector. For the large part, resistance had a more disorganized character 
as workers developed other forms of struggle, ranging from ‘classical’ sabotage (destroying 
machinery, and finished goods), through absenteeism, to online workers’ discussion boards. 
Faced with flexibility and precarity workers partially deprived of a ‘common voice and shared 
knowledge’ (Mrozowicki and Maciejewska, 2013) found a platform to express their ‘voices’ 
and share their ‘knowledge’ online. Crystal Park showed a mixture of traditional (sabotage) 
and new forms (online blogs) of workers resistance. Noticeably the Japanese methods of 
production were also largely opposed at the managerial level. In some cases Polish managers 
were left to their own devices by Japanese headquarters in maintaining the Polish operation 
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and there was no attempt to implement Japanese methods.  In companies where the methods 
were directly imposed by the Japanese HQ (for example a monthly rate of kaizens), Polish 
managers deliberately delayed or introduced ‘polonized’ versions of Japanese methods.   
Therefore this study suggests that labour processes in Poland have not resulted in increased 
individualization and that workers’ resistance shows a collectivist dimension that has been 
present to varying degrees since before the Second World War. This is discussed more 
extensively in the next section. 
 
8.3.3 Reflecting on workers’ resistance in Poland  
 
In Poland, transformation shaped by the neoliberal doctrine created a platform for a mass 
appeal to individualism. Suddenly collectivism (along with ‘communal’ and ‘co-operative’) 
acquired a somewhat pejorative meaning, and was mainly associated with the communist 
regime. Notwithstanding these attitudes, collectivist forms of workers’ organization are still 
strongly embedded in the Polish workplaces. Moreover, while collectivism is generally 
considered to be a feature of the communist era, its roots lie much deeper into Polish history.  
The Polish workplace is influenced by latifundium-like culture (Hryniewicz, 2007); originated 
in the 16th century folwark (agricultural enterprise based on extensive farming and serfdom of 
peasants) – where feudal workplace relations were characterized by an autocratic and 
paternalistic style of management. This was to some extent carried on through the communist 
era, where the relationship between managers and workers in the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) had feudal characteristics. This unique relationship was marked by the unhindered role 
of the overlord (manager). At the same time, as Hryniewicz argues, the peasants (workers) 
applied dual ethics: they demonstrated fairness towards their own group, while the acts of 
sabotage or stealing directed at the lord (management) were fully accepted, both in the feudal 
times and during the communist era.  
More importantly, the post-war history of the labour movement in Poland starkly demonstrated 
that workers responded collectively to the oppressive communist regime, not only rebelling 
and striking (Poznań 1956, Gdańsk 1970 and Radom 1976) but also organizing themselves at 
the factory’s level.  Hardy and Rainnie (1996) pointed out that during the communist era the 
workers expressed various levels of self-management in the form of workers’ councils from 
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1956 and the workers’ commissions from the 1970s (ibid: 73). Even though the independence 
of the councils was limited by the ‘superiority of the party’, the explosion of Solidarność in 
1980-1981 brought a truly ‘self-governing’ movement attracting ten million members. 
Moreover, in a broader sense, reaching out to the factory level, Solidarność symbolically 
established the collective identities; Us (the Polish nation) versus Them (the system, the 
regime) (Bakuniak and Nowak, 1987).  The sense of collective belonging among workers in 
Poland was not fully undermined by the management’s individualization strategies 
accompanied by the arrival of  HRM at the beginning of the 1990s. Recent research shows that 
individualism is not fully accepted in the workplace and the collectivistic tendencies are more 
prevalent in Polish organisational culture. There is generally a low acceptance of individual 
competition amongst workers and a high regard for the team effort (Czarzasty, 2009: 412). The 
research conducted in the years 1999-2000 by Gardawski (see Gardawski, 2009) shows that 
Polish workers’ attitudes towards the market economy and the post-transformational workplace 
were predominantly of a collectivistic nature. Yet contradictory consciousness exists among 
Polish workers as elements of individualist mentality are also present. Therefore the received 
ideas, which are represented by a dominance of ‘hyper-individualism’ (Szahaj, 2015), are 
contradictory to the ideas derived from the experience of the workplace (sense of collective 
action and belonging). 
This study is in line with Martinez Lucio and Stewart (1997). Despite a low unionisation rate 
among the workers of the researched plants, the nature of workers’ resistance can be described 
as collectivistic. 
 
8.4 The Varieties of Capitalism framework 
 
8.4.1 Poland’s peripheral capitalism 
 
The ideal types of Liberal Market Economy (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME) 
identified by Hall and Soskice (2001) did not embrace the post-socialist economies. Therefore 
scholars have been trying to distinguish the specificity of Central and Eastern European variety 
of capitalism using the framework posited by Hall and Soskice. This task posed a theoretical 
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challenge, as LME and CME were specifically designed for the developed OECD economies. 
Taxonomising a unified type for the whole group of Eastern European Countries, which 
substantially differ in terms of development of capitalist institutions (see Buchen, 2007) has 
proved challenging. Acknowledging Hall and Soskice’s framework, some authors pointed out 
that Eastern Europeans countries represent a hybrid between LME and CME. Others (Nölke 
and Vliegenthart, 2009) have established a separate variety; DME (Dependant Market 
Economy) - signifying the importance of the foreign investors in the economic development of 
Eastern Europe. Placing the Polish variety of capitalism in this paradigm poses a conceptual 
challenge (as outlined in Chapter 3). For some, Poland’s type of capitalism represents a hybrid 
– Mixed Market Economy (MME), others recognize the significant role of the foreign sector 
(Jasiecki, 2013), where the multinational companies gained a ‘systemic power’ (in Poland and 
other Visegrád economies) (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007b). 
The difference of emphasis concerning the various characteristic elements either of the LME 
or CME or emphasis on the key role of foreign investors, however, overlook the agency of 
workers. Labour is analysed predominantly through the lens of the strength of the trade unions. 
This is not surprising as the conceptual framework proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001) 
significantly downplays the role of labour, putting the firm at the centre of analysis.  
This research showed that the ‘Japanese’ national institutional context is far less important than 
the specific economic context and competitive conditions. Therefore, sector-specific 
characteristics will significantly influence the mode of transfer and inform the behaviour of the 
JFDI.  
The Polish variety of capitalism, however, has influenced the scale and mode of Japanese 
Foreign Investment. The investor took advantage of certain features of Polish National 
Business System (NBS) and the specific labour market situation. With a labour force profile 
that appeared to be almost ‘tailored’ to the needs of the investor; the choice of location with 
high long-term unemployment and job insecurity promised ‘an ideal employee’ – low skilled, 
compliant and prepared to work for low pay. In industrial relations, the Polish variety of 
capitalism can be characterised by weak indigenous capital, low-quality public institutions, the 
marginalisation of workers’ representation and a low standard of working conditions (Jasiecki, 
2013). Polish capitalism is still transforming and in this respect it is an institutional melting 
pot, rather than a perfect model of a particular VoC. Polish capitalism is shaped by a variety of 
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influences and in this mosaic of embedded influences Japanese investment is just one 
component among others: American, German, British or French. 
Poland attracts a significant volume of investment. However, bearing in mind the size of the 
economy, in terms of FDI profile, Poland is left on the periphery of Europe and even other 
Visegrád countries. Unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary where most of the high-
tech automotive investors migrated, Poland receives predominantly labour intensive and low-
profile investment; being rather a supplier of automotive components than a manufacturer of 
cars and named an ‘LCD country’, referring to assembling of LCD screens (Wojtala, 2012). 
Japanese investment in Crystal Park mirrors the general trend of investment in Poland. 
Post-1989 Polish governments and business have a very positive view of Japanese investors 
who are seen as an exemplar of success with their Foreign Direct Investment embodying 
cutting edge technology. Moreover, as far as nationalistic and historical discourse is concerned,  
the Japanese are viewed as benevolent, in contrast to ‘suspicious’ German investors who are 
one of the major sources of inward investment in Poland. Therefore the rhetoric of ‘textbook’ 
Japanisation portraying Japanese investment as stable, long term and bringing inevitable 
diffusion of high-tech.  
However, if Japanisation is defined only as a transfer of technology, stable employment and 
long term investment, the Polish case of Crystal Park that is the focus of this study embodies 
the antithesis of Japanisation – reflected in the limited transfer of technology and the short- 
term nature of investment characterized by precarious employment. 
 
8.4.2 A match made in heaven - Japanese maquiladora and Polish model of capitalism 
 
Over the last twenty years the Japanese economic system has undergone substantial change; 
with the erosion of traditional institutions such as life-time employment and a seniority based 
system (Watanabe, 2000). Therefore, it could be argued that the distinct features of Japan’s 
classical model of Coordinated Market Economy (CME) have diminished under the pressure 
of competition and convergence with LME systems. During this time, a substantial part of JFDI 
has gone to core LME systems – United Kingdom and USA. As previously mentioned, 
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agreeing on one particular model of classification is, in the case of Poland, difficult. Post-
transformational Polish economy, with policies of deregulation and privatisation and a 
contracting welfare state, is leaning towards the LME countries; however, it also shows features 
of DME with its dependence on FDI. Moreover, some authors argue, that - twenty five years 
into capitalism - Poland is exhibiting the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon variety (Szahaj, 
2015). Therefore comparatively, Poland was not terra incognita for Japanese investors.  
Japanese investment in Crystal Park broadly conforms to the feature of Dependant Market 
Economy (DME) with the dominant economic and political role multinationals play in a 
country’s development. The biggest investor, Sharp and its co-operators took advantage of the 
favourable government policy towards foreign investors (Special Economic Zones, direct 
subsidies, tax breaks), and flexible forms of employment (‘junk contracts’). The Japanese chose 
the peripheral site in the North-East Poland, which mirrors the pattern of Japanese investment 
in Western Europe and the USA. Although the timescale was not planned, Japanese investment 
in Crystal Park has proved to be very short-lived. The global downward trend in demand for 
electronics undermined Crystal Park’s prospects as only one third of the site was utilized. 
Poland is an attractive location for electronics manufacturing industry globally. Firms not only 
from Japan, but also South Korea, the Netherlands and China invest here, with producers 
scattered all over the Poland’s Special Economic Zones, and beyond. Just 120 kilometres East 
of Toruń, in Mława, LG Electronics located one of its biggest factories in Europe. The business 
relationship between the cluster’s companies very quickly became ‘relaxed’, as companies 
started looking for external partnerships, but not necessarily with other Japanese companies.  
Crystal Park did not offer high-tech investment or local linkages as the site was comprised of 
assembly lines where components were delivered directly from East Asia. Although these 
Japanese multinationals in Crystal Park were beneficiaries of the Pomeranian Special 
Economic Zone in terms of tax breaks and direct subsidies for several years, the investors did 
not fulfil the conditions regarding employment. Instead of the agreed 10,000 workers the site 
only employed 5,000 workers at the site, and government aid has been discontinued. After four 
years 2007-2011, the site has been downsizing. Some of the companies were taken over by 
Polish and Slovakian capital; while others moved to more attractive locations in Poland (for 
example Sumika relocated some of its production to Kobierzyce near Wrocław, part of 
Tarnobrzeg Special Economic Zone). Predominantly, the electronics industry is more footloose 
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than automotives and the existence of Poland’s SEZs enable inter-regional competition and 
encourage this ‘capital flight’ strategy.  
Regardless of the global downturn in the electronics industry, Crystal Park did not provide 
high-skilled jobs as was enthusiastically announced in 2006. Although Crystal Park became a 
‘retreat’ for many unemployed graduates from the local University, the majority of jobs were 
filled by low-skilled labour. The Japanese corporations reduced unemployment in the region, 
however this decrease was very brief and the Kujawy-Pomerania Province continues to suffer 
from unemployment above the national average. 
Japanese companies extensively used employment agencies. In contrast to the classical 
Japanese cluster, the core investors in Crystal Park were dependant on agency workers from 
the start, while some of the smaller, peripheral companies maintained relatively stable and 
long-term employment. During intensive periods of production, temporary workers constituted 
more than half of the Crystal Park’s workforce. The recession was used to further ‘justify’ an 
extremely flexible form of recruitment, flat wages and workers’ insecurity. This is in line with 
the findings of other scholars who found that similar policies were adopted by other foreign 
electronics corporations in Poland (Joniewicz and Szyniszewska, 2013; Mrozowicki and 
Maciejewska, 2013). Workers were employed on very short-term contacts (two weeks or one 
month). This precarious character of employment has impinged on workplace relations and 
diminished the extent of transfer of Japanese management practices.  
This study shows that Polish capitalism represents a case of a foreign-led economy, where 
multinational corporations obtained substantial bargaining power, through the macroeconomic 
context and weak public institutions. Vidal and Hauptmeier (2014: 2) suggested that 
‘comparative political economy has focused on institutional difference to the neglect of 
systemic capitalist processes, and on macro- and meso-level institutions to the neglect of the 
micro level, including labour process dynamics’. Similarly much of the Polish critical studies 
of transformation focused on institutional aspects of capitalism. In the context of comparative 
capitalism literature little or no attention was paid to workers’ resistance (Szahaj, 2015; 
Jasiecki, 2013; Tittenbrun, 2007). The narrow understanding of resistance – as limited to mere 
trade unionism and industrial actions – has led to a disregard of alternative forms of resistance 
outside these structural forms. Moreover, some authors claimed that the small scale of 
industrial disputes indicated that relations between managers and employees in Poland were of 
a non-confrontational character (Mykhenko, 2007). The authors designing the Variety of 
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Capitalism framework; either for developed economies (LME and CME), or for post-socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), assumed that workers were passive actors, 
unable to oppose capital. This thesis showed that at the company level, capital is resisted by 
workers, even if they are non-unionized and that workers’ collectivism is a basis for this 
resistance. 
As outlined in the Chapter Three the Variety of Capitalism framework places the firm in the 
centre of the socioeconomic arena. In the VoC framework industrial relations are considered 
to be one of the more important spheres of co-ordination the firm must address. However, the 
VoC’s view of the industrial relations is formalistic. This study argues that in industrial 
relations and labour process analysis, the VoC perspective needs to broaden to take account of 
workers’ agency and the institutional and economic specificities of the national capitalism 
shape industrial relations. In the case of the case study Japanese plants, the characteristics of 
Polish capitalism, to some extent, influence the labour process. Regardless of ‘nationality’– in 
the case of this study – Japanese, capital faces the same problems in terms of accumulation and 
valorisation pressures. However the particular characteristics of the national economy may 
equip capital with better tools for extracting the surplus value from workers and maintain 
profits under market competition. In the particular case of Crystal Park, the Polish variety of 
capitalism allowed Japanese investors to take advantage of macroeconomic aspects of the host 
country economy. High unemployment, an unstable job market and, as a consequence, high 
job insecurity, along with growing flexibilisation of employment (for example ‘junk contracts’) 
informed the behaviour of investors in terms of recruitment and hiring and firing policy. 
Additionally, the specificities of the electronics sector, a high level of competitiveness and 
footloose industry contributed to the workers’ exploitation and sense of insecurity. 
 
8.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research  
 
In terms of the focus of the study, Crystal Park, the cluster of Japanese electronics corporations, 
constitutes a sample of Japanese investment in Poland, which represents only one industry. 
Early studies (Kenney and Florida, 1995) have shown that typical Japanese practices are more 
prevalent in the automobile industry. Similar research in the Japanese car industry in Poland, 
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which investigates the transferability of Japanese methods would enrich the debate on the 
transfer of Japanese methods of production and management in Poland. As was stressed earlier 
Japanese investment in Poland was predominantly investigated from the management point of 
view. Therefore the research on the labour process in Japanese automotive plants would 
contribute to a better understanding of the JFDI in Poland 
Further research might be undertaken in the ‘post-Japanese’ factories of Crystal Park. The 
largest Japanese manufacturers were taken over by Slovakian and Polish corporations and 
potentially different management methods pose the question as to whether the same 
employment relations remain at the site.  
This thesis argues that research into new industrial relations in Poland should be less formalistic 
to reflect that non-trade union resistance is present in Polish workplaces and represented by a 
variety of forms. More specifically, the emergence of the numerous online discussion boards 
signifies a new trend in workers’ collective action. New forms of resistance can be found 
outside the formal trade union movement. These alternative forms of resistance could be 
examined, not only in the foreign owned, but also indigenous companies, in order to broaden 
and widen the debate on the nature of the resistance at the Polish workplace. 
 
8.6 Contribution to knowledge 
 
The Japanisation phenomenon in Poland has been mostly analysed from a managerial 
perspective, focused predominantly on model-based applications of ultra-efficient Japanese 
methods. The contribution of this study is first to challenge the notion of a simple transfer of 
management practises and secondly, to reassert the way workplaces are terrains  are contested 
in a variety of individual and collective ways. Therefore the findings of this thesis are in line 
with Stewart (1996: 16), who urged for going ‘beyond the consensus’ and recognize the 
importance of conflict and struggle within the Japanese employment relationship. The ultimate 
goal of Japanese investors (as in the case of any other capital) is to utilize an inexpensive 
workforce, not the transfer of exemplary management.  
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In line with other authors (Meardi, 2007; Hardy and Kozek, 2011) this research demonstrates 
that capital-labour conflict has not disappeared in Poland and workers can still resist capital, 
albeit through unconventional methods. In Poland, a new neoliberal discourse was dominant 
from the beginning of its transformation. This promoted the myth of the self-made man, and a 
belief that democracy and capitalism guarantees success and that anything is possible if only 
people work hard enough. Until recently there was little criticism of such notions. This made-
to-measure worker, perhaps in some ways close to a ‘designer employee’ concept (see Casey, 
1996), was purported to come with an instilled set of attitudes, which were not critical and were 
reluctant towards the idea of trade unionism. The crisis, growing austerity, flexibility, and the 
precarious character of employment, have brought critical approaches back to public discourse 
and into this thesis. New initiatives by workers are evident, both online and at the workplace 
level. Internet initiatives are particularly important as they signal the emergence of a new 
dimension and dynamic in workers’ resistance. There is a strong sense of collective identity in 
the content of the analysed discussion boards. A group of contributing workers, who share and 
relate to their common experience, develop bonds and collective understandings which survive 
outside the virtual world.  
Crystal Park serves as an example of a relatively short operation that attracted young workers, 
who did not associate with the old Solidarność and its wider political agenda, but recognised 
the need of trade unionism in the workplace to address the real problems experienced by 
workers. This thesis augments critical discourses and voices about the experience of workers, 
particularly in the context of the intense competition that has led to flexibility and precarious 
employment.  
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Appendix 1. Exemplary kaizen form (left) and simplified kaizen form at Ekitai (right) 
 
Kaizen Report Report №  
Date of 
submission: 
 
Originator:  
 
Team:  
Team Leader:  
Initiative Start 
Date: 
 
Completion Date:  
Description of Kaizen proposal 
 
Situation prior the proposal 
Analysis of changes 
implemented 
Outcomes (after 
implemented) 
   
Indicate the waste minimisation 
 
Measurable effects Comments 
 
 Immeasurable effects 
 
Line manager comments Quality control coordinator comments 
  
                                                            SUBMISSION FORM 
                                                    Workers’ Ideas - Kaizen 
 
Employee’s Name: ...................................................................................................................... 
Department: ............................................................................................................................. ... 
Date submitted: .......................................................................................................................... 
(Date the form was put in the box) 
  
PROBLEM: ............................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
SOLUTION: ............................................................................................................................. 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
Please enter YES if you wish to implement your idea yourself 
EKITAI  
Section to be completed by PPK Board 
Coordinator  .................................................................... 
(Member of the PPK Board responsible for the implementation of the innovation) 
Implementation date ............................................................. 
                                   INCENTIVE AWARDED     
..................................................../.........................................../....................................................................................... 
                        Date         Amount Paid                                 to be signed by PPK Board Chairman 
Savings achieved upon the implementation of the idea .......................................................... 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
Idea nr  
............../.............../............. 
xx 
 
Appendix 2. Survey conducted by National Labour Inspectorate in Toruń, Kessho 
plant, Procurement Department (2010) 
In the past 12 months, have you been subject to any of the following practices? 
№ Form of unfair treatment YES NO 
1. Your right to speak your mind limited 10 4 
2. Impossible for you  to speak out 11 3 
3. You have been shouted or scolded at for any work related comments, remarks or  problems brought up 13 1 
4. Your work being criticised 13 1 
5. You have experienced importunate phone calls 8 6 
6. Threat or menace in writing 4 10 
7. Humiliation through gestures 7 7 
8. You feel you have been (impersonally) alluded to in a degrading or humiliating manner 11 3 
9. You have been avoided 10 4 
10. Your post have been isolated or distanced from other workers 4 10 
11. Your co-workers have been prohibited from contacting you 2 12 
12. Being cut dead 11 3 
13. Being backbitten 11 3 
14. Someone spreading rumours and gossiping about you 7 7 
15. Being ridiculed 11 3 
16. Suggestions that you are mentally ill 5 9 
17. Derision of your disability 1 13 
18. Your carriage (ex. the way you walk) being impersonated 2 12 
19. Your political views or religious beliefs being attacked 0 14 
20. Mocking your nationality 0 14 
21. Underestimation of your commitment at work 12 2 
22. Your decisions being disputed/impugned 14 0 
23. Being addressed with a nickname/s (against your will); name calling 2 12 
24. Sexual advances/proposals at workplace 0 14 
25. Not being assigned any tasks 2 12 
26. Tasks you have been assigned or already working on  - revoked or given to someone else 4 10 
27. Giving you pointless tasks 14 0 
28. Excessive work being assigned 14 0 
29. Being delegated demeaning  or belittling tasks 2 12 
30. Being delegated tasks that could endanger or cause harm to your health 1 13 
31. Threats of physical violence 0 14 
32. Physical abuse 0 14 
33. Emotional abuse 11 3 
34. Sexual abuse 0 14 
35. Within the past 12 months have you experienced any other form of  destructive behaviour or unfair treatment 8 6 
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Appendix 2. Continued  
36. What is the nature of the practices mentioned above (№ 1-35) 
overt 8  
covert 4  
37. How long has it been taking place: 
a) No longer than 1 month 0  
b) Between 1 to 2 months 1  
c) Between 2 to 6 months 1  
d) 6 months up to a year 0  
e) Over 1.5 years 2  
f) Between 1.5 to 2 years 3  
g) 2 years and longer 6  
38. Was the person responsible: 
a) Your line manager 10  
b) Another manager 6  
c) A colleague 6  
d) Your subordinate 0  
39. How many people have you experienced malpractice from? 
a) One person 10  
b) Many people acting independently 1  
c) A group of people acting together 2  
d) other 1  
40. Has this person/Have these persons acted the same way towards any other employees? 14 0 
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Appendix 3. Summer 2011; Bydgoszcz;  Multi-branch Solidarity protest; joint unions protesting against the proposed changes to  retirement 
age; at the front  - Members of Kessho Ostaszewo branch of Solidarity holding their banner.  Source: Author
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Appendix 4. The photocopy of the original discussion board post 
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Appendix 5. Interviews questions 
  
Management 
-How the company was set up? Why this particular location was chosen. What were the 
factors which influenced investment decision? 
-Do you have a strong link with Japanese HQ? What is the extent to which company use 
Japanese expatriate managers? 
-Have you found any differences between Polish owned company and Japanese one in the 
terms of work organization and practices? What are the differences between Polish-owned (or 
western) and Japanese-owned workplace? 
-How do you recruit workers?  How important is the employee retention? How significant is 
the role of the employment agency in recruiting process? 
-What is the shopfloor worker profile in terms of age, gender, skills? 
-Does the company have seniority policy? How significant/serious is the rotation of the new 
employees? 
-Does the new employee induction program exist? How does it look like? 
-What attitudes do you want to see in workers? What do you value the most? 
-How do you manage performance of the workers? 
-Does the company apply bonus schemes? Are there any non-financial incentives? 
-To what extent Japanese production methods are being implemented at your company? 
-Do the quality circles exist? 
-How important is the quality policies in your company? In what way quality control is 
exercised? 
-How successful is kaizen initiative in your company? 
-How do you find typical Japanese methods of production and management? 
-How do the employees find typical Japanese management and production methods? 
-Does the trade union function at the site? How would you describe relations with trade 
unions? 
-Does the company have its own social policy? How does it look like? 
  
xxv 
 
                   
 
 Workers 
-How long have you been working for the company? Why did you apply? How would you 
describe the labour market situation in Toruń? 
-Is it your first job after graduation? What is your education history? 
-What position do you occupy? 
-Is the promotion involved? 
-Were you employed directly by the company, or by employment agency? 
-Have you found any differences between Polish-owned and Japanese-owned company in 
terms of work organization? 
-How many hours do you work weekly? 
  
-Is the overtime common? 
-Are required to be multiskilled? 
-How often trainings for workers are organized? 
-How much pressure do you feel from managers and supervisors? 
-How much pressure do you feel from workmates and colleagues? 
-How much pressure do you feel from the sheer quantity of work? 
-How much pressure do you feel from quality assurance policies? 
-What is your response towards involvement programs? 
-Have you experienced an increase in the speed of work? 
-How does the pay system look? 
-How does company welfarism look like? 
-Are you are trade union member? 
-How do you perceive trade union?       
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Appendix 6. The interview conducted on 21st November 2011 with Kessho General 
Manager (KGM) 
 
MB: So the factory was set up here in 2006? 
KGM (Witalis Korecki): Yes, that’s right; in April 2006. First local workers, Polish managers, were employed 
in June 2006, I joined in August. 
MB: And your private recognition, why Toruń? What influenced the investment decision? 
KGM: There were many factors. Most of all it’s down to the provice, local government’s activity. 
MB: Their endeavours? 
KGM: They put a lot of effort in it which effected in the decision that the investment will be here.    
[.......] 
KGM: Another problem is availability of the workforce. We can swear that Japanese are transferring the 
technology but they are doing it to a very limited extent. The truth is that the technology and a whole 'know how' 
stays in Japan, as 'the new' is being invented there. 
MB: And you do not have the R&D centre here, do you? There is one in Oxford, isn’t it? 
KGM: The quintessence of the factory's being established here is cheap manufacturing of the products that we 
can, by competing, sell in the region. So availability of the work force is a key factor to us. 
MB: And the quality of a workforce here in the region?  
KGM: Well, it varies. The old Polish proverb says: "Jaka płaca taka praca" (You get what, you pay for)* - which 
proves to be true here, to some extent only, of course. We are all aware that it's not just the pay that determines 
the quality of work performed. There are many factors. The process set-up, supervision, quality control. There are 
many more. At the beginning we had quite a lot of different problems. Mainly caused by inexperience, workers 
unfamiliarity with a certain regime of work.  
MB: Do you mean Japanese regime of work, which was unknown in Poland? 
KGM: I do not really think that it's about the Japanese, Chinese or Suisse regime. There was a regime and this 
was the problem. Suddenly t turned out that there is a need of working within the 'from - to' frame and that the 
workers cannot themselves decide where they are at the certain times. For example: I suddenly wish to have a 
cigarette so I go and have a smoke, I wish to have a little break, walk around in the factory - I do so. Why it was 
a problem, is the question. Up until that time these people worked for less demanding employers, mainly illegally, 
so when they gave those jobs up - they weren't losing a lot. Or they worked in agriculture - when someone wants 
a break on the field - they just take it. And suddenly it turned out that one has to arrive at the specific tine, at 
specific time one has to appear at their work post, there is a specific dress code, an obligation to wear working 
clothing. Even now it still happens that I spot the worker without the protective clothing on the shop floor. When 
I ask why they are not wearing their overalls I hear: "I washed it, forgot, forgot to bring it etc." Many different 
stories. We had to introduce the rules for smokers, too. There's been a huge protest over it and a lot of problems. 
MB: So smoking is allowed only during the main break. No 5-minutes smoking breaks in between? 
KGM: No, mainly because 5 minutes break on the production line is virtually impossible - no one would manage 
to go for 5 minutes on the dot, as the distances are simply too long. So to make it possible we would have to 
facilitate at least 15 minutes. It is not a rocket science to see what impact it would have on the production line. 
xxvii 
 
                   
 
Using the calculator we can easily see the line's efficiency fluctuation. Let's assume that we produce 1000 tellies 
per shift. Subtracting the half an hour daily breaks - we get 7and 1/2 hours.  
MB: It affects in the number of produced television sets. 
KGM: Precisely! It turns out we would be producing few television sets less. In this case it would be  Quick 
calculation – 7 and1/2 - 0.45 telly per minute - so 15 minutes - less 7 tellies, multiplying by number of shifts, 
days, months - makes it quite a substantial profit loss annually.  
MB: Would you blame this mentality, this work approach on the communist system? Would you say we still aren’t 
transformed work wise? 
KGM: No, I don’t think so. This is ‘Polish’ mentality rather than communist one. Of course, somewhere deep – 
the old rule must have had some influence. Not to mention this 70-ies expression “Czy się stoi, czy się leży” 
(Engl: "Whether you stand or whether you lay, you are entitled to a thousand quit pay!" – Pol. ‘Czy się stoi czy 
się leży, 1000 zł się należy’), but I wouldn’t say it has such a significant importance in this case. I am convinced 
that people just weren’t used to so much discipline in the workplace, weren’t familiar with the character of this 
particular industry. 
MB: Do you have many people working for you, who were unemployed for a long time? Does it reflect on their 
performance, attitude? 
 KGM: Yes, we do have quite a few people like that. However it is difficult for me to say whether it has any 
impact on their work. We haven’t done any research regarding this matter so far. Of course we have examined 
employee’s profile. Our employees are women mainly. Average age is 37 years old. Many of them had a long 
break in their employment or it was their first job. 
MB: And of course we have in mind the whole region. You have employees from Grudziądz and other 
neighbouring towns and villages. 
KGM: Yes, that’s correct. We have employees within the 50 miles radius.    
MB: Do you organize the transport for you workers? You co fund the transport as well, don’t you? To what extent 
do you fund it? 
KGM: Yes, we do. The workers pay some nominal part of it.  
MB: How does it work? Is it deducted from their salary? 
KGM: No, they pay the bus driver direct. This is the carrier’s system and there is no point to discuss it.  
MB: What is the workers attitude towards this transport? 
KGM: They treat it normal, as a necessity. They have a matter of course attitude towards it. They are aware that 
if they had to commute themselves and at their own expense it would be very costly, around ten times more. So 
we think they are quite happy we provide the transport. We put the ticket price up at the beginning of last year, 
and quite surprisingly, there was no reaction, no negative response for the first time in four years. Everyone was 
very understanding. 
MB: However it is very strange there is no bus stop here. No public transport to the plant. 
KGM: (laughs) I can tell you, we had such a ‘hullabaloo’ with the bus stop here. 
MB: What do you mean? The local authorities? 
KGM: Well, the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways is who I have in mind. 
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MB: And they wouldn’t approve of it? 
KGM: No, they haven’t agreed for some odd procedural reason. Distance between the bus stops or the bus stop 
and the nearest junction is regulated and we do not qualify. 
MB: So it doesn’t matter that the plant is here and 5 thousands of people working ... 
KGM: No, they don’t care about it. They only care about their regulations ... 
MB: I expect it is of significant importance to the companies here. You - firms have to cover the transport costs. 
You would prefer if people commuted themselves, I could imagine. 
KGM: We spend huge amounts of money for this. 
MB: Does it have any advantages at all? You have disciplined workers who are always at work on time. Does it 
have any logistic significance? 
KGM: Yes, to some extent, it helps. In a way – we control the traffic here, meaning, the buses are leaving the 
factory at certain times. What is the time now? Five to two? In a moment, in about twenty minutes the morning 
shift finishes and the afternoon shift arrives, and you are going to see all the buses leaving the Crystal Park. By 
providing our own transport for workers living far from the factory we give the people assurance that they will 
reach their destinations in more or less reasonable time. Besides, having this facility is very favourable recruitment 
wise. It narrows down the places where we are looking for workforce to the ones the carrier serves. 
MB: Thank you. Let’s get back to typically Japanese aspects, now. 
KGM: Pleasure. Shoot. 
MB: I would like to ask about the ‘visual’ side of being Japanese company. I mean “5 S”, for example. Do you 
have Japanese signs? Were they adapted? Do you try to introduce these practices? What is the workers approach 
towards them? 
KGM:  The “5 S” received a very warm welcome, actually. The reason being, after a few years people understood 
that keeping the workplace tidy, being systematic and safe aware pays off. There is no need to waste time to look 
for things needed, knowing where everything is and keeping it this way. So, yes, “5 S” has been very successfully 
implemented. We have also tried to introduce Kaizen activities. 
MB: And you do have competitions, as well. 
KGM: Yes, we do organise competitions of the quality circles. So yes, typical Japanese practices. However it is 
not ‘enforced’ or as widely introduced, if you wish, as in for example Toyota. They are known for their deeply 
Japanized organisational culture.  
MB: The corporate philosophy is different in Toyota and Sharp. 
KGM: Definitely. Toyota is more ‘powerful’, if you wish, in implementation of Japanese practices. It transplants 
them into the local factories.  
MB: How about Kaizen? Is there a rank and file kaizen initiative? 
KGM: No, not really. Few propositions were received, of course. However Kaizen is so popular form of gaining 
or releasing, if you like, the rationalising (as it was once called) energy, that it is used by many firms. The only 
problem is of nomenclatural nature – whether we call it Kaizen or rationalisation. Do excuse me, please. 
(Answering personal phone call). So, I was talking about .... 
MB: The Kaizen 
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KGM: Thank you, yes, and that the rank- and-file initiative sometimes appears as the workers try to improve their 
workplace. We had our own kaizen programme at the beginning but it wasn’t caught on, we had to make some 
changes, currently we are about to reintroduce it. We will have to wait for the results and see. 
MB: Is there a system of financial incentives? 
KGM: Yes, there will be. This time we are planning to introduce something similar to reward points system. We 
are going to encourage our employees to collect the points which can then be exchanged to certain catalogue 
prizes.   
MB: I would like to ask about the training now. 
KGM: (laughs). Regarding the training we have got a different, more, fundamentally different attitude to the 
Japanese. I will give you an example. On one occasion the Japanese finance director who used to work here some 
time ago, and who had joined the company when in his twenties, just after the graduation – please note, that when 
he worked with us he was in his late forties, close to 50; so he’s been with the company for over twenty years - 
on one occasion he said, he was proud he hasn’t undergone a single training for all those years. He thought it was 
great that everything he’s learnt, he’s learnt on the job. He has prided himself on this very reason. Here, all the 
time OJT – so on the job training – is the principle. Therefore everything the employees ought to know, they 
should get to know through their supervisors. The supervisors should ‘enlighten’, if you like, their subordinate 
workers with knowledge in order to pursue their occupational growth. This should allow them reach the heights 
of perfection, leading to the mastery of their job skills. This is Japanese approach and it took us ages to convince 
the Japanese that this is not the method accepted in Poland, in our culture. 
MB: In European culture ... 
KGM: Totally different approach. However one step at a time, slowly we managed to change their attitude. We 
never had any problems with so called ‘hard skills trainings’ – so if the tax rules were changing there was no 
problem with sending our accountant for professional training, obviously. But the language courses, soft skills 
training, managerial competence training, it took us a long time to convince the Japanese to agree for that. 
Regarding the language training  ... 
MB: Do you mean Japanese or English? 
KGM: To be honest, we have never managed to convince the board of directors about the necessity of language 
trainings, any language, really. What’s strange, as the Japanese do not speak English very well, their English is 
rather poor. But we have never succeeded in this particular field. They, of course, do accept professional training 
and can help in its accomplishment if it’s paid by the trainee personally, as it is regarded to be worker’s individual 
development. I progress and gain the knowledge which could be used elsewhere, so why should the company be 
obliged to pay for it?   
MB: What is the crew’s view on the Japanese approach to training? Weren’t employees interested in training? 
KGM: It’s obvious that the employees want to learn and develop new skills and we appreciate that. So the exact 
‘transplantation’ of Japanese ‘no training but OJT’ approach was not quite as successful as it would seem to be. I 
see many aspects of this problem. From the other hand, the very first group of managers went to Japan for three 
months in order to learn Japanese.  
MB: Just to learn the language? 
KGM: (laughs) Yes, just for that. The whole idea of it is not only absurd but also impossible to accomplish. There 
is no way someone can gain enough language proficiency to be able to use it at work in 3 months. At the same 
time – these people weren’t interested in continuing to learn Japanese – what seems illogical to me. And it’s 
difficult for me to understand the reasons behind it all. I have my private theory, which I would prefer not to 
mention.  
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MB: So Japanese was more important than English in Sharp’s case? 
KGM: I don’t really know. To be honest I wasn’t here at the beginning. I started working for this company later, 
after the group mentioned went to Japan.  
MB: Were they managers or engineers sent to Japan? 
KGM: This was a group of the managers, recruited here, within free job market who were sent to Japan in order 
to, well partly of course to familiarize themselves with the production process, the factory; in order to get to know 
the corporation and its culture; to learn the language; and then to return and implement at the plant, what they’ve 
learnt. But it didn’t work out. 
MB: So they rather can’t speak Japanese.  
KGM: Well, they have passed some exams ... 
MB: But they do not use it at work. 
KGM: No, they don’t. Besides, there aren’t many of them left here any longer. 
MB: Do ordinary shop floor workers have any contact with the Japanese? 
KGM: Yes, they do. 
MB: How does the communication process look like in these situations? If the worker doesn’t speak English, what 
then? 
KGM: Well, it depends. C’est la vie. You live in the UK – therefore you know, that sometimes it’s enough to 
know few words to communicate somehow. If everyone knows the context then obviously gestures, slang (shop 
floor expressions) will send the message. Besides there are supervisors, constant surpervision – and they can 
always help. 
MB: How about the translators? Do you use any? 
KGM: We used translators at the beginning, but this factory is more and more independent from the Japanese and 
Japanese management. 
MB: So there is a transfer of competences on to Polish managers? 
KGM: Yes, that’s right. However it is a slow process. Some would say it happens too slowly, some that it doesn’t 
seem to happen. But to give it the justice – this process has started already and the Japanese members of the Board 
of Directors, the top management are cognizant of that fact. They know it’s impossible to manage the plant with 
the Japanese staff only.   
MB: Does every Japanese manager have his Polish equivalent?  
KGM: No, we do not have such practice here.  
[...] 
MB: Would you be able to tell me something about the Unions? The trade unions, Solidarity, have been present 
here for a few years. How does the cooperation with unions look like here? How many people have joined the 
trade union? What is the percentage of unionists? It isn’t a lot, is it? 
KGM: 150 people, 150 or so. This is a good story, too, the story of these unions development at the plant. 
MB: Is it the Solidarity? 
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KGM: Yes, it is the Solidarity. Yyyyyyym (long pause) It is o.k. now. 
MB: But it wasn’t?  
KGM: It wasn’t o.k. More, it was very far from o.k. At the beginning, when the structures were being established, 
we had to deal with some representatives, active board members, whom I suspect of trying to further their own 
union career rather than bearing in mind the real purpose the union was meant to be created for. And they have 
partially achieved their goals. One of the women lost her job, as her contract simply ended and the supervisors 
did not want to extend it, which fact she had meticulously made a very good use of, causing an uproar by implying 
that her job loss was to blame on her union activity. This person supported by union’s regional board added fuel 
to the fire of our ‘bad relationship’ with ‘Solidarity’. Media are always prone to believe such stories and biased, 
as the journalist who wrote all those stories was a Solidarity member herself, so ... 
MB: Do you mean “Nowości”? 
KGM: Indeed!  So, it created a mixture of bad PR being ‘thrown’ at our factory and it has ruined our public 
image. That period – 2007-2008 – destroyed our profile. While, as I said – the person who is a union activist 
herself wrote an article about the union in our factory. It is impossible to avoid bias. There was no way the articles 
can be impartial in such case, and they weren’t. It has calmed down since. Mainly because the situation has 
stabilised, but also thanks the union leaders, who even if are ambitious to get to the higher union structures, are 
also sensible and they are sensible enough to find the balance necessary in maintaining working relationship with 
our management.  
MB: So at the beginning the union activity was treated as a springboard... 
KGM: It was just a fatuous activity of few people who suddenly decided to fight for workers rights, and while 
there is nothing wrong with doing so, and the unions are being established in various factories, the whole 
atmosphere created around this process, was then, in my opinion, intolerable. The paper was reporting some 
clandestine union activity. This can only demonstrate huge misunderstanding of the whole idea. If someone has 
to find a group of 20 potential union members and then go to the employer in order to inform the latter that the 
union is about to be established, it is obvious – that this person would keeping it quiet initially, while looking for 
the members, and only after getting a quorum necessary would go to the employer.  
MB: Going south. 
KGM: Evidently.  
[...] 
MB: I rather meant the attitude of the Japanese towards the Unions, their presence at the plant here. 
KGM: Well, there are trade unions in Japan. It’s nothing new to the Japanese. However their role is slightly 
different. Their main purpose is workers’ rights protection. Whereas they never really; well you are probably 
better informed as you research the topic; but as far as I am aware, there were no strike actions in Japan against 
the pay etc. 
MB: [....] But I’m rather asking how do Japanese treat the union’s presence here? Is it unusual to them?  
KGM: They are aware of it and have accepted union’s presence. Besides, our European HQ is in Germany where 
unions are very strong. Germans have these union councils etc. So the Japanese were familiar with it. It was 
nothing new to them. We had meetings with the unions. There were even meetings at the regional level. Our 
directors were having meetings with them. The Regional Council has organised an introductory dinner for our 
directors, as well. The Japanese didn’t treat union activity as anything strange. However the dialog with unions is 
left for the Polish part to deal with. 
 
xxxii 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
SHARP 
 
U-TEC POLAND 
YUSSEN  
(Former 
 NYK LOGISTICS & 
MEGACARRIER) 
APATOR  
(The only Polish Firm 
in the Crystal Park)  
 
 
 
KIMOTO 
 
TOKAI 
OKAYA 
 
 
TENSHO 
 
SOHBI 
 
 
ORION 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMIKA 
 
 
 
NIPPON 
EXPRESS 
 
 
 
 
NISSIN 
Appendix 7. Pomeranian Special Economic Zone; Cluster of Japanese Electronics 
Companies in Ostaszewo (2007-2012). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
